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The Labor Theory of Culture is a rigorous inquiry into the commonsense of contemporary 
cultural theory and an effort to articulate a materialist cultural theory as an alternative to the 
commonsense.  Cultural theory, I believe, in focusing on the immanence of culture separate from 
economics, has ultimately separated culture entirely from the labor relations and conflicts in 
which it is always involved.  It has become so focused on the details of culture and cultural 
difference that it cannot address cultural difference except on its own immanent terms.   It has 
therefore been increasingly unable, I suggest, to account for the new complexities of culture in 
relation to the emerging global class dynamics of the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
century.  I argue that by developing a labor theory of culture based on the texts of classical 
Marxism it becomes possible to address not only the immanent specifics of culture but culture's 
relation to its outside, which I think provides for a more comprehensive analysis of culture.  I 
realize that to argue for a labor theory of culture today is to write against the grain of cultural 
theory.  I therefore spend some time closely analyzing some of the central assumptions under 
girding "culturalism" by reading specific texts of theorists such as Georg Lukacs, Stuart Hall, 
Jacques Derrida, Slavoj Zizek, and Antonio Negri, whose work has transformed the vocabularies 
and interpretive strategies of contemporary cultural theory.  The self-situating of the labor theory 
of culture is important because almost all contemporary cultural theories regard themselves to be 
material, if not materialist. The question of what makes materiality in cultural theory is therefore 
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a central question of my project.  I for the most part focus on (post)modern North-Atlantic 
cultural theory and look at the way that the relation of culture to materiality has been deployed in 
the texts of Immanuel Kant, Roger Scruton, Tom Cohen, Fredric Jameson and Antonio Negri, as 
well as provide detailed readings of literature (Kafka), art (Matthew Barney), film (The Butcher 
Boy), and the "culture wars," to make my argument for a labor theory of culture in the 
contemporary more concrete. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his influential essay "The Centrality of Culture," Stuart Hall writes that our time is one of 
"'cultural revolution' in the substantive, empirical and material senses of the word. Substantively, 
the domain constituted by the activities, institutions and practices we call 'culture' has expanded 
out of all recognition" (209).  Never before has "culture" been as conspicuous as the present.  
Everything—including, as Fredric Jameson argues, nature and the unconscious 
(Postmodernism)—is seen as "cultural" now and the older sense of culture—as the opposite of 
natural and singular because created/creative—loses its meaning.  Everything from diseases and 
genetics to happiness and war is now made a matter of social construction, and its workings are 
analyzed in terms of signifying practices and differences.  Such a highly reflexive understanding 
of culture assumes that "language is constitutive of that which it names" (Barker, Making Sense 
of Cultural Studies 3).  Culture is made into a rhetorical figure of Derridean undecidabilty as it 
"can be both a descriptive and evaluative term," as Terry Eagleton argues, and is taken as a sign 
that the world has moved beyond the binaries of history such as naturalism and idealism, 
freedom and necessity, consciousness and spontaneity, contingency and necessity (The Idea of 
Culture 5).  And yet, this discursive view of culture gives a highly reified understanding of the 
social that separates it entirely from the underlying labor relations people must inhabit in order to 
live, especially the ruthless binary of class.  The fundamental separation of culture from the 
economic in the discourse theory of culture normalizes the existing social inequality as a matter 
 1 
of lifestyles and self-fashioning in the marketplace (David Chaney, Lifestyles).  It also 
formalizes culture itself by treating it as a self-enclosed and auto-intelligible practice. The 
canonic all-is-culture theory of the social almost always leads to one conclusion: "The old 
distinction which classical Marxism used to make between the economic 'base' and the 
ideological 'superstructure' is difficult to sustain in circumstances where the media both form a 
critical part of the material infrastructure of modern societies and are a principal means by which 
ideas and images are circulated" (Stuart Hall, "The Centrality of Culture" 209). 
The Labor Theory of Culture will be a rigorous inquiry into the commonsense of 
contemporary cultural theory and an effort to articulate a materialist cultural theory as an 
alternative to the commonsense.  Cultural theory, I believe, in focusing on the immanence of 
culture separate from economics, has ultimately separated culture entirely from the labor 
relations and conflicts in which it is always involved.  It has become so focused on the details of 
culture and cultural difference that it cannot address cultural difference except on its own 
immanent terms.   It has therefore been increasingly unable, I will suggest, to account for the 
new complexities of culture in relation to the emerging global class dynamics of the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century.  I will argue that by developing a labor theory of culture 
it becomes possible to address not only the immanent specifics of culture but culture's relation to 
its outside, which I think provides for a more comprehensive analysis of culture.  I will do so by 
a sustained and comprehensive engagement with major contemporary theories of culture and by 
reading specific texts of theorists such as Georg Lukacs, Stuart Hall, Tom Cohen, Slavoj Zizek, 
and Antonio Negri, whose work have transformed the vocabularies and interpretive strategies of 
contemporary cultural theory.   
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I realize that to argue for a labor theory of culture today is to write against the grain of 
cultural theory.  I will therefore spend some time closely analyzing some of the central 
assumptions under girding culturalism, as a basis for advancing a labor theory of culture in the 
contemporary.  The self-situating of the labor theory of culture is important because almost all 
contemporary cultural theories regard themselves to be material, if not materialist. The question 
of what makes materiality in cultural theory will therefore be a central question of my project.  I 
will for the most part be focusing on (post)modern North-Atlantic cultural theory and look at the 
way that the relation of culture to materiality has been deployed in the texts of Immanuel Kant, 
Roger Scruton, Tom Cohen, Slavoj Zizek and Antonio Negri, in order to explore the need for my 
own labor theory of culture.  Closely related to the question of materiality is the question of what 
constitutes a theory of culture.  One of my arguments will be that theory as description of the 
textual surfaces of culture has taken the place of theory as an explanation of culture in the 
humanities today.  Explanation is usually considered a totalitarian act of closure because it is a 
causal understanding of practices and phenomena that contains an implicit claim to Truth (capital 
T) that is thus the arch-binary of truth and falsehood.  Since Nietzsche's critique of causality (The 
Will to Power 293-300) cultural critique has moved away from explanation and embraced 
description as a mode of knowing that  "interprets" culture in its own terms but refuses to relate it 
to an "outside" (i.e. cause).  The Labor Theory of Culture returns to theory as explanation and 
will therefore make extensive use of the classical texts of materialist cultural theory such as those 
of Marx and Engels which prioritize causal understandings of culture.  My use of these texts will 
be to elaborate a materialist cultural theory and distinguish it from different understandings of 
materialism in the humanities today which are mostly descriptive and against explanation.     
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I distinguish between three forms of cultural theory according to the mode in which they 
theorize materiality: materiality as in opposition to culture (humanist), as synonymous with 
culture (discursive), and, as the basis of culture (materialist).  Using melodrama as a focus in 
chapter 1 I will distinguish between these forms of cultural theory in more detail.  These 
different modes of materiality in cultural theory cut across intellectual and political differences 
such as Marxism or deconstruction.  There have been "humanist" marxisms as well as 
"materialist" understandings of right wing thought, for example.1  These modes of intelligibility 
are therefore more effectively understood historically. Raymond Williams's theorization of 
"dominant," "residual" and "emergent" structures of feeling (Marxism and Literature 121-7) will 
help explain what I mean.  In Williams's terms, the intelligibility of cultural forms is dependent 
on their relative degree of incorporation into the hegemonic order—an incorporation that 
according to him is finally impossible—and not simply a matter of the formal specification of 
characteristics supposedly delineating different styles of thought.  The importance of such a 
conceptualization of culture is that provides an explanatory understanding of culture that can 
uncover the material forces that enable social change rather than a merely descriptive analytics 
that fails to penetrate the surface of culture. Thus "humanism," for instance, is "residual" in the 
contemporary not because, as mainstream commentary would have it, it has been eclipsed by 
postmodern thought.  In actuality the fundamental assumptions of humanism in cultural theory 
about the place of the subject in the social have been called into question by new social forces 
and developments, such as a globalization and the multicultural workforce, that have thrown its 
self-evidencies, such as the idea that culture unites society above and beyond its material 
differences, into crisis.  In short, I am arguing that humanism is more effectively read as 
                                                 
1  See for example Frederic Jameson, Fables of Agression: Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist. 
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symptomatic of a total cultural moment explained by a social basis outside the cultural 
superstructure, what Williams, following Marx, calls its "mode of production" (Marxism and 
Literature 125), a basis which it legitimates and helps organize and without which it loses its 
ability to provide the subject with a sense of the rational and real.   Postmodern modes of 
intelligibility are culturally dominant in the contemporary but its assumptions about culture are 
themselves in crisis under the impact of an emergent materialist cultural theory, as I will later 
discuss.  For example, the idea that culture testifies to an "incredulity toward grand narratives" 
(Lyotard) is not only logically problematic as a truth claim but more importantly historically 
problematic under the global dominance of neoliberalism. 
Theory since Plato has been an inquiry into the "essence" behind appearances.  At this 
level of generality however there would appear to be no difference between Plato's "timeless" 
and spiritual understanding of essence, for example, and Marx's inquiry into the economic laws 
of motion of social formations.  Discursivist theory has formalized theory and translated its 
search for the causes behind phenomena into the "metaphysics of presence," the belief in an 
"extra-discursive" essence, and has thus blurred the lines between idealist and materialist theory.  
Theory is now "radical" when it un-fixes binaries such "inside" and "outside" by translating them 
into multiple significations that proliferate the pleasures of the text beyond all master codes.  But 
what kind of reading-pleasure is this that suppresses the contestation on the first premises of 
theory and fails to consider the very different practical conclusions that follow from whether one 
believes that the world is a reflection of ideas, or, conversely, that ideas reflect material 
conditions?2  If the world is conditioned by ideas ending inequality would simply be a matter of 
changing ideas (enlightenment), which, for all its opposition to the Enlightenment, is what 
                                                 
 
2 Judith Butler for example calls the latter "left conservatism" because of its rejection of liberal pluralism. 
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discursivist theory itself argues: the composite writer JK Gibson-Graham for example, one of 
whom serves on the editorial board of Rethinking Marxism, argue that inequality will end with 
the end of "capital-centrism" (The End of Capitalism [As We Knew It]).  Conversely, if ideas are 
seen in the context of social inequality and unequal access to resources changes at the level of 
ideas must be understood as secondary reflections of more primary changes in the struggle over 
material resources: "ideas that revolutionize society… express the fact… that the dissolution of 
the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence" (Marx and 
Engels, Manifesto 489).  
There are important cultural issues raised by the basic difference in theory as well.  In 
viewing a film for example do we "identify" with the "characters" and the ups and downs of their 
"story" or are we being placed ideologically in relation to corporate power and given to think that 
ideas shape the world we see?  Is Seabiscuit (dir. Gary Ross), for instance, the story of the 
triumph of the human spirit (in a horse?) over all obstacles that empowers its viewers with a 
sense of the possible, or, is it about how "spirit" itself is an obstacle to entrepreneurial freedom in 
a "posthuman" present that demands new ethical subjectivities to mitigate the social 
consequences of global capitalism?  What is a text anyway?  Is it a figural arrangement of tropes 
more or less "aesthetically" arranged to confuse "reference with phenomenalism" as Paul de Man 
writes, or, is it an "arena of class struggle" as Voloshinov argues?  And, what about language 
itself?  Is it an arbitrary construct "without positive terms" (Sausurre) or a product of labor that 
embodies positive knowledge (Engels)?  These questions of course assume the possibility of 
decided answers grounded in reliable foundations ("essence") and thus raise the question of the 
need for theory.  But theory as an inquiry into origins is today declared to be dead.  Theory is 
labeled "spectral" by the theorists themselves (Derrida, Specters of Marx; Ghostly Demarcations, 
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ed. Michael Sprinker) on the grounds that theory is "essentialist" while its foundations have 
disappeared.  Leaving aside for the moment that anti-foundationalism is itself a foundation, 
discursivist theory has made the specter of theory the limit text of theory and claimed that this 
"unconditional" theory, which is supposed to exist without foundations, is the most radical 
theory because it rejects the dogmatic.  By disconnecting theory from the class relations that 
shape culture, however, theory has come to be the most dogmatic assertion that the way things 
are is incontestable.  Theory has been turned from being an inquiry into the conditions of 
knowing from which a transformative understanding of the totality is produced into an ornament 
of speculation and the legitimation of "spiritual" solutions for inequality that has placed theory in 
crisis.  As a result the theorists have in their statements become indistinguishable from the 
humanists they once distanced themselves from for whom theory simply interferes with aesthetic 
pleasure.  
The question of the "popular" is central to ongoing debates in cultural studies.  This is not 
only because of the serious consequences its theorization has for social praxis in shaping the 
emergent globality in the wake of the anti-capitalist protests, but, more importantly, because in 
capitalism "popular" is used to hide class antagonism (through such descriptive concepts as 
"status" and "lifestyle" for example).  In chapter 1 I argue for an oppositional and enabling 
theory of the popular as the other of pluralism. Pluralism, as in the semiotic democracy of the 
cultural left, alibis the totalitarianism of the free market which is based on wage-slavery of the 
many for the profit of a few.  What is popular, I will argue, is not a question of "subjectivity" 
(freedom of speech) but of objectivity (economic freedom)—not a matter of political desire but 
of material need.  It is not "popular," in other words, to occult consciousness of the class 
antagonism in society but an elitist bourgeois practice that maintains exploitation.  However, 
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what is "radical" now is precisely a post-class understanding of the popular that alibis class 
inequality.  For this reason, I will argue that for a truly radical cultural studies it is necessary to 
provide "root" knowledge of the social (Marx, Reader 60)—knowledge of the social relations of 
production ("class")—against the complexification (masked as analytical subtlety) and the 
fetishism of singularities (that supports a "free" market ideology of agency) which make up the 
populist reason of post-al capitalism in the knowledge industry.  Root knowledge is essential in 
order to foreground the binary in the "popular" between popular-as-populist post-class ideology 
and popular-as-class critique.  The blending and blurring of the binary supports the ruling class 
by dehistoricizing and normalizing capitalist subjectivities and displacing the historical "outside" 
(socialism) with a pietistic "beyond" (utopia). 
Melodrama has always been a site of the "class struggle at the level of theory" (Althusser) 
where the populist sentimentality and critique-al knowledge of the social have fought it out.  This 
is not surprising because, as one critic puts it, melodrama has been a popular way to "deal with 
the dynamics of early capitalist economics" (Elsaesser 73) and now, under the neoliberal 
populism of the market pedagogy in global capitalism, "society… is more and more splitting up 
into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat" (Marx and Engels, 
Reader 474).  In the market pedagogy, the "popularity" of melodrama has been considered a 
matter of its formal plurality and made central to understanding the form.  In other words, the 
secondary issue that melodramas are "spectacular, and based on broad appeal" (Elsaesser 75) or, 
similarly, because they originally were "written for a public that extended from the lower 
classes… through all sectors of the middle class, and even embraced members of the aristocracy" 
(Brooks xvi), or, in different language, because they "served as a crucial space in which the 
cultural, political, and economic exigencies… were played out and transformed into public 
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discourses" (Hays and Nikolopoulou viii); or, more common-sensically because melodrama is 
"powered by emotion" and thus "liberating for people" (Lang 20) to consume; because of its 
"insistence on the importance of the ordinary" and the "everyday" as a site of "desire" (Byars 
11); or its formal "irony" in structuring "experience" in such a way that "ignorance of the 
properly social and political dimensions of these changes [social crises] and their causality" is 
given "symbolic plausibility" (Elsaesser 72-3) by being placed on an "existential level" (86), has 
been made primary and the material basis of melodrama in class conflict has been occulted.  To 
say these are secondary considerations is not to deny that culturalist theory of melodrama is 
internally constituted by a local division over whether the popularity of melodrama is due to its 
being a transparent representation of people's "lived experience," or, rather, because it gives a 
post-mimetic representation that displays the constructedness of the real (a regional contradiction 
I engage within the text).  It is only by making the class politics of melodrama primary, however, 
that the cultural struggles can be clarified and melodrama provide an occasion to produce root 
knowledge and radical subjectivities capable of engaging in the praxis of social change.    
    What I call "(post)melodrama" is essential to such a critique.  Such a concept is needed 
to mark the ensemble of practices that diffuses culture into an empty plurality of consumer 
attachments that makes the populist common-sense of global capitalism that agency is a matter 
of knowledge (values) not praxis (labor).  The critique of (post)melodrama will also provide a 
theorization of what in the discourses of Marxism has been put forward as a popular melodrama 
in which the class conflicts over the real are made central to transforming cultural practices for 
revolutionary change.   
In chapter 1 I outline how the historical shifts in the discussion of melodrama reveal the 
political economy of the "subject" and agency under capitalism and thus explain that what 
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appears to be a debate over the politics of the popular in the dominant writings is in actuality an 
inter-class debate about which subjectivities better alibi the ruling class and facilitate the 
construction of a compliant workforce.  Later in the chapter I will demonstrate the effectiveness 
of this theorization in reading the (post)melodramatic text of The Butcher Boy (dir. Neil Jordan, 
1997). 
My first chapter also begins to analyze humanist cultural theory more closely by reading 
some of its central tutor-texts; Plato and Kant's. In Kant's Critique of Judgment the aesthetic is 
considered "pure" and "disinterested" and is made a kind of experience prior to conceptuality as 
well as a necessary precondition of understanding.  His view indicates a late shift in the 
Enlightenment project to the primacy of the senses over reason and has been used, by Lyotard 
and de Man for instance, to argue for a theory of materiality as in excess of concepts.  Besides 
indicating a late shift in humanist thought that de-values reason, Kant's aesthetic turn is an 
important moment in the genealogy of culturalism that is widely seen as leading, through 
Nietzsche, toward a (post)modern materialism.   
So dominant is the theory of materiality authorized by Kant's third critique that it shapes 
as well the writings of contemporary conservative critics such as Roger Scruton, who is 
supposedly opposed to postmodernism.  I will also investigate Scruton's cultural theory as a 
contemporary humanist approach which argues that culture reflects a timeless human essence 
(spirit) opposed to the modern forces of materiality (consumer society).  In this way I propose to 
show that humanist theories of culture such as Kant and Scruton's presume the same ahistorical 
theory of materiality one finds in postmodern theorists who argue for the materiality of signs as 
an allegory of the opacity of desire.  
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In order to further explain the ideological coincidence of humanist and discursive cultural 
theory more closely I will engage the writings of Tom Cohen in chapter two.  Cohen understands 
materiality as cultural "inscription" and argues that the real is an effect of signification.  Cohen 
rejects all other theories of materiality as ideological because they are more or less "mimetic" 
and lack the kind of discursive self-reflexivity he thinks makes the writings of de Man in 
particular culturally radical.  His own writings show, however, that more important than surface 
differences over mimesis is the deep commitment of culturalism against a materialist cultural 
theory, an antagonism that unites the otherwise intellectually opposed positions of humanist and 
discursive cultural theory.   
What Cohen's writings thus show despite themselves is that at stake in the debates over 
mimesis is not mimesis but different ways of knowing the world that have different and opposed 
political consequences in terms of the ongoing class conflicts over the cultural real. To clarify 
this point, I will look at a specific cultural reading that Cohen proposes as a model for 
discursivist cultural studies, his reading of Alfred Hitchcock's The 39 Steps.    
In the remainder of chapter 2 I turn to Franz Kafka as an example of the crisis of the 
contemporary totality so as to make my arguments above regarding culture as a site of conflict 
over materiality more concrete.  Kafka's writings and their "readings" have become not only a 
layered cultural signpost but also a threshold in critical and cultural theory. In their readings of 
Kafka, Lukács and Derrida, to take two of his most careful readers, bring out not only the 
complexities of his texts but also mark the the way in which the act of reading itself has become 
a complex and materially consequential cultural practice.  Kafka is usually seen as the opposite 
of a "realistic" writer because of the attenuated view of the world in his texts and the 
impossibility of an authentic human response to these conditions they seem to represent.  This 
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view fails to read Kafka as reflecting on social relations because it conflates reflection with 
"reference" and concludes that because his writing lacks systemic awareness of society and 
modalities of change it must be read in "existential" or "metaphysical" terms and that are 
common-sensically assumed to be above politics and free of class ideology.  Conversely, I will 
show how in the spectrality of its details Kafka's text registers the fact that capitalism as it 
develops must alienate all social activity and productions to serve the rule of profit so that 
nothing in the end is able to remain a local and self-enclosed activity but rather entails an 
invisible (but global) system for its production. I will argue that Kafka follows a culturalist logic 
by surfacing the contradictions of daily life under monopoly capitalism while mystifying any 
causal systemic explanation for them. What the culturalist reading of Kafka is blind to and what 
materialist reading emphasizes, however, is the textual resistance in the texts of Kafka to the 
system of monopoly capitalism which transforms daily life into a regimented life regulated by 
the logic of the commodity (exchange value)—Kafka's symbolic protest of culture as "mere 
training to act like a machine" (Marx and Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party) that 
provides the index of labor in his text. 
Across chapters 2 and 3 I give a genealogy of culturalism in terms of its engagement with 
materialism and social relations, demonstrating how the opposition of culture and materiality in 
humanist theory was critiqued by discursive cultural theory while at the same time the primary 
ideological function of maintaining the immanence of culture as separate from labor has been 
preserved.  More recently culturalism is itself being contested and is under pressure because of 
the sharp economic antagonisms structuring daily life.   This has given rise to a renewed interest 
in those theories that claim to provide a theory of culture which takes the economic into account.  
Here the neo-marxist theories of materiality of Jameson and Negri are of significance and will be 
 12 
investigated in chapter 3.  While providing a political economic critique of the dominant cultural 
theory, their articulation of the economic and the labor relations is in fact limited.  In opposition, 
I argue that it is necessary to return to the understanding of labor found in the texts of classical 
Marxism.  Such a view of labor provides a more effective understanding of culture (as, for 
example, found in the writings of Lenin and Lukács) and provides the founding notions for a 
labor theory of culture.   
Like all other modes and forms of cultural theory, the very theoretical identity of 
Marxism is itself contested of course—not just from non- and anti-Marxists who question the 
very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any 
kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself.  In 
chapter 2, therefore, I also outline what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of classical 
Marxism, which I will later elaborate on as providing the core of a materialist cultural theory.  
Here I will put forward the ideas of a labor theory of culture such as "labor," "value," "surplus-
value," "capital," "commodity," and "production," through a reading of Marx's Capital, and I will 
counterpose these ideas to the revisionist discourses of the humanist and postmodern marxisms 
authorized by the writings of Rosemary Hennessey and Slavoj Zizek respectively.  In this 
chapter I will argue that the "culturalism" of the dominant cultural theory denies not only history 
and the materiality of culture but also denies "agency"—i.e., how men and women make history 
and change the social relations and themselves through their productive activity, or what Marx 
calls "labor." Culture as self-made and auto-intelligible is, in other words, a form of 
understanding that foreshortens any historical understanding of culture and its place in shaping 
the contemporary.  In this chapter I will also explore the possibility of a different form of cultural 
studies, one located in the history and materiality of culture and committed to foregrounding the 
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agency of labor.  By labor I do not mean a superstructural mediation, the "constitutive power" 
Negri for example locates in high-tech "affective labor" or the "lived experience" of class E. P. 
Thompson finds in the consumption habits of working people.  I mean labor as a social relation, 
specifically the ratio between necessary and surplus-labor time that inaugurates the exploitation 
central to capitalism and that explains its central contradiction: the antagonism between profit 
(exchange value) and need (use value).  
The value of a materialist cultural theory is its integrated view of culture in the social 
formation and opposition to all one-sided and reified understandings.  As Adolfo Sanchez 
Vásquez has explained, what gives to materialist cultural theory its explanatory power is the 
recognition that culture is at root labor.  Labor, not as "work… a merely economic category" 
(42), in the sense that Negri understands culture as "immaterial labor," but labor as what Vásquez 
calls "artistic concreteness" (32)—"a particular form of creative work" (Vásquez, Art and 
Society 42) whose object is to shape men and women themselves: "man is the specific object of 
art even if he is not always the object of artistic representation" (31).  Vásquez theorizes culture 
as providing a certain kind of knowing that enables men and women to change reality. This is 
primarily a result of the fact that culture transforms the material world in such a way as to 
"capture… human reality in its essential aspects and tear… off the veil of its mystification" (34) 
thus providing the necessary consciousness skills (theory as explanation) required for broader 
transformations.  Because of its "artistic concreteness" as demystification culture may act as a 
critique of the "objective concreteness" of science as well and militate against the reified view of 
things that science takes under capitalism, a one-sided view of self-enclosed processes with no 
relation to human social relations and needs. Vásquez himself may participate in such reification, 
however, in so far as his conception of "artistic concreteness" is tied to the idea of "an artistic 
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structure or totality that has its own set of laws" (24) that are universal for all time.  How is such 
a theory of materiality itself not the same as the reified materiality he attributes to science?  In 
my last chapter I will investigate the status of materiality in materialist cultural theory and 
contemporary culture in order to conceptualize a more historical theory of materiality for cultural 
theory than he seems to allow. 
In chapter 3 I will continue the practice begun in previous chapters of embedding the 
debates over materiality in the practices of culture.  For this purpose I will analyze the 
retrospective exhibit and reception of Matthew Barney's The Cremaster Cycle (Guggenheim 
2003) as a limit-text of materiality in transnational capitalism and tease out its class politics.  The 
Cremaster Cycle provides an important occasion to inquire into the ongoing debates in cultural 
theory around questions of materiality and agency.  The reason for this is because of the way the 
work is committed to a logic of excess that seems to defy conceptual boundaries and thus 
apparently produces a space of freedom for the subject in the daily, while in the process 
immunizing the social relations from an ideology critique, by (re)turning to class struggle as 
merely a trope of desire for example.  However, I also propose to read The Cremaster Cycle as a 
modality of labor because of how the way it challenges multicultural and postmodern cultural 
politics—by returning to conflictual understandings of the social totality for instance—
transforms the cultural real in accordance with the emergent material needs of global capitalism.  
I will argue that such a densely layered text as The Cremaster Cycle provides a lesson in global 
literacy that has become historically necessary under transnational capitalism in ways that were 
first announced in materialist cultural theory, in texts such as The Manifesto of The Communist 
Party and The German Ideology.  It produces this dialectical effect by evacuating all conceptual 
binaries of their historicity by relaying them through a thick network of multiple significations 
 15 
that is framed in the cultural imaginary, as the public reception of the work shows, as exceeding 
ideological closure but that are in actuality a socially necessary ensemble of consciousness skills, 
a global subjectivity, in the global factory.   
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1.0  CULTURE AND ITS OUTSIDE 
1.1 CULTURALISM 
One of the mainstays of contemporary cultural theory is the argument that the social is primarily 
shaped by culture.  Culture, that is, not as a collection of artifacts or an archive of progress, but, 
rather, following the writings of Antonio Gramsci, as "an arena of consent and resistance" (Stuart 
Hall, "Deconstructing" 239) over the shape of the social.  Contemporary cultural theory has 
extended the understanding of culture beyond universalist, and, therefore, supposedly elitist 
assumptions and normative hegemonic conclusions about culture and instead focused on culture 
as "the articulation and activation of meaning" (Storey xiii) on the grounds that it is primarily 
discourse that possesses "the power and the authority to define social reality" (Storey xii).  The 
meanings in a culture that both secure and contest the dominant social arrangements are thought 
to lie in what Michel de Certeau calls "secondary production" (Storey xiii): the sphere of 
consumption, rather than originating in the economic sphere of production.  In these terms, it is 
the "consumer who in effect 'produces in use'" (Storey xiii) the meanings of the culture that 
determine social reality. So much has such a focus on the daily practices of consumption and 
identification been "central to the project of cultural studies" (Storey xi) that some have simply 
argued that "cultural studies could be described... perhaps more accurately as ideological studies" 
(James Carey qtd. in Storey xii).  The focus in cultural theory on the constitutive power of 
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discourse to define social reality has shifted the attention of cultural studies from the wider social 
relations of production which shape consumption and, as I will argue, in fact determine the social 
real.   
The assumption that consumption is more important then production, which has steadily 
shaped cultural theory since the 60s, has become the common-sense of both cultural theory and 
daily culture itself.  And, like all common-sense assumptions, the assumption of the priority of 
culture over class, which I will refer to as "culturalism," has gained the status of a self-evident 
fact.  In this chapter I offer a sustained inquiry into the commonsense of culturalism and an 
articulation of a labor theory of culture.  The point is not only to offer the labor theory of culture 
as an "alternative," however, but to explain why culturalism has become dominant, to inquire 
into what its material effects and limits are, and what its relation to the existing social 
arrangements is.   
Cultural theory, I believe, has become so focused on the details of culture and cultural 
difference that it cannot address cultural difference except on the culturalist terms described 
above. Cultural theory has ultimately insulated culture entirely from the labor relations and 
conflicts in which it is always involved. People's "lifestyles" (which is another way of referring 
to the commodities they consume and how they consume them) are assumed to be more 
significant, in these terms, than the labor relations they must enter into as a necessary 
precondition of consumption.  Such an assumption concludes that the markers and beliefs that 
position individuals in culture as men and women, black, latino, gay,… are more important than 
the fact that they are wage workers that must first sell themselves daily to capital before they can 
acquire the cultural markers of identity.  My argument in this text is that by developing a labor 
theory of culture, it becomes possible to address not only the specificities of culture focused on 
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exclusively by the culturalist approach but also culture's relation to its "outside," the labor 
arrangements an examination of which, I think, provides for a more comprehensive analysis of 
culture and that will return cultural theory to being what Marx called a "material force" because 
it produces root knowledge of inequality (Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right).  Such an understanding of the priority of the economic is seen on 
the cultural left as "left conservatism" (Butler, Bove, et. al.) because it (supposedly) forecloses 
difference.  But, as Teresa Ebert has argued, "differences in class societies are always 
exploitative" (169) because they serve to divide and segment the working class and foster 
competition between the workers. What is needed in cultural theory is not more thick description 
of difference but its critique. 
The theorization of culturalism I provide in this essay contests the "insider" story usually 
told about its emergence which in one way or another posits history as changes in knowledge and 
maintains that a break in the order of knowledge has occurred which suspends the laws of motion 
of capitalism that explain culture as a superstructural phenomena (i.e., ideology as false 
consciousness of the economic).  The most popular and therefore taken for granted story that 
contemporary culture forms a self-enclosed area of shifting meanings and values unconnected to 
class relations is the "globalization" story.  In different articulations "globalization" is taken as 
the dominance of the market over areas once believed to be sacred or natural.  In this story 
capitalism is seen as a liberating force that frees human desire from any normative constraints. 
Through the manufacturing of endless choices in the marketplace, this story assumes, people are 
made to believe that objective reality itself is simply a matter of "free choice" and are thereby 
empowered to change the world.3  Social conflicts, on this logic, are treated as basically moral 
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conflicts over rival interpretations about the world at a time when positive knowledge of the 
world is held to be unavailable because it has dissolved in the matrices of exchange and subject 
to constant renegotiation.  Perhaps the most popular exponent of this view is New York Times 
columnist Thomas Friedman, who has simply popularized ideas which had their beginnings in 
Nietzsche's writings (which argue that an historic reversal of values has occurred that has 
orphaned all meanings and rendered them essentially ironic), and have since made their way 
through the writings of the Frankfurt School, Daniel Bell, Francis Fukuyama, Jean Baudrillard, 
and Anthony Giddens.   
According to Friedman in the year 2000 the world entered a "whole new era" (The World 
is Flat 10) because of a fortuitous "convergence" (10) of technologies and market forces that 
have made the world "flat" as "it is now possible for more people than ever to collaborate and 
compete in real time with more other people on more different kinds of work from more different 
corners of the planet and on a more equal footing than at any previous time in the history of the 
world" (8). In the "new" flat world it is culture — in the form of "software, brainpower, complex 
algorithms, knowledge workers, call centers, transmission protocols, [and] breakthroughs in 
optical engineering" (4) — that constitutes "the source of wealth" (4) and "explain[s] what [is] 
happening in the world today" (7) and not the conflict between capital and labor.  For neoliberals 
like Friedman, as it is for leftists such as Hardt and Negri, "knowledge work" is a code for more 
"cooperative" transnational systems of production that are taken to constitute a basically non-
exploitative ("creative") form of labor.  All contemporary cultural theory makes this assumption 
that labor is no longer exploitative because it is "cooperative" and "creative" knowledge-work 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 So popular is this story that the comedian Stephen Colbert has parodied it on his cable television show with the 
neologism "wikiality" ("truth by consensus" rather than fact), which is a portmanteau of "Wikipedia" (the user edited 
online encyclopedia) and "reality." 
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(i.e., post-industrial and post-Fordist).  Implicit in "knowledge work" is the assumption that labor 
is an experiential matter defined by the type of work engaged in, rather than a social relation. 
However, unlike work, which takes place in a specific location and expends labor power on a set 
of given materials for a particular end, labor is an abstract social process that can only be set in 
motion through the combined activity of the whole society.  The claim that contemporary society 
is defined by "knowledge work" is a gross reification of labor in which one particular kind of 
work (usually service work which requires "affective" performance) is taken as a metaphor for 
social relations as a whole while the basic class structure is disappeared from view and society is 
emptied of its historicity.  By turning labor into a metaphor of a highly reified experience of 
living in cyber-capitalism "labor" is given a conservative meaning whose function is to police the 
boundaries of knowledge by turning attention away from the exploitative basis of capitalism.  
Labor is actually exploitative at root.  Labor is exploitative not because it is more or less coercive 
or creative but because it takes place in an economy in which the social means of production 
have been expropriated by a few who thereby force the majority into wage slavery to produce 
profit for themselves.  To call such a global social relation "cooperative" and "creative" is to 
mystify the exploitative basis of labor and turn cultural theory against the workers. 
Because cyber-capitalism is seen as transcending class struggle in the economic base in 
"globalization" discourse the conflicts of today are themselves regarded as purely cultural having 
nothing to do with the division between the haves and have nots.  Freidman for example argues 
that class is itself cultural.  According to him, class is essentially a psychological matter: "class is 
a state of mind" (The World is Flat 461).  What divides people in other words is not access to the 
material resources they need to live but "hope"—whether they "believe they have a pathway out 
of poverty or lower-income status toward a higher standard of living and a better future for their 
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kids" (461) or not.  For Hardt and Negri too class is essentially a cultural matter: "class is 
determined by class struggle" (Multitude 104).  According to them "class is a political concept" 
(104) rather than an economic one. It is culture (hope, struggle) that explains inequality and not 
inequality that explains culture in culturalist theory. For Friedman "the line between those who 
are in the flat world and those who are not is this line of hope" (The World is Flat 461-2).  The 
"hopeful" are "cooperative" with the imperatives of the global economy and the hopeless are just 
"sick" (462) or demoralized by bad government (462).  In this narrative of a "new" capitalism 
culture is given a culturalist validation and the world is flattened to the terms of the market 
where power no longer divides people and everything appears to be a matter of choices between 
morally free and equal persons.  On this logic "the poor are actually extraordinarily wealthy" 
(Hardt and Negri Multitude 131) because "despite the myriad mechanisms of hierarchy and 
subordination" they are "creative" and "express an enormous power of life" (129) by resisting 
power from above.  Inequality is here assumed to be residual and for the most part history, while 
now is the time of creative self-expression and a new found freedom. What is never examined in 
this familiar story on which soap operas are based is how behind the appearance of formal 
equality in the market lies the material inequality in production that actually explains culture and 
its differences and conflicts as caused by unequal access to material resources like energy, 
housing, food, health care and communications.  By considering culture only on its own terms 
culture is idealized as a series of emotional attachments to free floating ideas that immunizes the 
division of labor from critique and pathologizes the contradictions of class society. In other 
words, rather than examining the ideological function of thoughts, ideas, desires, affects, 
experiences, etc. to legitimate and mystify class relations culturalist theory reads culture on its 
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own terms as simply concerning matters of personal belief with merely an emotional basis in 
order to construct the story of an eternal capitalism.   
Friedman calls himself a "technological determinist" (The World is Flat 160) but then 
quickly clarifies that what he means by that is not that technology determines subjectivity—
"Using them does not make you modern, smart, more wise, fair or decent"—but it "just makes 
you able to communicate, compete, and collaborate farther and faster" (460).  Leaving aside the 
fact that such social changes as are being described have of course already changed what it 
means to be "smart," "fair," etc., if the experience of new technologies does not in itself produce 
a more progressive society in Freidman's view of the world the "hope" that it does so is assumed 
to be essential for a good society.  And yet, such an empty "hope" without a basis in objective 
reality relies on a religious view of the world that transcodes the material conflicts arising out of 
class society into eternal cultural wars over beliefs and is actually antithetical to the socially 
collaborative nature of the contemporary work process Freidman formally idealizes and 
celebrates.  It is for this reason in fact that Friedman must posit a "hope" in technology rather 
than religion, a religion of technology as it were, so as to overcome the contradiction between the 
real social nature of work in the world today and the alienated consciousness it actually produces 
in the context of market competition.  But, such an irrational reconciliation between the fact of 
modern technology and cultural values as Friedman proposes simply maintains the everyday 
alienated consciousness of both and fails to see them as grounded in the social relations of 
production, which would entail implicating technology and culture in the alienated nature of 
private property (exploitation) in general, which is the objective cause of contemporary ideology.  
It is the coercive appropriation of the labor of others by a few that produces the view that 
technology is merely technical (associated with "work" and "making a living" rather than a part 
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of "life" and "creative") and that it does not have an historical tendency to "simplify" and 
revolutionize class relations, as The Manifesto of the Communist Party argues, by deskilling and 
impoverishing the laborer.  The idea that culture is a free floating realm of beliefs and passionate 
attachments which carry no trace of class interest and have no ideological consequences in 
maintaining class society is equally a product of the same material conditions of exploitation 
which causes people to view what are in actuality social relations as relations between things and 
ideas because the actual basis of society is mystified by the expropriation and command of the 
social wealth by a few.  If the command and fruits of labor were also socialized, as its execution 
and discipline currently is, the alienated consciousness of culture ("life") and technique ("work") 
would dissolve and "the government of persons… replaced by the administration of things" 
(Engels Socialism: Utopian and Scientific) undertaken on behalf of the "free association of 
producers" (Marx).  Friedman's formal contrasting of technology and culture is an ideological 
device to maintain that individuals are morally free and equal, but the categorical nature of this 
division which places humanity in a spiritual beyond actually helps to reinforce the subjugation 
of people to their alienated existence which is in reality caused by their lack of access to and 
control over their own social production.  Freedom is not a cultural matter of belief or proudly 
maintaining "dignity" in the face of negative circumstances.  Neither is it brought about by re-
defining work as a "creative" act.  Freedom is at root a matter of access to the material conditions 
of life and the free time it brings to help cultivate and appropriate the powers of social labor. 
Another popular story about the rise of culturalism is really an inversion of the above 
aimed at a different demographic that while critical of globalization in some respects secretly 
maintains its culturalist terms. In this story—which is manufactured for the lower "middle 
classes" who are resentful at finding themselves proletarianized rather than the entrepreneurial 
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upper layer that Friedman is addressing who as yet still hope to "make it"—everything is a 
matter of cultural conflicts, including the infrastructure of technology and market forces.  This is 
the contemporary understood as what Foucault called the regime of "bio-power" in which, he 
argues, "phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species" finally entered into "the sphere of 
political techniques" (The History of Sexuality 141-2).   This view has become central to the 
later writings of Negri written with Hardt, such as Empire and Multitude, which reflect the views 
of the anti-globalization movement.  According to Foucault, the form of society had 
fundamentally changed during the eighteenth century and power was essentially redefined; from 
an subtractive "right of seizure" that subjected people and things to the imperatives of the state, 
the modality of power changed to a "productive" one in which individuals are disciplined by 
social institutions, such as the factory, school and prison, so as to augment control over life and 
redefine it as a compulsive social norm.  Because the "normalizing society" (144) legitimates 
itself in terms of improving "life" itself, first in opposition to the repressive rule previously 
reserved to the sovereign and then in terms of productivity and efficiency, all political conflicts 
since the eighteenth century, Foucault argues, tend to revolve around "basic needs, man's 
concrete essence, [and] the realization of his potential" (145).  Thus for Foucault political 
demands for "basic needs" (145) do not fundamentally challenge the system as they "rel[y] for 
support on the very thing it invested, that is, on life and man as a living being" (144).  Struggles 
over material life are thus re-understood by Foucault: rather than being fundamental to the 
system in the way that Marx argued they touched upon its very roots, they are assumed to be 
merely cultural struggles which take as a given the continued reproduction of capitalism. Since 
"power and knowledge assumed responsibility for the life processes" (142) bringing "its 
mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations" (143) what really matters according to 
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Foucault is not class struggles over resources but how life "constantly escapes" (143) rational 
calculation and throws man's "existence as a living being in question" (143).     
Actually the form of rule of capital, whether it be politically suppressive or juridically 
regulative, is explained by the need for the capitalist class to make profit from the labor of others 
and not some will to power over life as such.  The "excesses" of bio-power such as the atomic 
bomb and microbiology that cause Foucault to revise the classical definition of Man as a 
"rational animal" on the grounds that "modern man is an animal whose politics places his 
existence as a living being in question" (The History of Sexuality 143) are not irrational 
"excesses" from the point of view of profit accumulation, which is the true norm under 
capitalism and not productivity. If productivity, the control of forces for the meeting of the 
requirements of life and the proliferation of techniques for its control, were really the norm and 
not profit there would be no unemployment or "homelessness," for example.  It was after all to 
the fear of roaming "masterless men" produced by the privatization of the commons in Europe in 
the eighteenth century that Foucault attributes the rise of the "carcereal society" in Discipline and 
Punish, so then what explains the existence of the unemployed and the poor today?  To say 
unemployment depends on a political calculation made on the basis of an arbitrary cultural 
definition of health and well-being that serves a few while precluding extending its privileges to 
others who are singled out for poverty does not explain the existence of poverty but simply re-
describes the common-sense about it in a more sophisticated language.  It assumes that poverty is 
cultural and has to do with how well or ill someone conforms to societal norms like how "smart" 
they are, or whether they have made "good" choices or not, and not their access to the means of 
production, whether they own them and can use them to exploit the labor of others or are 
exploited.  It is actually access to and control over the means of production that empowers a few 
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to establish social norms and enforce conformity to them as well as explains the content of those 
norms and what lies outside them, rather than the struggle over such norms in themselves and 
what they (dis)allow.  Foucault's understanding of power depends on seeing it as "horizontal" 
and proscriptive rather than "vertical" or hierarchical, but such a view presupposes a basic 
equality in material terms.  Foucault assumes, for example, that "the accumulation of men and 
the accumulation of capital—cannot be separated… each makes the other possible and 
necessary" (History of Sexuality 221).  Such a formal understanding of the relation of the social 
to the means of production denies any causal relation of determination between them while 
silently assuming that production serves "to increase the docility and utility of all the elements of 
the system" (218), in other words, that production is a "political technology" (205) for the 
"utopia of the perfectly governed" (198).  The self-enclosed mechanical circularity of production 
in this account, as in Friedman, simply alienates production from its class basis and thereby 
uncritically reflects the way production is actually alienated in practice as private property 
without implicating the structure of ownership in the exploitation of labor and examining the 
way the division of labor (class) shapes culture and consciousness.  The result of such a view is 
to shift contestation from the base to the superstructure so that it is power, reified from its 
material basis, rather than structural inequality that is contested.  Thus what is basic to capitalism 
according to Foucault is not exploitation but "these tiny, everyday, physical mechanisms [of] 
micro-power that are essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines" 
(History of Sexuality 222) and it is on these local terms that power is exercised: "power is 
everywhere" (93) and "where there is power, there is resistance" (95).  By segregating power 
from its social basis in the exploitation of wage labor, which is where the division between the 
powerful and powerless is materially determined, and shifting it to the level of its effects in the 
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local and everyday micro practices, Foucault accommodates capital in the base and as a 
consequence cannot explain the self-negation of capitalism produced by its own law of value, 
which leads to the polarization of classes and revolution.  His theory is thus itself part of the 
dream of a perfectly governed utopia albeit with the spectacle of resistance but, just the same, 
with no social revolutions.  Despite the formal inversion to be found in Foucault's writings of the 
technologist position that Friedman represents, the rule of the market is yet assumed to be the 
limit of history and all struggles are seen as merely symbolic struggles that do not touch on the 
basic class relations.  For both of them culture is segregated from the economic base and in this 
way they eternalize capitalism through a culturalist argument and place cultural theory in the 
service of the ruling class.   
The culturalist account of the rise of culturalism is not an explanation of why 
contemporary culture is ruled by the logic of capitalism and so obsessed with the  "inside" 
practices of everyday life that the "outside" is disappeared. In fact they make an explanation 
from the outside impossible by consigning its terms to the past on the grounds that the present is 
basically different because of new technologies and exceeds any logic except the a-logic of 
desire, which is of course the voluntarist logic of the market. 
The disguising of class conflicts in terms of culture is of course as old as class society 
itself.  Every ruling class in history has identified its particular form of rule with the general good 
and justified its mode of appropriating the labor of others in cultural, and for the most part 
religious, terms.  It was with the rise of capitalism, however, that culture begins to take on an 
independent basis and is seen as by definition "free," as in Humanist and Enlightenment 
discourses; free from religious and political coercion on the one hand, and free of the rule of the 
market on the other.  Because the freedom of culture was only ever an ideal of bourgeois society 
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contradicted in daily practice it became a dogma that culture was a timeless space that expresses 
what is most rational, moral and beautiful—the best that has been thought and said—and as such 
the essence of what it means to be a person.  The reason for this idealization of culture has an 
economic basis however in the basic inequality of capitalism and it is necessary to unpack this 
relation in order to explain the present dominance of culturalism and why it has replaced 
humanism as an apologetic for inequality.  
In the period between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries capitalism systematically 
dispossessed the laborer of not only his labor power or ability to work but also of all the material 
preconditions through which labor is alone possible, such as the material to be worked upon, the 
instruments of labor and the means of subsistence of the laborer.  This systematic expropriation 
of the material conditions of productive social life commodified the worker as an "individual" 
unit of the production process and this individual that is free to work or starve is the real material 
basis for bourgeois philosophy and culture since the Enlightenment and what is behind the basic 
division in the human sciences between the subject (culture) and its "soft" knowledges, such as 
the humanities and social sciences, and the object (nature), which is investigated by the "hard" 
physical sciences.  Capitalism needs persons to be defined as individuals because it needs them 
to voluntarily enter into an economic agreement to exchange their labor power for wages.  An 
idealist view of culture is the necessary result of a society that defines its highest achievements in 
terms of individual freedom, because it depends on the free exchange of labor for wages, and has 
been forced to attack any other cultural basis for defining freedom, such as social equality.  
Because the development of capitalism itself has come more and more to limit individual 
freedom to those who can monetarily afford it, the "individual" has been displaced as the 
standard of knowing and achievement, especially since the historic economic downturn 
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experienced by the Western democracies since the mid-70s.  It was then that culturalism 
emerged and has since become dominant.   
Culturalism is not simply the use of culture to disguise and legitimate class oppression as 
idealism and religion have always done.  Neither is it simply an extension of the humanist 
ideology of culture as the free expression of free subjects which relegates inequality to nature 
and explains it away as differences of knowledge or natural abilities.  Culturalism is the 
systematic inculcation in the regime of discourse which gives all social practices a cultural 
foundation in codes, conventions, discourse, values, perceptions, and affect—rather than explain 
social practices as at root economic and grounded in the division of labor and the interaction of 
labor and the natural world—at a time when it becomes impossible to justify capitalism on its 
own terms because of the crisis of profitability and the increasing inequality it produces.  The 
changes in technology which are commonly supposed to explain the reification of culture in the 
contemporary are themselves explained as effects of class forces, especially the drive to innovate 
endemic to market competition which has as a necessary result the increasing alienation of the 
worker from her own labor power through under-/unemployment.   The shift from "modernism" 
as a cultural dominant to "postmodernism," which in the humanities is represented as a shift from 
"humanism" to "culturalism," is a cultural effect of the global crisis of cyber-capitalism and not 
its triumphant "globalization" as culturalist discourses argue.  The reason for this is because 
capitalism cannot ultimately survive the reification of culture it makes necessary as this 
reification itself is caused by the separation of the laborer from the productive process entirely, 
thus leading to a crisis of overproduction and the fall in the rate of profit.  
For roughly the last thirty years the capitalist West has experienced a prolonged crisis of 
profitability which comes from systemic overproduction—it has reached the point that 
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technological efficiency has massively lowered the need for labor worldwide thus raising 
unemployment (often disguised as under-employment) while the profit imperative is brutally 
maintained as the rationale of production.  Capitalism now is finding it difficult to secure new 
areas of labor for productive investment, which among other things (such as financial 
speculation) forces it to expand its market geographically and at great cost in both material and 
ideological terms.  The global expansion of capitalism is actually a short term way to stave off 
the inevitable fall in the rate of profit that comes from the introduction of technological 
innovations in the context of market competition.  The value of capital depends on its ability to 
productively employ wage-labor and realize a surplus-value over and above the costs of 
production and the reproduction of the laborer.  In order to realize a bigger share of surplus-value 
in the context of market competition capitalists are forced to lower the amount of necessary labor 
it takes to produce commodities and this is for the most part done by increasing the productivity 
of labor through the introduction of labor saving devices.  With the spread of the most efficient 
methods of production the general result is to raise the amount of capital socially invested in 
plant and equipment relative to the amount invested in labor thus increasing what Marx calls "the 
organic composition of capital" at the expense of the working class who find themselves 
deskilled, their wages cheapened and unemployed.  The rising organic composition of capital is 
what produces a fall in the rate of profit because of the social costs it inflicts on the workforce, 
the consumers of the commodities.4 Capitalism, through the workings of the law of value which 
governs the production of commodities, inevitably reaches the point where it calls itself into 
                                                 
4 In the post-war period up to 1980 the value composition of fixed capital (that is, capital invested in raw materials, 
plant and equipment that is necessary to set labor in motion) rose by over 77 percent, seeing the biggest rise in the 
mid-70s, and the rate of profit fell by a third, according to the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Statistics (Shaikh and Tonak, Measuring the Wealth of Nations). According to Shaikh and Tonak, corporate profits 
to corporate net stock fell 13 percent between 1969-73, from 11-15 percent to between 8.8 and 11 percent.  It has 
since only risen to about 9.4 percent in 1996 (Measuring the Wealth of Nations 12). 
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question as it is "incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it 
cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him" 
(Marx and Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party).  Because capitalism over the last 
thirty years has not been able to "deliver the goods" to more and more people and prove the 
superiority of the market for insuring individual freedom the "free subject" of the classical period 
of bourgeois ascendancy has been placed in crisis and a self-enclosed understanding of culture 
has taken its place in the dominant ideology as the self-regulating mechanism that protects the 
market from a class-based critique that would implicate "ideas" in the terms of inequality.  
Culture serves this crisis management function most effectively by not simply dismissing 
inequality and the antagonisms it generates (how could it?), but by translating (reifying) the 
contradictions into cultural terms that leave the foundation of capitalism basically intact. At the 
core of the labor theory of culture is the explanation of how culturalism itself has an economic 
basis—it reflects the interests of those who having had their material needs already met from the 
labor of the other can afford to focus on their desires in the market at a time of inescapable social 
inequality and it projects this special interest as universal, as ideology has always done. 
By drawing out the ways in which cultural theory is shaped by the developments of labor, 
a labor theory of culture works to connect the most pressing cultural questions to the economic 
and political structures that determine how people live their lives.  The connection of culture and 
daily life is based on the recognition that culture has an economic root in labor: the "process by 
which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between 
himself and nature" (Marx Capital 283). Before there can be a culture of consent and resistance 
over the socially consequential meaning(s) that shape people's lives, there first needs to be their 
material life itself.  By grasping the material dependence of culture on the metabolism between 
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labor and nature it follows, as Marx goes on to explain, "that the man who possesses no other 
property than his labour power, must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of 
other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labour" ("Gotha 
Programme" 81). In other words, according to Marx, labor is not simply a natural process 
necessary to sustain life but is also a historical zone of conflicts over control of the means of 
production.  It follows then that culture is not merely an expression of technological capacity or 
even a symbolic compensation for material contradictions, as Jameson for example argues 
(Political Unconscious 79), but the arena "in which men become conscious of this [economic] 
conflict and fight it out" (Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 21).  In 
short, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social 
existence that determines their consciousness" (Marx, 21). 
Marx's labor theory has for the most part been dismissed in cultural theory as "humanist" 
because for him labor names "the human essence" ("Theses on Feuerbach" 145) which explains 
culture.  But such a reading misses the fact that for Marx the human essence (labor) is neither a 
metaphysical "abstraction inherent in each single individual" (145), such as the "rationality" of 
homo economicus in classical political economy or rational choice theory, nor is it an idealist 
representation of "'society as the subject'" (The German Ideology, 59) that regards the 
"interrelated individuals … as a single individual, which accomplishes the mystery of generating 
itself" (59). Rather, labor refers to "the ensemble of the social relations" (145) under which men 
and women interact with the material world and each other and is therefore a materialist rather 
than a speculative concept.  The boundaries of culture are on this logic defined not by cultural 
struggles themselves but by the possibilities of labor as the material basis of culture (what people 
need in order to consume), and the meanings attached to these practices (as essential and 
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consequential or not) are dependent on the collective social project of production (the global 
division of labor and the conflicts over it). Although debates over cultural "values" tend to begin 
where it seems that labor ends—in the sphere of consumption—the options of what can and 
cannot be consumed in any culture are determined by the kind and level of activity in production 
at any given historical moment.  It is this necessary material "context" that determines the 
"meanings" available in a society's signifying practices. 
Currently, for instance, there is what is widely commented on as a "return to ideology" 
and the world is seen as divided between rival "fundamentalisms."  Leaving aside that 
fundamentalism in the Islamic world is not just about values (although that is the way it is 
represented in the Western media, it is essentially about inequality), in the US it is seen in purely 
cultural terms as a rise in religious feelings in response to an invasion of "alien" cultural values 
represented under the sign of 9-11 (Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations).  What the 
narrative of a cultural war over "values" silently covers over is the accumulation of surplus 
profits in the countries of the North from the countries of the South.  When "they" say that the 
West is on a crusade to destroy Islam, this is a code for "the West is plundering our oil, forcing 
our governments to spend our money on military weapons, giving us cell phones and DVDs 
instead of drinking water,… ."  Fundamentalism is basically an economic struggle transcoded 
into populist religious languages for organizational reasons (in mosques, by governments, in the 
media, etc.).  US fundamentalism is also represented domestically as the dominance of a "red" 
state mentality over its "blue" rival, purportedly testifying to basic differences in cultural 
consumption (as in the writings of such mainstream commentators as David Brooks and Thomas 
Frank); latte drinking, Volvo driving and IKEA shopping versus soft drinks, NASCAR and Wal-
Mart for example.  On the latter terms US fundamentalism is supposed to signal the dominance 
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of an oil dependent mode of production located in the "red states" over a service economy mostly 
located in the "blue states."  Whether seen as a clash of civilizations between the West and the 
rest or a cultural war within the US, what is being disguised under "cultural wars" is the material 
(that is, economic) domination that explains both the cultural differences within the US, whether 
one shops at Wal-Mart or IKEA or drinks latte or a Big Gulp for example, as well as the 
culturalist ideology which claims that cultural difference explains material inequality in the 
world rather than the reverse.  Without the accumulation and concentration of capital in the 
North at the expense of the South there would not be the array of commodities there are in the 
US nor would there be the culture industry promoting culturalism as the global frame of 
intelligibility explaining the contemporary.   
The declining rate of profit produced by the growing concentration and centralization of 
capital, that can be seen in the wave of corporate merges and layoffs in recent years, necessitates 
ever more cheapening of the costs of production through such things as technical innovations and 
the global search for, and more and more the forcible seizure of, markets of cheap labor to 
increase the amount of surplus-value over wages (and related marginal costs) per unit output.  
The constant innovations produce cultural differences within and between markets as every 
capitalist tries to realize more surplus-value by introducing competitive differences in how 
products are made that increases their value in relation to those of thier rivals. Big Gulp versus 
latte drinking is not simply a difference in lifestyle choices. Both deliver caffeine and sugar to 
keep workers awake and alert on the job but they differ in the manner that they do to reflect 
differences that have arisen within the division of labor, between "hi" and "lo-tech" workers for 
example.  While both contain high doses of caffeine the sugar content of a latte is more variable 
reflecting the "participatory management process" of more highly skilled urban workers 
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compared to the mass of unskilled workers who shop at places like 7-Eleven and Wal-mart. In 
general the more choices any given commodity entails for its consumption the more it reflects 
the needs of a self-regulating workforce whose job description dictates more thought because it 
has not yet been technically rationalized.   
To argue as I am that culture is economically determined by the global division of labor 
is not to deny cultural differences and the micro-practices of the everyday but to explain them as 
the effects of more primary economic causes.  My reason for doing so is because contemporary 
cultural theory is dominated by a culturalist ideology that focuses solely on culture and not its 
material cause in labor arrangements and thus makes it seem as if the world we see is culturally 
determined, that it is "spirit" that moves the world.  Culturalism reifies culture and blocks the 
consciousness of necessity that is needed for social emancipation.  In actuality the effects of 
culture on subjectivity and social practices such as voting and shopping are relays of economic 
production and reflect as imperatives and drives what are at root economic interests tied to the 
division of labor.  Red state versus blue state cultural practices and consumption patterns reflect 
different segments of capital in the US and the degree to which they are competitive in world 
markets, whether like the oil industry they are struggling for hegemony or whether like the 
information technology sector they enjoy a relative economic dominance and profit from more 
cooperation with rivals and increase their profits incrementally through constant (planned as 
obsolescent) innovations.  Big Gulp or NASCAR racing signify as they do not because the 
workers who consume them work for big oil or because they have been brainwashed by 
Republican talk radio.  The efficient "jolt" offered by a Big Gulp and the "rush" enjoyed in 
NASCAR in the presence of loud and fast machines is an effect of the division of labor and the 
kinds of needs and skills required by capitalism both to normalize these workers to the type of 
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low skill work that they do and to make them more productive by suppressing the need for class 
conscious cultural practices and displacing them with training in competitive "brand wars" 
(disguised as culture wars).  To be blind to the economic needs reflected in culture by 
considering culture to be merely the self-enclosed production of signs and the contestations over 
meaning is, therefore, to engage in the production of "false consciousness" (Engels, "Letters" 
766) and to "imagine… false or seeming motive forces" (766) in place of "the real motive 
forces" (766) that compel individuals.  The real force determining culture—which is mainly 
reduced under capitalism to the culture of consumption and "mere training to act as a machine" 
(Marx and Engels, Collected Works Vol. 6 Communist Manifesto 497)—is profit and the 
precondition of profit is exploited and alienated labor. 
According to the labor theory of culture, 
 
It was through labor that humanity created itself as a skillful, large-
brained, language-using animal, and through labor that it created 
an elaborate cultural superstructure. The very impressiveness of 
mankind's mental achievements, however, has obscured the 
fundamental significance of labor. Furthermore, the separation of 
planning for labor from the labor itself, a development of complex 
society, contributed to the rise of an idealistic world outlook, one 
that explains people's actions as "arising out of thoughts instead of 
their needs" [Engels]. (E. B. Leacock qtd. in Woolfson 77) 
 
By considering the historical alienation of social labor into culture as a realm of ideas that 
obscures its own socio-economic basis Engels transforms our understanding of labor from being 
simply a natural-technical activity into a crucial critique-al concept opposed to ideology. Culture 
is a "reflection" of the economic base because it "explains people's actions as arising out of 
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thoughts instead of their needs" as it must of necessity given the complexity of the division of 
labor which demands flexible signifying practices and literacies while at the same time 
demanding technical rationalization of the relationship of society to nature.  As a concrete 
historical activity labor of course transforms the material world in accordance with subjective 
human needs and abilities and, in the process, expands them.  Labor is a constant social activity 
expended on nature that through the course of history requires the abilities of the laborer be 
adjusted to the conditions in which labor is carried out. The consciousness of the laborer is thus 
also the product of accumulated (or "dead" as Marx says) social labor.  However, it is the 
prioritization of this abstract (natural and social) compulsion shaping the concrete instance of 
labor and its effects that allows Engels to define labor as the opposite of ideology, as the real 
social activity and material precondition that explains human practices. As the other of ideology 
labor is thus what Marx in his "Theses on Feuerbach" calls a "'revolutionary'… practical-critical, 
activity" (Reader 143) and ideology is understood in a material way as the spontaneous reflection 
of the complexity of labor arrangements that mystifies the real causes of human activity, rather 
than simply a cultural bias for example.  As a "revolutionary practical-critical activity," or 
"praxis," labor acts as a material force that transforms the natural world to serve human purposes 
and in the process—through, for example, the development of abstract signs and languages that 
allow them to generalize from the specific occasion and to foresee the future—transforms human 
beings themselves from being slaves to nature into a conscious and collective agent.  Theory thus 
has a necessary function in the labor process in that it makes it possible to abstract from the 
immediately given reality and to project into the future a different reality that corresponds more 
with evolving human needs in a way that culture as a spontaneous reflection of the existing order 
does not.  In this sense theory must be understood as grasping the outside of culture and unlike 
 38 
culture in general cannot be reduced to ideology, which is the uncriti(que)al reflection of the 
social relations that arises spontaneously from the division of labor.   
Taken as something "in itself" separate from the labor practices, as a realm of ideas or 
"culture," an ideological distortion takes place which mystifies rather than clarifies the place of 
culture in the social.  This separation and distortion is itself necessitated by history (past labor) as 
capitalism demands that more and more areas of life be technically rationalized in order to 
increase the rate of profit as, "The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing 
the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole 
relations of society" (Marx and Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party 476). This 
rationalization demanded by production for exchange ultimately "strip[s] of its halo every 
occupation" (476) and compels man "to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his 
relations with his kind" (476).  Whereas up till now particular cultural activities were alienated 
from their social basis by the market and given their own distinct disciplinary formations, such as 
"art," "philosophy," or "ethics," the same process of rationalization for the market has now made 
culture as a whole seem like a thing in itself (a realm of values) unconnected to the social base of 
production because it has become the object of specialized producers.  Culture has always had an 
economic function, however, in co-coordinating labor in relation to its material task and in 
reconciling the energies of individuals to work in common, as can more clearly be seen in tribal 
agricultural societies.  The form of culture of course changes depending on the nature of the class 
relations it reflects.  Prior to its commodification culture used to be a reflection of a more 
spontaneous and organic division of labor that arose from the more direct and forcible class 
system of feudalism in which land served as the primary resource and culture was embedded 
within a religious framework which provided a highly codified symbolic interpretation of the 
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world and one's place in it.  With the advent of capitalism and the privatization of the communal 
lands that formed the basis of agricultural economy the "organic" symbolic edifice of culture was 
destroyed and it could no longer be seen in its traditional guise as a self-evident expression of the 
way the world is, and culture begins to take on a highly rational purpose to provide an 
independent justification for all human activities without appealing to religion or tradition.  
Culture, in short, is always the production of men and women within a particular historic relation 
to the means of production through which they (re)produce their existence.  It is only under 
transnational capitalism that culture appears totally alienated from the social relations of 
production as a realm of purely discursive "values" because the rule of capital systematically 
alienates labor from the laborer by forcing her to produce not according to her needs but solely 
for exchange on the market.   
Capitalism, by depriving the worker of access to the means of production, forces the 
worker to work for wages the value of which is equivalent to the number of commodities she 
needs in order to survive and return to work.  The amount of time required for this "necessary 
labor" given the technical productivity of labor is minimal.  The rest of the time the worker is 
engaged in "surplus labor"—labor which forms neither a part of wages nor the consumption of 
the capitalist but is engaged in solely to create values which later can be exchanged on the 
market for a profit by the capitalist.  The alienated labor is the basis of culture because it creates 
a world of commodities as well as the alienated perception of production in which it appears that 
labor is exchanged for wages (articles of consumption) rather than the source of all value.  If 
production for need was the rule rather than production for profit there would be no "culture" in 
the one-sided way it is currently understood as a realm of consumption (which is coded in 
culturalist theory as discursive "production").  Culturalism, which posits that values shape the 
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world we see, is the ideology of the class whose existence depends on the exploitation of wage-
labor, the exploitation of which, furthermore, in actuality produces the commodification in which 
culture takes on an alienated appearance as a separate and self-enclosed area free of economic 
determination.  And yet, labor in reality creates the "all-sided production of the whole earth" 
(Marx and Engels, German Ideology 59), both objectively in the transformation of nature and 
subjectively in the transformation of the laborer whose exploited labor can in no way be 
experienced as a creative and self-fulfilling act (i.e., as agency) because of its abstract economic 
basis.  And yet because labor is the "all-round dependence" (59) of this "world-historical co-
operation of individuals" (59), as Marx and Engles argue, it also necessarily produces the basis 
for "the control and conscious mastery of these powers, which born of the action of men on one 
another, have till now overawed and ruled men as powers completely alien to them" (59) and 
thereby provides the basis for the materialist critique of ideology and the empowerment of the 
worker as a criti(que)al citizen of the world.  Labor is thus more than the source of value, it is a 
"'revolutionary' practical-critical, activity" that transforms our understanding of culture from an 
ideological one that trivializes culture as a "thing-in-itself" to a criti(que)al one that implicates 
culture in the material world and thereby helps to emancipate consciousness from the rule of 
capital.  In the remainder of this chapter I will investigate the construction of "popular culture" in 
general and melodrama in particular and lay bare how they are made to support the ideology of 
culturalism in the knowledge industry.  In doing so I will explain what is living (productive) and 
what is dead (reproductive) in popular culture and why. 
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1.2 POPULISM AND THE CULTURAL TECHNOLOGIES OF CAPITAL 
"Popular culture" has become the almost exclusive focus of cultural theory in the knowledge 
industry of the metropole and, in this sense, popular culture can be understood as "central to the 
project of cultural studies" (Storey, Popular Culture xi).  In contemporary cultural theory popular 
culture is no longer seen as a collection of artifacts or an archive of progress, as in 
anthropological discourses, but, rather, following the writings of Antonio Gramsci, "an arena of 
consent and resistance" (Hall, "Deconstructing" 239) over the shape of the social.  Popular 
culture, in other words, is analytically opposed to dominant culture, and, far from being a trivial 
matter is considered instrumental for consolidating support for the status quo.  The trivializing of 
popular culture in theory and practice as mere "leisure" or "entertainment" makes it a particularly 
effective place for securing the consent of the governed.  The study of popular culture is 
therefore political.  "Popular culture," seen as the place "where hegemony arises, and where it is 
secured" (Hall, "Deconstructing" 239), is used in cultural studies to contest idealist 
understandings of culture that position mass consumer culture in a lower scale of value in 
relation to "high" culture.  The traditional distinction between "high" and "low" culture presumes 
culture to have a civilizing mission to "humanize" the other, and yet it ignores, and thereby 
stabilizes, social inequality. Popular culture, in the broad political sense it currently carries, 
extends the understanding of culture beyond homogeneous, and, therefore, supposedly elitist 
assumptions and normative hegemonic conclusions "about who can claim the power and the 
authority to define social reality" (Storey, Popular Culture xii).  Thus, the politics of popular 
culture is often times a matter of looking at how culture is "made from within and below" by 
"subordinated peoples" (Fiske 2) in opposition to the dominant interests and agencies that control 
material production.  The study of popular culture in cultural studies is mostly and primarily 
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concerned with discourse, or, in other words, "the articulation and activation of meaning" (Storey 
xiii) in a culture that is used to secure and contest power at the site of subjectivity.    
Popular culture has become the object of contestation because of its own hegemonic 
function in cultural studies.  For example, Lawrence Grossberg, editor of the influential journal 
Cultural Studies, writes that the argument for "why popular culture matters," given by Stuart Hall 
in his founding essay quoted above, "continues to leave the relationship between culture and 
capital unexamined" ("Speculations" 16). In contrast to his own years of denying any causal 
relationship between capitalism and culture5 Grossberg now argues that "cultural studies must 
explicitly return to questions of economics" and "the exploitation of... labor" if it is going to be 
able to understand, respond to, and transform "the changing configurations of… systems of 
inequality" (16).  Similarly, Douglas Kellner argues that the "turn[] away from so-called high or 
elite culture in favor of the popular… merely inverts the positive/negative valorizations of the 
older high/low distinction" and, as a result, "disconnects cultural studies from attempts to 
develop oppositional forms of culture" that "wanted to develop art that would revolutionize 
society" ("Cultural Studies" 142-3). The study of popular culture as in itself subversive of 
dominant culture is here seen as a populist and anti-democratic assumption. 
The study of "popular culture" today thus raises the question: is popular culture a relay of 
the dominant ideology that legitimates the way things are, or, does it carry an oppositional value 
as critique for a new society?  Is popular best understood as the spontaneous expression of 
oppression and resistance "made from within and below" by "subordinated peoples," or, 
revolutionary because it corresponds to the material needs of the oppressed and exploited to be 
socially emancipated, as for example in Georg Lukács' understanding of "imputed class 
                                                 
5 See for example, Bringing it all Back Home: Essays on Cultural Studies. 
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consciousness" (History and Class Consciousness)?  Or is the focus on culture meeting people's 
needs itself an example of reified thinking because such a focus marginalizes the liberating 
power of pleasure, the "Everything Bad is Good for You" (Steven Johnson) argument that sees in 
popular culture such as the Internet an insurgent savvy awareness? 
Melodrama has always been a site of the "class struggle at the level of theory" (Althusser) 
where the populist sentimentality of cultural resistance and critique-al knowledge of the social 
have fought it out. In this chapter I wish to discuss melodrama as a way to make theorization of 
the popular and popular culture more concrete and answer the questions it poses for cultural 
studies. I will outline how the historical shifts in the discussion of melodrama reveal the political 
economy of the "subject" and agency under capitalism and thus explain that what appears to be a 
debate over the politics of the popular in cultural studies is in actuality an inter-class debate 
about which subjectivities better alibi the ruling class and facilitate the construction of a 
compliant workforce.  Later, I will demonstrate the effectiveness of this theorization through a 
reading of The Butcher Boy (dir. Neil Jordan, 1997).   
The question of the "popular" is central to ongoing debates in cultural studies not only 
because of the serious consequences its theorization has for social praxis in shaping the emergent 
globality in the wake of the mass protests in Seattle and Genoa and around the world in protest of 
the US invasion of Iraq, but, more importantly, because in capitalism the "popular" is used to 
hide class antagonism (through such descriptive concepts as "status" and "lifestyle," for 
example).  Before I theorize the conflicts over the popular in contemporary discourses I give a 
brief history of the term here. 
"Popular" comes from the Latin popularis (belonging to the people) and was "originally a 
legal and political" (Williams, Keywords) term in the sense that it denoted the properties, 
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resources and rights set aside for "citizens" by the state.  The contemporary meaning of the term 
as "widely favored" or "well-liked" also stems from the original Latin meaning in the sense that 
it presupposes a similar social division of labor between what is "private" (and protected from 
the majority by the armed coercive power of the state) and what is "public" (and maintained by 
the "consensus" of the governed).  The coercive division between the public and the private in 
classical Roman society produced the need for "tribunes of the people" who sought popular 
election to office by defending the public interest and forming "popular opinion."  For this reason 
as well "popular" may denote an opportunist trivialization of important issues for the sake of 
personal gain, as in "popularizing."  With the industrial revolution and the emergence of mass 
culture the term for the most part loses the connotations of status which it always had up to this 
point and takes on the meaning of that which comes from "the people themselves" as if it simply 
denoted a homogeneous and spontaneous activity on their part with no political content.  In the 
German idealist tradition popular as "of the people" becomes a central concept for talking about 
culture as "made by the people themselves" (i.e., "folk-culture") sometimes within a utopian 
framework which opposed itself to industrial "civilization."  It was the evacuation of the 
concept's traditional critical function as a political term by romantic anti-capitalist thought that 
caused the term to undergo another change in meaning which in some ways reactivates the older 
usage as that which marks a division between what belongs to "the people" (public) and what 
does not (private).  This is the usage found in the socialist and communist tradition: "popular" as 
that which serves the interests of the majority, the property-less masses who have been 
expropriated by capital from control and ownership of the social wealth they have produced. 
Thus what is "popular" for Marx denotes "a class of civil society which is not a class of civil 
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society"6 but "the dissolution of all classes" (Marx, Early Writings 256)—the proletariat.  The 
proletariat embodies the popular for Marx for because its condition of life is the norm under 
capitalism as well as because of how in accordance with this position the proletariat "cannot 
emancipate itself without emancipating itself from—and thereby emancipating—all other 
spheres of society" (Marx 256).  Popular is thus a term that designates both the material interest 
and historical task of the proletariat as it has been formed by capitalist production and is no 
longer a merely cultural marker of "status" (whether "high" as in the classical Roman idea of the 
citizen or "low" as in romantic ideology) or simply political.  With the emergence of the 
revolutionary usage of the popular as of the proletariat a "populist" backlash occurs and the term 
acquires its contemporary apologetic character as denoting a "cross-class" or "post-class" mode 
of intelligibility in which the class antagonisms in culture are suppressed for the purposes of 
mere local reforms, as in the writings of Stephen Greenblatt for instance.  Thus, according to 
Greenblatt theatre constitutes a "felt community" that circulates a "social energy" that represents 
an image of society "in which convictions and class do not divide people, for social energy cuts 
across differences and 'trickles down' from the high and mighty to the low and abject, including 
all to explode together in laughter, anxiety, and exhalation" (Siebers 61).  It is no surprise that 
                                                 
6 Marx argues that the proletariat can claim "no particular right" (Early Writings 256) under capitalism 
because as a class of civil society it shares in the universal bourgeois right to sell its labor freely in the market while 
at the same time it remains a class whose cause of formation lies outside civil society in the fact of the means of 
production having been privatized in the hands of a few and the daily expropriation of labor this entails as a 
consequence. 
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the meaning of popular today is so controversial as it is the site of a class war in which it either 
denotes the idea of the negation of capitalism or coming to peace with global inequality. 
What is popular, I will argue, is not a question of "subjectivity" (freedom of speech) but 
of objectivity (economic freedom): the popular is not a matter of desire and pleasure but of 
material need and historic necessity.  It is not "popular" but an ideological operation, in other 
words, to occult consciousness of the class antagonism at the base of society between capital and 
wage-labor.  Popular in this ideological sense is in actuality an elitist bourgeois practice that 
maintains exploitation.  And yet this is precisely the sense of popular used by the dominant 
cultural studies which argues that popular culture is radical because it is "made from within and 
below" by "subordinated peoples" (Fiske, The Popular 2) and as such "resistant" to the dominant.  
What is "radical" now is precisely a populist post-class understanding of the popular that alibis 
class inequality by reducing questions of inequality to the signifying dynamics of consumption 
where power can seem to be aleatory and shifting.  Because of the contemporary equation of 
radical with the surface features of culture it is necessary to reactivate radical as "root" 
knowledge of the social (Marx, Reader 60)—knowledge of the social relations of production 
(class).  Root knowledge is essential in order to foreground the binary in the "popular" between 
popular-as-populist post-class ideology which normalizes inequality through the symbolic 
practices of cultural resistance and popular-as-class critique which desediments the culture and 
reveals the material forces of change.  The blending and blurring of the binary supports the 
ruling class by dehistoricizing and normalizing capitalist subjectivities and displacing the 
historical "outside" (socialism) with a pietistic "beyond" (utopia). In such terms, the outside 
(labor) is thought to be an effect of the inside (tropes), as Jacques Derrida for example argues in 
his critique of structuralism; the binary inside/outside that governs materialist theory of culture is 
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itself an effect of différance, the internal tropic play of the structure itself as it tries to "fix" its 
absent center ("Structure, Sign, and Play" 247-65).7  In these terms, it is assumed that "once the 
deconstruction of those categories [of identity] fully reveals the power games that govern their 
actual structuration, new and more complex hegemonico-political moves become possible within 
them" (Laclau, Making 2).  According to this discursive logic, it becomes impossible to connect 
the secondary processes and mediations of culture to their more basic economic causes, which is 
necessary for changing the social totality from a "realm of necessity" to a "realm of freedom" 
(Marx, Capital Vol. III, 958-9). By disconnecting the outside (social relations of production) 
from the inside (cultural practices of meaning) the relation of determination between the two is 
reversed and culture is assumed to constitute the real and re-make history.      
 The dominant cultural studies reads "the popular" as "post-class"—an opaque network of 
discursive strategies and flexi-subjects free of the material universality of labor.  This is the 
popular as a relay of the dogma that "discourse" is "co-extensive with the social as such" 
(Laclau, "Populist" 87) which displaces class consciousness of the social totality outside of 
discourse with an entrepreneurial "desire" for "equality" in consumption (Laclau and Mouffe 
164).  In cultural studies now the rule is that "'Society' is not a valid object of discourse" because 
"there is no single underlying principle… constituting" it (Laclau and Mouffe 111) such as 
"surplus-value."  Surplus-value is the unit of laboring productivity privately consumed by the 
owning class that is daily expended by the working class over and above that portion of the work 
day whose use value is equivalent to the worker's historically attained means of subsistence.  
                                                 
7 Derrida's "linguistic turn" in cultural theory is widely seen as necessitated by an historical break, as he himself has 
stated: "never as much as at the present has it [the problem of language] invaded, as such, the global horizon" (Of 
Grammatology 6).  A "peculiarity of our epoch," he goes on to argue, which occurs at precisely the same "moment 
when the phoneticization of writing... begins to lay hold on world culture" (4). 
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Without the concept of surplus-value there cannot be root critique of culture as ideology that 
maintains class inequality in the base.  In other words, the classical Marxist critique of the global 
regime of wage-labor and its knowledge industries cannot guide collective praxis for the 
emancipation of all from the rule of profit when "truth is plural," as Derrida says (Spurs 103). 
"Truth is plural" is another way of saying that all knowledge is local and thus not reliable for 
securing universal social equality.  The coercive equality of the market needs the popular as 
common-sense liberal pluralism which maintains the system of wage-labor, not popular as 
knowledge of the commonality of labor which is necessary to change it.  It is the same common-
sense which dismisses critique as domineering, as when the unity of "a 'universal class'" and "a 
'knowing' vanguard subject" is read as the mark of "totalitarianism" (Butler, Laclau, and Zizek 
3).  But, without such a unity of theory and practice in the commonality of labor cultural theory 
dissolves itself into an empty populism that supports the wage-slavery of the global market as 
"resistance."  The populist cultural studies which celebrates people's symbolic resistance in the 
pleasures of consumption cannot explain why there can be no equality in consumption while a 
few continue to live off the unpaid surplus-labor of the many.  
  I am arguing that the "popular" is not the rule of desire and ignorance enshrined in the 
cultural studies that takes the limits of the market as the limits of history: rather, I treat the 
"popular" as the arena of concepts of, and conflicts over, the cultural "real" (Zavarzadeh, Seeing 
Films Politically 5).  The cultural real is neither the space of the actual (the market), which is 
merely the surface appearance of society, nor is it the ideological reflection of the existing 
regime in people's minds (ideology).  The cultural real is where the contradictions between the 
ideological and the actual, which are caused by the material forces behind appearances that are 
actually shaping the actual and thus perpetually bring the ideological to crisis, surface and must 
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be contained.  Popular in the sense that I mean as the structure of conflicts shaping the social 
real, reconnects theory with the daily by implicating everyday practices into the ensemble of 
practices that makes the totality under capitalism (what Marx calls the "workday," Capital 1, Ch. 
6).  In other words, popular marks the place where "what is" has come to be and that furthermore 
explains why "what is" must change.  Change is theorized as a matter of necessity, particularly 
the need for men and women to (re)produce as a totality their material conditions of life.  From 
this it follows that what is popular is not merely a rhetorical question about how culture "figures" 
the real and "persuades" by appealing to "desire."  Persuasion, as Marx explains, is always a 
matter of "the silent compulsion of the economic" (Capital Vol. 1, 899).  Rather, as Brecht 
explains, "popular" is a question of "the representation of truth, of the real mechanism of society" 
that enables people to "make history, change the world and themselves" (83, 81).  As Marx puts 
it, men and women "make history" when they become "conscious of the conflicts" (which are 
"not chosen by themselves" but a matter of what they are "compelled to do"), "take sides" and 
"fight it out" (Critique of Political Economy, 21). 
The populist argument in cultural studies says that Marxist theory is not 
revolutionary because its commitment to class analysis prevents it from understanding the 
"excess" pleasure generated by capitalism beyond exploitation, which it locates in such popular 
cultural forms as melodrama.  The passionate attachments people form in consuming commodity 
culture on this reading are seen as open to being re-signified into post-capitalist commitments.  
In Slavoj Zizek's writings, for example, capitalism is not based on exploitation in production 
(surplus-labor) but on struggles over consumption ("surplus-enjoyment"). Revolutionary practice 
is always informed by class consciousness and transformative cultural critique has always aimed 
at producing class consciousness by laying bare the false consciousness that ruling ideology 
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institutes in the everyday. Transformative cultural critique, in other words, is always a linking of 
consciousness to production practices from which a knowledge of social totality emerges.  Zizek 
considers classical Marxism to have an epistemologically naïve theory of "ideology" that fails to 
account for the persistence of "desire" beyond critique, the "enlightened false-consciousness" of 
The Sublime Object of Ideology, Mapping Ideology, and so on.  Zizek's more recent "return to 
the centrality of the Marxist critique" (Preface, Reader ix) is, as a result, a purely tropic 
voluntarism of the kind he endlessly celebrates in his diffusionist readings of culture as desire-al 
moments when social norms are violated and personal emotions spontaneously experienced as 
absolutely compulsory (as "drive"). Zizek's concept of revolutionary Marxist praxis consists of 
re-describing it as an "excessive" lifestyle choice—analogous to pedophilia and other culturally 
marginalized practices (Ticklish Subject 381-8). In his reading, Marxism is the only 
metaphorical displacement of "desire" into "surplus-pleasure" that makes imperative the "direct 
socialization of the productive process" (350) and that thus causes the subjects committed to it to 
experience a Symbolic death at the hands of the neoliberal culture industry. It is this 
"affirmative" reversal of familiar anti-communist narratives that makes Zizek's writings so 
highly praised in the bourgeois "high-theory" market—where it is read as "subtle" and an 
example of "deep thinking" because it confirms a transcendental position considered above 
politics by making all politics ideological. If everything is ideology, however, there can be no 
fundamental social change only formal repetition and "reversal of values" (Nietzsche). Zizek's 
pastiche of psycho-marxism consists in presenting what is only theoretically possible for the 
capitalist—those few who have already met, in excess, their material needs through the 
exploitation of the labor of the other and who can therefore afford to elaborate fantasies of 
desire—as a universal form of agency freely available to everyone (surplus-enjoyment).  
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In the affirmative cultural studies represented by Zizek, popular culture is not a site of 
false-consciousness of the totality as Marxism argues because the subject is seen as taking from 
her experience of consumption what are widely considered to be knowledges at odds with the 
normative values of the dominant ideology.  Take Erin Brockovich (Soderbergh, 2000) for 
example.  In a populist reading what is of value in the film is the way in which sexist 
representations of women are re-iterated as enabling of an activist subjectivity that radically 
questions the normativity of global representations.  Thus, what will be necessary to focus on are 
such scenes that stage and reiterate the sexist norm, like the bedroom scene between Erin and 
George, her biker boyfriend, when, faced with unemployment once again, Erin is forced to admit 
that her adolescent fantasy of herself as "Miss Wichita" did not mean that she was "going to do 
something important with her life."  The scene becomes a staged parody of her acceptance of the 
crown which goes on to mock the global values she claimed that her reign would be devoted to: 
ending world hunger and bringing about world peace.  It is the knowledge of the impossibility of 
such goals being brought about through such means as a "beauty contest" that justifies as more 
"realistic" Erin's use of her body—what the film refers to as her "boobs"—in her work as a legal 
aid/activist dedicated to uncovering and prosecuting the class action case against The Pacific Gas 
& Electric Company.     
The excess of the purely filmic experience—the moment staging the fantasy of women's 
sexuality as an agent of world-historic change—is read in the affirmative cultural studies as a 
"structure of feeling" that gives "the very first indication[] that… a new structure is forming" 
(Williams, Marxism and Literature 133) within the Symbolic edifice of a culture's norms and 
regulations that radically calls into question its more traditional values.  In this reading the 
"affective" is "read" as an effect of "power" and given its own separate genealogy that cuts it off 
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from its relation to the economic base, which actually determines social change.  The "power" of 
these films to "affect" change by imaginative means is thus reduced to re-iterating the reformist 
notion that change is a matter of the contingent and aleatory self-change of cultural practices 
themselves.  As in Foucault, power spontaneously emerges from the body and is contained and 
re-signified through dominant representations which themselves gradually change (proliferate) 
through such contacts and re-containments.  But such a reading must assume that cultural 
practices and cultural studies are not part of the same regime of labor.  In actuality, what is being 
called the "affective" and coded as an "excess" in Erin Brockovich, where the real is shown to be 
a fantasy open to political re-signification, is not merely a theoretical construction (culturalism), 
but itself the product of an historical laboring process through which people are being trained 
daily by mass industrial production through an ensemble of practices (education, popular culture, 
the cinema, the family, personal relationships, . . . ) to see culture as self-enclosed and come to 
assume this training as a natural basis for reading/writing/thinking/acting in the structure of 
global capitalism (the workday).  Affect and excess, in other words, which are attributed to the 
consumer's experience in the affirmative cultural studies, are alibis for dissimulating as a 
spontaneous experience of the subject what is in fact the role of the culture industry as a whole in 
training the postmodern workforce in the consciousness skills of culturalism.   
The question of the popular and affective in reading the commodified cultural practices 
of the daily such as film melodrama therefore is: Does melodrama stage the performative display 
of self-enclosed/self-affective power conflicts in society or, as Marx argued, is it part of "the 
history of industry" and therefore part of "the open book of the essential powers of man, man's 
psychology present in tangible form" ("Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" 354) and thus 
capable of producing knowledge that the structure of people's "wants and pleasures" is an effect 
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of labor and that the structures of feeling available in a society are always tied to their economic 
arrangements.  When the global (industrial) history of the affective is uncovered what is revealed 
is that there is nothing spontaneous and resistant about people's feelings at all because as Marx 
explains "our wants and pleasures have their origin in society" and are not therefore measured 
"in relation to the objects which serve for their gratification" but always "in relation to society" 
(Wage-Labour 33). Because of the social division of labor between those who work for a living 
and those whose ownership of the means of production allows them to live off the labor of others 
"enjoyment and labour, production and consumption" always "devolve on different individuals" 
(Marx and Engels, The German Ideology 45). The affectivity of melodrama which is seen as 
"excessive" and "resistant" in the dominant cultural studies is a form of false consciousness of 
class relations that corresponds to the actual class interest of the capitalists against the workers.  
Melodrama occults and mystifies the structure of society and translates its crises and 
contradictions into matters of the heart.  Melodrama fetishizes the affective by cutting it off from 
industrial production and thereby trivializes people's emotions.  Rather than constructing people's 
emotions as rooted in class and producing a global knowledge of them such a global knowledge 
is rather positioned in melodrama as the inhuman other of a passionate involvement with the 
world as it is and that therefore takes "what is" as "what ought to be."  In the global melodrama 
of contemporary transnational capitalism the inhuman other is always coded as those in whom 
knowledge has suppressed their freedom so as to scapegoat theory for social change as outdated 
in the world without borders.  Thus in Erin Brockovich it is the lawyers (professionals) who 
continually are shown as providing alibis for the corporate powers that be by blaming people's 
"lifestyle" for their health problems which are actually the result of the "environmental" pollution 
of industry.  Their knowledge skills are positioned against the "people skills" of Erin who shares 
 54 
the worker's lifestyle and herself experiences the prejudice of her boss and co-workers for it.  
Class as culture and affective knowing (being "in touch" with the people and experiencing 
cultural oppression) is thus placed against elitist knowledge (theory) as the means to effect 
change while knowledge is turned into a matter of "people skills" (cultural values).          
Because the global crisis of capitalism has become impossible to ignore melodrama has 
become the site of a basic class contradiction.  This is the contradiction between the role of 
melodrama in reproducing the cultural needs of exploited workers and its more basic function, 
which is to maintain a high rate of profit for the capitalist.  It is no surprise therefore that critics, 
in the attempt to revive interest in the form by making it seem relevant to the conflicts of the 
times, have come to identify melodrama as a genre of "crisis." Peter Brooks reads melodrama as 
a form of material "resistance" and agency because of its anti-normative stylistic excesses which, 
he claims, sutures the spectator into an affective zone of interiority following the loss of the 
sacred in modern society.  He argues that melodrama offers a moral solution to the unresolvable 
social contradictions of modernity due to the collapse of the sacred into the political following 
the French Revolution.  Melodrama thus provides a "moral occult"—a "realm of meaning and 
value… masked by the surface of reality" (5)—to manage the social crisis unleashed by the 
revolutionary de-sacralization of social life which yet still depends upon "the individual's 
'sacrifice to the ideal'" (6) for the reproduction of the social order.  Melodrama thus is an instance 
of what Foucault calls "political technology" because it installs a new structure of feeling in the 
world.  For Brooks this new feeling is the assumption of an "act of interpretation" (what 
Foucault, following Nietzsche, called "conscience") in everyday life in a world that constantly 
confronts the subject with the need to take sides in the ongoing struggles.  Brooks thus displaces 
the class basis of the social crisis by representing history in a voluntarist way, as the emergence 
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of the traumatic in social life provoking a universal search for stable meaning.  Such a move 
makes positive and reliable knowledge of the world independent of the subject impossible.  Such 
a view of the crisis as the loss of transcendence normalizes capitalism by treating history as the 
scene of an empty repetition—the eternal return of what Zizek, for example, understands as the 
traumatic traversal of the fantasmatic unity of the hegemonic Symbolic order—without the basic 
continuity of and conflicts over labor relations. 
One sees the same normalization of crisis dramatized in popular contemporary 
melodramas such as Erin Brockovich in the "uncanny" consciousness skills of the working 
mother played by Julia Roberts, which "shocks" the knowledge elite (the cadre of corporate 
lawyers she works with) by its sheer acuity—coming as it does from such an "unexpected" 
source.  It is the same spontaneous knowledge that, by contrast, is coded as "people skills" that 
makes her an "organic intellectual" of the working-class community which has been medically 
devastated by the corporate polluting of their ground water.  Erin's uncanny skills are shown to 
place her "in touch" with the lives of the workers in a way that is not available to professionals.  
Her subjectivity—what in real life Erin Brockovich Ellis refers to as women's "compassion" that 
she thinks is central to the "American Spirit" (Interview) and in the narrative of pleasure 
provided by the film is simply called "boobs"—is thus central to the way that the film displaces 
class from production relations to superstructural relations by re-coding class as knowledge skills 
(cultural values). "People skills"/"American Spirit"/"boobs" are code words for a kind of 
consciousness that cannot be explained by the existing relations of production, which are thus 
immunized from critique.  What such a voluntarist notion of agency as knowledge does is 
produce an occult critique of the existing that mystifies the actual dependence of labor on the 
wages provided by capital so as to naturalize the historicially specific bourgeois appropriation of 
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surplus-value and protect it from critique.  If workers can be shown to be ingenious at finding 
resources and making do with what exists, then there is no need for the revolutionary 
expropriation of property and the reappropriation of their alienated social wealth from the 
capitalist class.  Contemporary melodrama is all about finding such pockets of resistance within 
the daily and providing the subject with the consciousness skills to cope with things as they are.  
The same mystification of capital as life skills is popularized by public intellectuals like 
Hernando de Soto and Pierre Bourdieu in such organs of finance capital as The New York Times 
and The London Financial Times.  "Capital," in Bourdieu for example, functions as the basis of 
social commonality, as in Weberian sociology generally, as "income" and cultural "skill" that is 
merely inequitably distributed as "life chances" on the market and not, as in Marx, as property, 
the objective material basis that allows a minority parasitical to social production to exploit the 
labor of the majority. In classical Marxism capital is precisely what divides the working class 
from the capitalist class: capital is the accumulated surplus-value extracted by the bourgeois 
owners who, having monopolized the means of production, have forced the majority of people to 
engage in unpaid surplus-labor in order to survive. In Bourdieu capital doesn't divide people 
materially (in production), it unites them culturally (in the market).  According to Bourdieu, 
capital is anything capable of being culturally valued and whose possession establishes group 
distinctions ("habitus") and thus motivates competition and rivalry over the "symbolic profits" 
accruing around social status markers (like "boobs").  The working class need not engage in class 
struggle because it can just make do by voluntarily re-fashioning its cultural values into 
marketable assets, as does Erin Brockovich in the imagined reality of contemporary melodrama. 
The formalist approach to melodrama normalizes the historical conflicts into empty 
signifiers of symbolic and traumatic "crises" that reveal the de-centered basis of the social and 
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thus occults the ideological function of melodrama in the class struggle—by, for example, 
conflating those moments when melodrama serves to normalize the division of labor by 
mystifying the social basis of life and those moments in which it has served the people by 
clarifying the daily struggles.  Thus other cultural critics responding to the crisis of melodrama 
under global capitalism have situated its intelligibility more specifically in cultural struggles over 
meaning and have refused ascribing a meta-historical significance to the form.  Brooks' argument 
that melodrama provides a moral resolution to symbolic conflicts is thus opposed in writing 
about melodrama today on the grounds that it fails to deal with the "specificity" of melodrama, 
its insertion into social struggles and "regimes of discourse" (the academy, Hollywood star-
system, queer camp, etc.).  But cultural struggle here is diffused into local struggles and follows 
Foucault's conservative reading of culture as contingent struggles over power that are assumed to 
be unaffected by economic determination and the object of which is to open discourse to other 
"voices."  To bring to bear the productive base of social practices as a critique of the 
superstructure is considered an elitist move on this localized reading of culture because it 
violates the fetish of "pleasure" which is considered the spontaneous political agency of 
marginalized "voices" (the body of the other excluded from dominant representations).  Popular 
consciousness is supposed to be "mobilized" by the excessiveness of the melodrama, its 
difference from the normative regime of values imposed by dominant history and power, and 
thus enabling because it allows the "voice" of the other to be heard.  But this is really populist 
sentimentality which actively denies the centrality of class in social life, the fact that before one 
is politically oppressed as a Latino, lesbian, woman, etc. one is socially exploited by being 
inserted into labor relations that culture functions to legitimate. The constituencies whose voice 
is considered to be marginalized are in fact divided by class and mostly consist of wage laborers 
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who have an alienated relation to culture because of their separation from the social means of 
production and the wealth it produces, not because they are formally excluded from dominant 
institutions and have no "voice."  What global workers need is not more freedom of speech, 
which trivializes the needs of the working people, but freedom from exploitation. 
The ideological effect of contemporary melodrama is not in the "story," which tends to be 
clichéd and familiar anyway, nor in the manner that the story is figured in the zone of the 
affective, how it formally stages subjective fantasies for example, but more in the way the story 
is imag(in)ed. When referring to the "imag(in)ed" story of contemporary melodrama I mean 
more than its self-enclosed processes of signification and excessive disavowals—such a reading 
would simply return cultural criticism to formalist readings.  The imag(in)ed text refers to the 
placing of the subject in labor relations with a false consciousness of these relations—either as 
relations voluntarily entered into or as the performative display of the cultural politics of 
subjectivity—that correspond to the alienated reality of capitalism.  I take the dominance of the 
imag(in)ed text in contemporary melodrama over "story" and "signification" as evidence of my 
argument that what at any moment is considered "affective" is itself an effect of the ensemble of 
the social relations.  
Take The Matrix (Andy and Larry Wachowski, 1999) or Crouching Tiger, Hidden 
Dragon (Ang Lee, 2001) for example.  These films can be said to be melodramatic because of 
how they engage with class antagonism (by containing class to the superstructure as differences 
in knowledge "skills" and cultural "taste") while at the same time they are concerned to provide a 
global image of agency beyond class in the transvaluation of the cultural symbolic order where 
class has been contained by the dominant ideology.  In The Matrix class is re-signified as 
knowledge of the matrix itself, the virtual reality of twenty-first century capitalism that covers 
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over the reality of a post-apocalyptic world enslaved by machines.  It is on this knowledge base 
that agency is figured in the film as a conflict between those who knowing the real choose to 
fight and sacrifice their passionate attachments given to them by the matrix (Neo, Trinity, 
Morpheus) while they use it as a medium to liberate others and those who despite knowing the 
truth choose the matrix anyway (Cypher) because they cannot sacrifice their personal pleasure 
for the collective good.  Similarly, in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon there are two orders in 
which people are divided: the "official" order represented by the Wudan code of monastic-feudal 
society and the "outlaw" order of Giang Hu, composed of "tigers and dragons" and ruled by the 
bandit code of "kill or be killed."  Agency here is gained not by those who use their knowledge 
skills to liberate the oppressed (such as Jade Fox [Cheng Pei Pei] who has stolen the Wudan 
knowledge because it is used to keep women subordinate to men), or themselves (such as Li Mu 
Bai [Chow Yun Fat] who has discovered that enlightenment is merely just a "deep and sorrowful 
silence"), but by Jen Yu (Zhang Ziyi) who as an outlaw aristocrat occupies a hybrid location.  
Jen Yu values personal freedom over everything else and makes the Wudan knowledge she has 
helped Jade Fox to steal her own private property by refusing to teach her accomplice how to use 
it fully (for ending patriarchy).  Ang Lee calls her the "real hero" of the film (Lee). 
What is effective about these melodramas and what makes them so popular is not what is 
endlessly reiterated in the culture industry and retained in the memory of the viewer: it is not the 
sensational "look" of these films in relation to others, the way that the use of "wire-work" 
(Crouching Tiger) or "bullet-time" (Matrix) photography re-works on-screen action to please the 
viewer for example.  Nor of course is it the story lines, which are based on empty New-Age-y 
premises which repeat familiar religious themes that have become the mantras of cyber-business 
culture, sold as self-management techniques by business gurus on Oprah and late night 
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infomercials.  Neither is the effect of these films a matter of how their innovative "look" makes 
"appealing" the message big business wishes to "communicate" to the audience.  What makes 
them popular is their imaginative and affirmative placing of the postmodern worker into the 
newer flexible managerial systems of cyber-capitalism, which is staged as a virtual reality in The 
Matrix and as "a realm under the surface of society and the rule of law, called Giang Hu" (139) 
in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, a realm imag(in)ed purely as an arena of symbolic struggles 
over social status where knowledge determines one's class position rather than labor.  
These films are popular because they are concerned with re-training the workforce in the 
kinds of consciousness skills needed by newer, more flexible, labor relations which have 
massively privatized the means of social reproduction.  At the same time, they are alienated 
products of bourgeois production based on profit which determines that change can only take 
place in a commodified form as local innovation rather than situate agency collectively as the 
global praxis of labor.  Personal invention (transvaluation) rather than social transformation 
(revolution) depends on the naturalization of labor relations (private property) as that bedrock 
real that cannot be changed.  When workers consume The Matrix or Crouching Tiger, Hidden 
Dragon they are being provided with the consciousness skills of a highly advanced capitalist 
society and are being ideologically trained to see change in an alienated way, as separate from 
social relations as a whole and therefore as spontaneous/voluntarist, making for a more 
compliant workforce open to the terms of social reproduction of class relations under capitalism.  
It is the need for the ideological construction of a compliant workforce that makes agency in 
today's melodramas always appear to be a matter of spontaneous (voluntarist) skills subverting 
normative hierarchies: from the uncanny cognitive skills of Matt Damon in Good Will Hunting 
(Gus Van Sant, 1997) or Julia Roberts in Erin Brokovitch (2000) that makes their characters 
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upwardly mobile; to the elaborate narrative performatics of The Notebook (Nick Cassavetes, 
2004) where an older Noah has to daily reconstruct his relationship to Allie who has lost her 
memory to Alzheimer's by reading to her the story she's written of their youthful romance that 
subverts the class divide between them by constructing an image of him as a self-made man; to 
the young democrats' voluntary rejection of "foreign aid" and embrace of the values of self-
determination in Ousmane Sembene's Guelwaar (1992); or of the Maori tribal resistance to the 
value practices of patriarchal modernity in Once Were Warriors (Lee Tamahori, 1995), to name a 
few.   
The governing logic of the global melodrama of today in which class conflicts are central 
albeit represented as cultural conflicts is that the spontaneous experience of the people 
transforms fixed regimes of power.  It is the old popular front ideology of "people vs. power 
bloc" now passing as "democracy against capitalism" on the North Left by those like Ellen 
Meiksins Wood, who follows E. P. Thompson and argues that  
 
because production relations are experienced by subordinate 
classes in their own particular ways... they can come into 
contradiction with the 'common-sense of power'; and it is such 
contradictions that produce the struggles which determine the 
reorganization and transformation of modes of production. 
(Democracy 65)   
 
On these terms the raw experience of oppression and displacement leads to revolutionary 
changes without the need for materialist social theory.  This populist logic is valorized in the 
global melodrama of cyber-capitalism by being imag(in)ed as resistant to capitalism by giving 
the worker a false consciousness of class that turns capitalism and class into cultural matters.  In 
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this cyber-imaginary, global cultural changes like the Internet and the new eco-friendly lifestyle 
politics are supposed to have empowered the people against totalitarian structures by decentering 
and deregulating their lives so that they can find freedom in the local and everyday, the sphere of 
consumption, rather than, as in the past, through class struggle over the socio-economic 
conditions of production.  The dominance of this view has even produced a soap-operetic 
leftism.   
Rosemary Hennessy's Profit and Pleasure, for example, is rooted in the notion that 
politics is basically a community activity. In bourgeois cultural criticism, the idea of "community 
activity" is a code term that signals the substitution of shared "ideas," "assumptions," and 
"emotions" for "class" solidarity. What, therefore, lies at the core of "community" is not a 
structure (class) but a "feeling" (emotional intensity). Hennessy, who is not as subtle as Zizek, is 
quite open about the valorization of "feeling" ("opened her heart" [xii], "feisty politics" [xii], 
"precious friendship" [xiii], "a path with heart" [xiii], "warmth and love" [xiii]). The mark of 
membership in her imagined community is "heartache": in this evaluative social scheme, she 
who has felt the most "heartache" (emotional intensity) is the most authentic member of the 
community. This appeal to a "comradeship" based on the intensity of "feeling" clearly indicates 
that no matter what Marxist or quasi-Marxist language Hennessy uses elsewhere in her book, she 
basically believes that people's lives are changed not by revolutionary praxis but by encountering 
other "feeling" people: "During the last year of writing this book, I met… and my life has not 
been the same since" (xiii). The lesson of this encounter, Hennessy indicates, was not the classic 
lessons of Marxism that social change is a product of structural change, but that social change 
comes about by means of something called "revolutionary love" ("amor revolutionario," xiii) 
which—according to her—has taken her "time and again to the other side" ("llevarme una y otra 
 63 
vez al otro lado," xiii). The other lesson is the danger of vanguardism: "revolutionary love" has 
also reminded her that "power is finally and always in the hands of the people" ("el poder es 
finalmente y siempre en los manos de la gente," xiii)—People as spontaneous actors. This 
activist subject whose agency lies in civil society rather than production is of course central to 
normalizing the neoliberal order.  It is the new citizenship of post-national market subject who is 
driven by imperatives of consumption rather than class. 
 This is not surprising because, as one critic puts it, melodrama has been a popular way to 
"deal with the dynamics of early capitalist economics" (Elsaesser 73) and "society… is more and 
more splitting up into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat" 
(Marx and Engels, Reader 474).  Take the way, for example, that what Thomas Elsaesser calls 
Balzac's "vital and melodramatic" experience of "early" capitalism sounds more like a 
description of the contradictions of "late" transnational capitalism.    
 
The good/evil dichotomy has almost disappeared, and the 
Manichean conflicts have shifted away from questions of morality 
to the paradoxes of psychology and economics. What we see is a 
Schopenhauerian struggle of the will: the ruthlessness of industrial 
entrepreneurs and bankers, the spectacle of an uprooted, 
"decadent" aristocracy still holding tremendous political power, the 
sudden twists of fortune with no-good parasites becoming 
millionaires overnight (or vice versa) through speculation and the 
stock exchange, the antics hangers-on, parvenus and cynical artist-
intellectuals, the demonic, spell-binding potency of money and 
capital, the contrasts between abysmal poverty and unheard of 
affluence and waste which characterized the "anarchic" phase of 
industrialization and high finance. (73) 
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By privatizing melodrama as a "mode of experience" (74) specific to a "given historical and 
social context" (72) of "intense social and ideological crisis" (70) Elsaesser quietly displaces 
class struggle to an "earlier" time (an "'anarchic' phase of industrialization and high finance") and 
announces a new post-class moment free of the contradictions of the past.  By reifying the 
affective in this way—taking it out of the ongoing conflicts over the social real of class 
arrangements—culturalist theory makes melodrama a populist apologetic of capitalism.  
Melodramas have in fact always served to contain rather than deepen the class antagonism in this 
way by concealing class relations under a "sensational" and "catastrophic" façade which 
"attract[s] a heterogeneous public, the majority, avid for illusions" in a world that "demands 
action from them and, at the same time, eliminates all possibilities for that action" (Alea 111-2).  
I use the term  "(post)melodrama"  for the culturalist ideology which always considers 
melodrama popular because it provides a "post-class" space that resolves the antagonisms in the 
superstructural imaginary where they become matters of an "affective" pedagogy that naturalizes 
class inequality. (Post)melodrama has become an institution in the culture industry because it has 
become impossible to ignore or otherwise escape the effects of the class polarization of the 
globe.  (Post)melodrama displaces root knowledge of the class conflicts for the enslaved market 
subject who finds it impossible to take sides in a world of side taking because to do so would 
compromise their access to consumption.   
 The popularity of melodrama has usually been made an idealist matter by attributing it to 
the openness of the form, because it is considered a transparent representation of people's "lived 
experience," or, because in its opacity it gives a post-mimetic representation that displays the 
constructedness of the real (a regional contradiction I will focus on later).  In cultural studies as it 
is currently constituted a formal division is thus maintained between "ideology" (as 
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representation) and the cultural "real," the effect of which is to place the social in excess of 
representation in such a way as to make it unavailable for transformation.  The pedagogical 
effect of this split which perhaps carries the most important political consequences for engaging 
the contestation over melodrama is whether the cultural real is read as a "utopian" position from 
which to organize the ambiguity of contemporary experience into a seamless existential identity 
(as in Benjamin, Brooks, Elsaesser, Lang, Klinger, Byars), or, whether it is a matter of how the 
textual excesses of melodrama de-regulate "desire" making it unavailable for anchorage in the 
social for the purposes of collectivity (as in the writings of Althusser, Butler, Hays and 
Nikolopoulou).  However, what this internal division prioritizes is the question how experience is 
represented in melodrama, which at most considers agency to be a local question of "re-
description" of the ideological (as in Foucault's localism of "where there is power, there is 
resistance," History 95), and not why the dispersal of the social into the local and affective as is 
found in melodrama is needed by capitalism to alibi class relations.  For this reason there needs 
to be a critique of the contemporary construction of the popularity of melodrama because it 
occults the class struggle between those who own and those who must work for them. 
 What I call (post)melodrama is essential to such a critique.  Such a concept is needed to 
mark the ensemble of practices that diffuses culture into an empty plurality of consumer 
attachments that constitutes the populist common-sense of global capitalism which requires that 
agency be considered a matter of knowledge (values) not praxis (labor).  The critique of 
(post)melodrama will also provide a theorization of what in the discourses of Marxism has been 
put forward as a popular (global) theory of melodrama in which the class conflicts over the real 
are made central to transforming cultural practices for revolutionary change.   
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I understand the oppositional relation of a "popular" or "global melodrama" and  what I 
am calling contemporary (post)melodrama as similar to Tomás Gutiérrez Alea's theorization of 
the difference between "popular film" and "people's film." "Popular cinema," he explains, is the 
cinema of commodification in the sense that it "attract[s] a heterogeneous public, the majority, 
avid for illusions" ("The Viewer's Dialectic" 111) and does so by becoming a "costly and 
complex industry" that "has had to invent all kinds of formulae and recipes in order that the show 
it offers pleases the broadest public" (112) so as to make a profit, rather than serving as "an 
expression of the people—of the sectors most oppressed and exploited by an alienating system of 
production" (111) as does the "people's cinema."  (Post)melodrama, like Alea's "popular 
cinema," has "been the major vehicle used to encourage viewers' false illusions" as well as "the 
most effective expression of a culture of the masses as a function of passive consumers, of 
contemplating and heartbroken spectators" in a world that "demands action from them and, at the 
same time, eliminates all possibilities for that action" (112).  On the other hand, what I am 
calling "global melodrama" is like the people's cinema in that it is "popular, because it 
express[es] the interests, aspirations and values of broad sectors of the population" which are 
"carrying history onward" (113).  Alea's praxical conclusion is that "popular ought to respond 
not only to immediate interests (expressed in the need to enjoy oneself, to play, to abandon 
oneself to the moment, to elude. . . ) but also to basic needs and to the final objective: 
transforming reality and bettering mankind" (111).  Therefore, as Alea concludes, "if we want to 
find some kind of concrete criterion of what popular means it is necessary to know what those 
people represent…  in terms of the historical moment and their specific class" (115).  It is only in 
accordance with the objective criterion of class that foregrounds the "basic" and "vital needs" of 
the people that Alea's theory of the popular enables us to expose the dissimulations of 
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transnational capitalism in (post)melodrama and explain how "an authentically popular cinema" 
will only be possible "in a socialist society" (115) which has abolished wage-labor.   
What is normatively framed in writing on melodrama as a split between a "realist" or 
"modern" aesthetic and an "avant-garde" or "postmodern" cultural politics has monopolized 
debate and broadly divides research in the field.  That it is a staged debate with a predetermined 
outcome is evident in that both sides represent melodrama as a self-enclosed regime of discourse 
with no necessary connection to the laws of motion of capitalism.  I therefore use the concept 
(post)melodrama to draw out the continuity across what is considered, because of the historical 
overtones associated with "postmodernism," an epochal shift in history in theorizing melodrama.  
The "postmodern" writings on melodrama are actually more like "neomodern" texts because of 
the way they posit the agency of culture as the resistance embodied in consumption and mystify 
the political economy of the subject.  That they do so on the argument that melodrama is popular 
and more radically democratic because of its textual excesses than are the more self-reflexive 
auteurist works celebrated in high modernism does not really constitute so important a 
distinction as to justify the "post" prefix in distinguishing writing on melodrama.  More 
important is it to see such a distinction in the context of changing modalities of labor practices as 
providing the kinds of consciousness skills needed under the globalizing economy.  
"(Post)melodrama" is meant to indicate this local shift in capitalist subjectivities which maintains 
the class binary in the totality. Changes in how melodrama has been produced and consumed and 
"imag(in)ed" reflect broader social changes in the division of labor.  I would now like to examine 
these changes more closely.   
 I read melodrama in four ways that depend on how cultural conflicts were being engaged 
in ideology under the impact of changes in capitalism. All reify a cultural zone of spontaneity (of 
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"affect-ivity" and "popular-ity") from "everyday, material industry" (Marx, "Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts" 354) under the impact of globalizing cyber-capitalism: 
 
1. humanist melodrama considered a generic "fictional system for making sense 
of experience" (Brooks xvii), nostalgic about a past community of meaning in 
which "fiction" and "experience" were strictly demarcated. 
 
2. a purely cinematic modern "anti-melodrama" with its auteurist aesthetics of 
"irony" in which melodrama is read as an elaborate tropics of "unfreedom" 
(Elsaesser 88) plotting "the agonies that have accompanied the demise of the 
'affirmative culture'" (89). 
 
3. the "neomelodramas" of neoliberalism that read melodrama as "discourse," i.e., 
an "allegory of reading" about "the construction and contestation of the mimetic 
illusion itself" as an "occasion to trace the repeated transformation of… gendered 
gestures from a promised mimesis into a subversive performativity" (Butler, 
"Melodramatic Repetition" 3-4) which represents a dogmatic turn to the 
voluntarist subjectivity of the free market. 
 
4. the activist "post-melodrama" of today in which, as in Althusser, melodrama is 
read as an "immanent  critique" of ideology because it is "decentered" or "marked 
by an internal disassociation, an unresolved alterity" (Althusser "The 'Piccolo 
Teatro'" 142) that is believed to constitute the cultural Real.  In (post)melodrama 
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the performance "is the spectator's consciousness" (150) which is itself 
"incomplete, like any other consciousness, but moved by this incompletion itself" 
toward "the production of a new spectator, an actor who starts where the 
performance ends, who only starts so as to complete it, but in life" (151). 
 
The "classic" or "humanist" melodrama theorized by Walter Benjamin (The Origin of 
German Tragic Drama) and Peter Brooks (The Melodramatic Imagination) is premised on a 
Hegelian view of history as the agency of culture.  Hegel saw modernity as a "period of 
transition" in which while "the spirit of the time... disintegrates one fragment after another of the 
structure of the previous world," while "the wealth of the bygone life… is still consciously 
present in recollection" (Phenomenology 75-6) because it is embedded in the cultural archive.  
Humanist readings of melodrama are framed as a critical project to "restore" to the cultural 
archive its buried, popular utopian function.  Under the expansion and consolidation of 
capitalism in the West after both world wars and the impact of market forces which were 
commodifying the "lifeworld" and "subjectivity," critics reacted with a nostalgia for an earlier 
form of capitalism characterized by a lower level of contradiction.  Readings of melodrama 
functioned as myth at these times to secure what was seen as a lost communal totality in which 
individuals were freer of the market logic that is changing the world into a global factory. 
For example, in the writings of traditional liberal humanists like Brooks melodrama is 
read as a "sense making enterprise" (xvii) that "represents both the urge toward resacralization 
and the impossibility of conceiving sacralization other than in personal terms" (16) in times 
when "there is no universally accepted social code" (21).  On this view, history is seen as 
constituted by a break with the past, a crisis which moves the subject away from the cultural 
 70 
common-sense that provides him with a "meaningful" existence.  Melodrama thus acts as therapy 
for the culturally orphaned subject by representing a "greater aesthetic self-consciousness" (xvi), 
a "mode of conception and expression… for making sense of experience" through "the discovery 
of meaning" in the "act of interpretation itself" (Brooks xvii).   
The humanist mode of intelligibility in cultural theory put forward by Brooks assumes 
that culture is free of material and conceptual conflicts and is the space of the aesthetic.  In this 
view, culture is above politics, economics, and theory, and provides a zone where the subject has 
access to an emotional plenitude that negates the dehumanizing imperatives of modern life and 
returns him to his essential humanity.  A list of humanist cultural critics may include such 
diverse writers as Matthew Arnold, Thomas Carlyle, Lionel Trilling, Cleaneth Brooks, George 
Steiner, Herbert Marcuse, Simone de Beauvoir, E. P. Thompson, Paul Goodman, and Gertrude 
Himmelfarb.  These different writers, despite their intellectual and political differences, all share 
a commitment to culture as transcending daily life, which is itself placed in the position of being 
inauthentic and oppressive of the experiential agency of the subject.  What makes the subject 
differs within and between different humanist positions—desire, reason, or moral choice for 
example, have all been made essential to what it means to be human—but the basic form of the 
subject is the same: it is a being uniquely capable of genuine thoughts and feelings whose 
authentic expression and communication provides moving experiences that stand to "humanize" 
the world.  Culture is thus the tradition of ideas and works that distinguishes Man as unique in 
nature.  
The humanist mode of reading culture is residual in the contemporary and its 
fundamental premises have been radically called into question by postmodern cultural theory, 
which argues that with changes in the technologies of writing foundational understandings of 
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culture that posit a fundamental binary between culture and "not culture" are epistemologically 
and politically suspect as they must foreclose awareness of the materiality of culture itself.  
Brooks has argued for the hegemonic function of melodrama in cultural theory on the grounds 
that its framing of experience is "an inescapable and central form of our cultural lives" (xii) that 
is "vital to the modern imagination" (xv).  He has therefore been criticized for making 
"overarching generalizations about affect" by excluding "the ways in which melodrama served as 
a crucial space in which the cultural, political and economic exigencies" are "played out and 
transformed into public discourses" (Hays and Nikolopoulou viii).  In a new preface, Brooks 
defends himself from such criticism by reiterating the normative containment function provided 
by melodrama: 
 
One of the heartening characteristics of our moment in intellectual 
and scholarly life is that we are all reading one another—to the 
extent that we are able—across disciplinary boundaries, with a 
sense of recognition, and a sense that the aesthetic and cultural 
stakes are the same.  What we have learned... is that the 
melodramatic mode no longer needs to be approached in the mode 
of apology... we have also learned that it... can do things for us that 
other genres and modes can't. Perhaps melodrama alone is 
adequate to contemporary psychic affect. It has the flexibility, the 
multifariousness, to dramatize and to explicate life in imaginative 
forms that transgress the traditional generic constraints, and the 
traditional demarcations of high culture from popular 
entertainment. (xii) 
 
Thus the study of melodrama brings its own melodramatic rewards (it is "heartening") in that it 
recovers the ideological function of the "popular" to bring about "the greatest mixture of social 
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classes" (xvi) in an economically pragmatic way, by "transgressing" social divisions (such as 
"high"/"low culture" and "humanism"/"postmodernism"), in other words, by simply masking the 
class antagonisms at the level of theory and culture through an aesthetic relay.  To say it again, 
what is popular in the humanist tradition is an aesthetics of privatization that occults knowledge 
of the class inequality that makes the social antagonisms.  Thus for Brooks melodrama functions 
as a post-ideological "third way" in which class antagonism disappears in the moral homilies of 
"good" prose: "While its social implications may be variously revolutionary or conservative, it is 
in all cases radically democratic, striving to make its representations clear and legible to 
everyone" (15). 
In his study of German Trauerspiel (mourning-plays) written by Protestants under 
the Counter-Reformation of the seventeenth-century, Water Benjamin provides an earlier 
example of the humanist position in what has become a tutor-text of neo-marxist cultural theory.  
In his text on The Origin of German Tragic-Drama (written in 1925 and published for the first 
time in English in 1977) Benjamin reads the origin of cultural modernity as a due to a crisis of 
"sovereignty" that has brought about a permanent "state of emergency," an "aversion to 
constitutive ideas" (40) in general and a "fragmenting" of scientific knowledge in particular into 
multi-disciplines that do not cohere into a universally valid system of truth (33).  Because 
Benjamin considers the idea of the sovereignty of the State to have withered away since the 
seventeenth-century popular revolutionary movements did away with the divine right of kings, 
his theory of history proposes the becoming political of theory itself because as a result of these 
developments it is "quite impossible" he says, 
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to derive an easy moral satisfaction…from the tyrant's end. For if 
the tyrant falls, not simply in his own name, as an individual, but 
as a ruler and in the name of mankind and history, then his fall has 
the quality of a judgment, in which the subject too is implicated. 
(72)     
 
Benjamin's investment in the cultural politics of the symbolic essentially undermines the radical 
project of cultural theory as it can no longer be seen as able to provide reliable and positive 
knowledge of the world needed to change it.  Instead, cultural theory assumes primarily an 
aesthetic function for Benjamin who uses the crisis of meaning unleashed by modernity as an 
opportunity to "restore, by representation, the primacy of the symbolic character of the word… 
by recalling in memory the primordial form of perception" (36), which for him is found in the 
baroque tragic dramatic use of "allegory."  Benjamin's cultural theory is thus an instance of  
"redemptive critique" (Habermas, quoted in Wolin 29-77), what Benjamin himself understood as 
the recovery of the "truth content" of works (their situatedness under specific material 
conditions) from their "material content" (their immediate form of appearance) so as to reactivate 
the historicity of the present.  A redemptive critique consists of restoring through a hermeneutic 
operation an "existential" or organic unity of consciousness in the cultural archive that has been 
forgotten due to the de-sacralizing of cultural texts by historic progress.  In the Origin this 
existential unity is considered the "truth-content" of baroque allegory as a utopian longing for the 
sacred—a world without class contradictions—which had to be coded under the dictatorship of 
the Church during the Counter-Reformation in the guise of "mourning," a universal condition of 
creaturely existence given over to despair because of the excess and intractability of the 
contemporary political contradictions.   
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 Benjamin reads Trauerspeil as an earlier attempt to restore the need for the sacred by 
emphasizing the "fallen" and "creaturely" status of humanity associated with the spread of 
modernity.  As an example, take the fragment by Christoph Männling from his Theatre of Death 
(1692) that Benjamin places as preface to the final chapter on "Allegory and Trauerspiel": 
 
Whosoever would grace this frail cottage, in which poverty adorns 
every corner, with a rational epitome, would be making no inept 
statement nor overstepping the mark of well-founded truth if he 
called the world a general store, a customs-house of death, in 
which man is the merchandise, death the wondrous merchant, God 
the most conscientious book-keeper, but the grave the bonded 
draper's hall and ware house. (Origin 159) 
 
The effect of the inscription is not so as to argue following Marx that religion is "the 
heart of a heartless world" (Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 
of Right) that has been overtaken by the desacralizing imperative of the commodity form.  On 
Benjamin's terms such a materialist insight would be equated with the surface "material content" 
of the text.  The point of the inscription rather is the "existential" truth it contains in which 
religion and commerce function as metaphorical elaboration of a spirit of mourning.  This is the 
"truth-content" of the baroque age Benjamin seeks to hermeneutically "redeem" so as to restore a 
popular subjectivity in the present.   According to Benjamin, the popular originally emerged 
from the cultural conflicts of seventeenth-century Europe in so far as the "thesis of the age" 
required "spirit," understood as "both strict inner discipline and unscrupulous external action" in 
order "to exercise dictatorship" (98).  The valorization of spirit brought into being a reaction of 
"faith": "a mood of mourning [Trauer] in the creature stripped of all naïve impulses" that "opens 
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the way for the unlimited compromise with the world" (98) from which baroque culture "extracts 
a profusion of things which customarily escaped the grasp of artistic formulation" (66) and 
which "bore the imprint of the absolutist maxim: everything for the people, nothing by the 
people themselves" (48-9).  
Benjamin's turning to the popular culture of baroque allegory was part of a messianic 
project to restore the hegemonic function of the State (during a revolutionary "state of 
emergency") "whose constitutional position," he assumed, establishes a unity that traverses 
constituted "power" and constitutive "faith" and, thereby, "guarantees the continuity of the 
community" (Origin 65) under dictatorship.  Its potential to do so, he believed, was due to the 
fact that while the "present day heirs of the baroque writers… if not actually hostile to the state, 
that is revolutionary" are "characterized by the absence of any idea of the state" (56), and are for 
this reason ignorant of the popular need for a hegemonic authority, "the baroque writer felt 
bound in every particular to the ideal of an absolutist constitution" (56) and therefore preserved 
the presently lacking ideal of community.  In short, hegemony makes faith in a post-class utopia 
necessary at the same time that it makes actual social emancipation impossible.  Both "spirit" 
(power) and "faith" (mourning) are revealed to be extreme moral codes that, although originating 
from an historically specific political antagonism (Catholic absolutism vs. Protestant 
revolutionism), constitute the matrix of the modern totality according to Benjamin. Benjamin 
turns to a restorationist cultural milieu because he sees the "national" orthodoxy of his day as 
blind to its own hegemony in marginalizing the melodramatic heritage and thus blind to its own 
role in exacerbating the loss "of any idea of the state" to the point of fomenting a contemporary 
"extreme" "revolutionary" "hostility" to it.  Thus, his critique of contemporary German philology 
was that it could not authentically fulfill its national-popular function because in the cultural 
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sphere, where the issue was preserving the "spirit" of "the literary heritage of Germany," it 
marginalized the "non-popular" (but populist) baroque Trauerspiel: 
  
The drama, more than any other literary form, needs a resonance in 
history. Baroque drama has been denied this resonance. The 
renewal of the literary heritage of Germany, which began with 
romanticism, has, even today, hardly touched baroque literature… 
German philology looked on the totally non-popular efforts of an 
educated bureaucracy with suspicion.  Notwithstanding the 
genuine importance of what these men did for the language and the 
national heritage, and notwithstanding their conscious participation 
in the development of a national literature—their work too 
obviously bore the imprint of the absolutist maxim: everything for 
the people, nothing by the people themselves, to be able to win 
over [the] philologists… A spirit, which prevented them—although 
they were laboring on the construction of a German drama—from 
ever using the material of German popular culture. (Origin 48-9) 
 
Benjamin's cultural populism celebrates "the totally non-popular efforts of an educated 
bureaucracy" which "bore the imprint of the absolutist maxim: everything for the people, nothing 
by the people themselves," and valorizes the dictatorial counter-revolutionary State as guarantor 
of "the continuity of the community" in utopia.  His brand of cultural populism is what is now 
being turned to in cultural studies as the "essence" of Marxism because it teaches how it is 
"possible to read… a work of culture in order to reveal its message of transcendence and hope" 
(Grant 144), as, for example, in the writings of the later Derrida (Specters of Marx), Badiou and 
Zizek to name a few.  And yet, Benjamin's national-popular messianism and its nostalgic dream 
of a post-class State puts him in direct opposition to Marxist internationalism which argues for 
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exactly the opposite view of history—"the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
class struggles" (Manifesto of the Communist Party).  This class-consciousness of history is the 
other of Benjamin's messianic historicity because as a theory of history it could only have 
emerged, as Marx and Engles explain, "since the establishment of Modern Industry and the 
world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway" 
(Collected Works 486).  The State on these terms is "but a committee for managing the common 
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (CW 486) in their united interest in exploiting the global 
working class and thus cannot serve as a compensatory utopian alternative to cultural alienation. 
Writing on melodrama has of course changed since Benjamin's and Brooks' studies of it as a 
popular modern imaginary.  Significantly, Brooks himself, who is considered to have written a 
"foundational text in theorizing the genre" (Bratton 1), now "applies Foucaultian theories of the 
body to his earlier conception" (2), displacing his previous focus on the "personal" (Brooks 16) 
as what is central to consolidating the modern symbolic order.  What has not changed, however, 
is the class politics.  For example, although Hays and Nikolopoulou, as shown above, criticize 
the "excess-ive" view of melodrama in Brooks and the humanist tradition because it reifies 
aesthetic considerations from the broader cultural conflicts, they themselves situate melodrama 
in excess of history (as class struggle).  On the grounds that "the genetic mutability of 
melodrama is a sign that it responds more to historical than to aesthetic demands" (xiv), they 
argue that melodrama has the function of "'resolving' the historical complexities that lie behind 
its intersecting horizons" (x) by "revising notions of value" (xi) and "refashioning… the terms 
that define interpersonal relations" (xi-xii).  Thus, unlike the "closed historical narrative" of "the 
novel" which "elides" cultural and political struggles, melodrama, by incorporating "the 
discourses of imperialism, nationalism, and class conflict" (x), they argue, cannot serve a 
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"canonical" function and, therefore, represents an "ideology of defeat that actually inverts the 
bourgeois ethos of moral superiority and altruism" (xi).  Thus, melodrama represents a formally 
empty utopic space "not yet… fully codified" that can be "put to use either to imagine 
alternatives or to enforce the cultural paradigms that dominate" (xiv).  In short, melodrama is 
made a matter of never-ending "ideological dynamics" (vii), by which of course is meant merely 
cultural struggles over "values," that serves the purpose of mystifying rather than clarifying the 
materiality of culture as a site of class struggles over social resources.   
In the cultural theory of Hays and Nikolopoulou, culture is itself material because it is the 
singular means as well as the medium in which the "sense of the real" is discursively constructed 
and the place of the subject in history and the social is primarily determined.  "The entities 
discourse refers to are," on this view, "constituted in and by discourse" (Hindess and Hirst, Mode 
of Production and Social Formation 19-20).  Culture, in other words, is not the other of a real 
world lying "out there" beyond the means with which we attempt to grasp it—what is "outside" 
(e.g., nature or truth) is really an effect of the "inside" of the modes of signification available in a 
culture.  The discursivist cultural theory they represent is traced through a list of by now canonic 
signatures: Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Jean Baudrillard, 
Louis Althusser, bell hooks, and Judith Butler.  I realize this list may seem problematic to some 
because of its inclusion of what are usually considered diverse theorists working on 
incommensurate problematics.  Is not the "body" in Foucault different than the "body" in Barthes 
or Lacan?  My argument here is that despite the apparent differences between Foucault's 
analytics of the body as the object of "political technologies" and Barthes' performatics of the 
"grain of the voice" or Lacan's "speaking subject," they all consider materiality as the non-
discursive "real" and as such conceptually opaque.  Despite his criticisms of Lacan's 
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logocentrism, Derrida too in his dense philosophical texts such as Of Grammatology as well as 
his performative writings like Glas understands materiality as basically matter: "différance" is 
not only an example of the undecidable play of language but also a tutor-text on the "materiality 
of the signifier."  And despite Althusser's commitment to class analysis his pluralization of 
production through the concept of "overdetermination" effectively argues against capitalism as a 
foundational concept and functions not much differently in social theory from what Derrida calls 
the "supplement."  Althusser's deconstruction of the binary of base and superstructure, which is 
the order of determination in history, leads him to a merely descriptive social theory that reifies 
the localities of the social formation as ideological state apparatuses (the school, church, etc.) 
and takes as material "what is."  But "what is" is always a matter of the codes of culture that 
cannot grasp how "what is" came to be and why, through the class struggle.  
What is material for discursivist cultural theory is the materiality of the signifier, the 
excessive differential slippage of the signifier over the series of signifieds.  Since all conceptual 
oppositions emerge in the process of signification, and because human practices are 
conventionally made intelligible through the habitual repetition of linguistic codes, what is 
material is considered a "language effect."  Agency, on this view, is not a matter of "expressing" 
or "communicating" a human essence (logos) but rather a matter of "paralogy" (Lyotard), the 
performance of innovative linguistic acts that resignify and challenge the mode of intelligibility 
of the dominant discourses in a culture.  Agency, in short, is a matter of what Lacan called "the 
agency of the letter" that eludes all attempts to halt signification and secure meaning in a culture 
as difference is the origin of meaning and thus materially basic to knowing, as Derrida shows 
(Margins of Philosophy 1-27).   
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Rather than only reading the shift in writing on melodrama immanently and discursively 
as a movement from "closural" to "flexible" styles of thought as in the dominant discursivist 
cultural studies, it is more important to see these characterizations themselves as an index of the 
historicity of changes in the division of labor from a national to a transnational basis.  The shift 
in focus to a "flexible" and "pluralist" view of culture and movement away from a humanist 
aesthetic as "authoritarian" and "elitist" as is found in postmodern writings on melodrama is in 
actuality a labeling dictated by capital as it de-regulates on a world scale in order to facilitate the 
accumulation process. 
The coding is done because previously capitalism needed a subject capable of 
synthesizing his experiences into an intelligible whole, i.e., one who was capable of extracting a 
"meaning-full" pattern from the contradictions of his experience.  What this imperative did was 
to normalize a certain division of labor that carried a more pronounced relation of authority 
between upper management and workers than exists now.  The "author" in the humanist 
tradition—who stands in for the authority of the culture—was thought to "create" meaning 
directly from his "experience" and deposit it into an integral "work."  The "reader" was expected 
to extract the "meaning" by showing that she had grasped the author's "intention" thus proving 
herself to be a responsible member of the community capable of being trusted with safeguarding 
the pre-established codes of the culture.  The humanist view of culture made "sense" (i.e., was 
capable of reproducing the social relations) when labor was organized into a division between a 
higher managerial layer and a more broad layer of unskilled workers.  Humanism fell into crisis 
when these relations changed due to advances in the forces of production.   
These advances have de-skilled labor to a greater degree on a global scale so that anyone 
with a minimum of training can perform it and the workers who do so are increasingly 
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multinational and multicultural.  As a result, the "managers" of the past have been transformed 
into wage-laborers so that under global capitalism there are basically two classes: exploiters and 
exploited.  Thus capitalism no longer needs the cumbersome apparatus of idealist humanist 
aesthetic found in Brooks' or Benjamin's writings on melodrama, but a more flexible regime of 
discourse as in Hays and Nikolopoulou with a higher degree of tolerance of contradictions.  The 
discursive flexibility is necessary to contain the cultural crisis under capitalism in which culture 
stands revealed for the global majority as "mere training to act like a machine" (Marx and 
Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party)—i.e., a performative operation lacking a principled 
basis of intelligibility outside its own repetition, for the production of pragmatic subjectivities 
who go along to get along under the existing state of things.  Hays and Nikolopoulou fulfill this 
function in the most effective way by jettisoning the past norms while evacuating culture of its 
social function to reproduce labor relations under the "radical" alibi that power in class society is 
open to discursive change.  Their surface theory of the social as "ideologically dynamic" mirrors 
the sensationalism of bourgeois melodrama to the same effect of mystifying the social relations 
of production, while their merely descriptive theory of melodrama is seen as more concrete 
because it mirrors the specificity of the form.  But by valorizing a merely semiotic democracy in 
melodrama they support a cultural regime in which practice is naturalized as local pragmatics 
that maintains class inequality rather than socially transformative praxis to meet the needs of all.  
They actually miss the concrete specificity of melodrama too by occulting its praxical function in 
the division of labor.  Melodrama has actually always been an effect of the fact that "men make 
their own history" but not "under circumstances chosen by themselves" (595) and thus either 
"served the purpose of glorifying the new struggles… of magnifying the given tasks in 
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imagination" or "parodying the old" and "taking flight from their solution in reality" (Marx, 
Reader 596).   
Discursivist cultural theory is dominant as it has incorporated the traditional ideas of 
cultural theory in ways that account for the plurality and artificiality of modern culture without 
simply dismissing them as "irrational" and "dehumanizing" forces against an ideal norm about 
what it essentially means to be human, supposedly uniquely reflected and expressed in Culture 
(the tradition of Great Works).  However, discursivist cultural theory is being challenged by the 
emergent discourses of a materialist cultural theory that questions the exclusive focus on 
discourse as not very different from the humanist idealization of culture as free of the social.  In 
these terms, the social is not just the mechanism of inscription of the subject, as humanist and 
discursivist theory both maintain, but social as relations of production.  Such a critical practice 
traces itself in the texts of Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Franz Fanon, Raymond 
Williams, Catherine Belsey, Frederic Jameson, Terry Eagleton, Jorge Larrain, and Barbara 
Foley, to name a few.  These theorists have all in various ways provided valuable critiques of the 
process of capitalist reification that explains the idealization of culture as having its roots in the 
logic of capitalism. 
Because of its dominance discursivist cultural theory is usually seen as the limit of the 
political on the grounds that its foregrounding of the materiality of difference seems to privilege 
traditionally marginalized cultures whose sense of the real is articulated in other than 
monumental and essentialized terms, such as queer or black cultures (which themselves contain 
and marginalize internal differences like lesbigay and brown), or, "low" or popular culture, 
which is consumed for pleasures other than that of cultural negation, innovation and 
transformation.  But, this assumes that the conflicts and contradictions of the world are simply 
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"differences" in lifestyles that form around contrary significations and values rather than 
antagonisms that are based on social relations of power such as over access to material resources.   
Materialist cultural studies thus asks the question: Is it more enabling to see the binaries 
of race, for instance, as merely a cultural conflict that arises because of the privileging of certain 
values that will change with a change in the discourse we use to understand them?  Or, is it more 
effective to see race as a material conflict over the power and wealth available in a society that 
although relayed in cultural terms always exceeds the fate of signs?  Is the difference between 
popular and high culture simply a question of contrary value judgments over the status of and 
attitude toward pleasure in a culture, or is something materially at stake here regarding the 
possibility of a new society with greater cultural freedom than presently exists?   
The needs of the working class—which always include a "moral and historical 
component" (Marx) such as the need for dramatic entertainment—are conditioned by the class 
position of the workers in the division of labor and can be understood only by grasping these 
basic arrangements.  Because of the material crisis in social life under the regime of capital and 
wage-labor between production for meeting human needs (use-value) and production for profit 
(exchange-value), culture has always been the site of intense class conflicts.  Melodrama has 
always been a more or less successful (i.e., popular) way to represent these conflicts in dramatic 
and imaginative ways while naturalizing and normalizing the division of labor.  What Ernest 
Mandel wrote about "crime stories" is true for melodramas as well: They are 
 
fuelled by an anxiety…, a contradiction between biological 
impulses and social constraints that bourgeois society has not 
solved, and indeed cannot solve… an objective need for the 
bourgeois class to reconcile awareness of the 'biological fate' of 
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humanity, of the violence of passions, of the inevitability of crime, 
with the defense of and apology for the existing social order. 
Revolt against private property becomes individualized… The 
criminalization of attacks on private property makes it possible to 
turn these attacks themselves into ideological supports of private 
property. (8-9) 
 
Although melodramas are more broadly concerned with moral transgressions than crime 
as such, Mandel's reading of the process of "criminalization" of revolts against property 
presupposing the reification of the social as natural follows Marx's reading of melodrama as a 
"spiritualization" of the material needs and motivations of the working classes which denies that 
their agency is determined by the capitalist form of appropriation (exploitation).  In their critique 
of the melodramatic imagination of Eugène Sue and the Left Hegelians in The Holy Family, 
Marx and Engels engaged with the need on the part of the bourgeoisie to construct an "ethical 
socialism" to contain the emergent revolutionary agency of the proletariat represented by their 
own "scientific socialism."  They explained how this was done by valorizing popular culture and 
in the process occluding the material basis of class consciousness in labor relations.  Since then 
melodrama has been more or less successful in containing class conflicts to the degree to which 
it has met the needs of the people to consume imaginative representations of their real conditions 
of life (i.e., provided a use-value under capitalism) while stabilizing exploitation.  At times when 
the class struggle between labor and capital becomes impossible to ignore because of the relative 
immiseration of workers in relation to the owners and when all aspects of everyday life become 
implicated in the class struggle, melodrama has been less successful in meeting social needs and 
seems "irrelevant," "forced," "fake," or "clichéd" (even in its self-consciously "revolutionary" 
forms, which pale in comparison with the struggle in reality at such times as it has assumed such 
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a role).  As capitalism has expanded across the globe to the point that the world has come to 
seem nothing but "an immense collection of commodities" (Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 125) 
melodrama has more and more been subsumed under capital as well and made to serve the profit 
motive by being reduced to the status of escapist entertainment which is to say, as in the words 
of The Manifesto of the Communist Party, reduced to "mere training to act as a machine" 
(Reader 487).  The culture industry of contemporary melodramas thus offers "a ludicrous 
parenthesis in the middle of everyday reality" (Alea 116) in which the subject is imag(in)ed in 
ways that keep workers available for exploitation by the ruling class.  
Before the emergence of melodrama as a form of semiotic democracy in discursivist 
cultural theory under neoliberalism there was the "anti-melodrama" of the seventies.  Under the 
impact of formalist narratology and (post)structuralist poetics there was practically a complete 
inversion of the meaning of melodrama in the seventies from its earlier post-war humanist and 
existentialist articulations.  From a "redemptive" aesthetic critique of modern social alienation it 
became a technically alienated critique (attributed to the spontaneous "gaze" of the cinematic 
apparatus) of capitalist aesthetics (what Elsaesser calls "liberal idealism").  In the anti-
melodrama discussed by such writers as Elsaesser, the focus is shifted from reading "plays" and 
"novels" to reading "film."  This shift in focus also displaces the "communal" agency of 
universal "myth" sought for by the modernists for an "auteurist" ideology (in which Sirk and 
later Fassbinder stand as heroes) typical of the cultural avant-garde.  What provides the agency 
of melodrama here is its commodification into a cinema of "sensations," which is read as the 
"sublimation of dramatic conflict into décor, colour, gesture and composition of frame" 
(Elsaesser 76), that renders the ideology of liberal individualism ironic because while on the one 
hand these films "advocate… that the remedy is to apply more of the same" old affirmative 
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idealism on the other they reveal the inadequacy of doing so because of "the very mediocrity of 
the human beings involved" (89).  Whereas classical melodrama was sentimental and nostalgic 
for a time before the market polarized society into "haves" and "have nots," anti-melodrama is 
post-nostalgic and unapologetic about supporting the ideology of the market as the agency of 
social change on the grounds that ideology is subverted through its cynical repetition.  It is the 
"ironic" untimeliness of setting the ideology of "liberal idealism" contained in the melodramatic 
form in the time of the coercive harmony ("affirmative culture" 89) of the market that makes 
Elsaesser conclude that (auteurist) melodrama spontaneously constitutes a "devastating critique" 
of ideology (85).  I want to focus on Elsaesser's text for a moment because of the way that it 
reads like a survey of what have become the familiar moves of the discursivist cultural theory 
that has displaced knowledge of the class antagonism in melodrama by valorizing voluntarism 
over history and pluralism over critique. 
According to Elsaesser, "problems of melodrama" can be reduced to "problems of style" 
(74): in other words, to aesthetic conventions.  He therefore presupposes that its historical 
changes are not made in connection with the social totality and the materiality of labor, but by an 
overdetermined succession of merely contingent epistemic breaks in which narrative "modes of 
experience" fall into ideological crisis by the emergence of newer narrative technologies.  Thus, 
according to him, whereas writers in nineteenth-century Europe "understood the melodrama as a 
form which carried its own values and already embodied its own significant content" because "it 
served as the literary equivalent of a particular, historically and socially conditioned mode of 
experience" (74) this is in actuality the result of their, and our own, thinking in "conformity with 
literary standards of verisimilitude" found in "the novel" whose sheer "size connotes solid 
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emotional involvement for the reader" (76).  "We," on the other hand, because of the dominance 
of cinema, ordinarily "call something melodramatic" when there   
 
is an exaggerated rise-and-fall pattern in human actions and 
emotional responses, a from-the-sublime-to-the-ridiculous 
movement, a foreshortening of lived time in favour of intensity—
all of which produces a graph of much greater fluctuation, a 
quicker swing from one extreme to the other than is considered 
natural. (76) 
 
Cinema, according to Elsaesser, has thus made melodrama into "an expressive code… a 
particular form of dramatic mise-en-scène, characterized by a dynamic use of spatial and musical 
categories, as opposed to intellectual or literary ones" (75) that "appeal to the reality of the 
psyche" (73), characterized by "ignorance of the properly social and political… causality [of] 
social crises" (72).  Thus, according to him, Balzac depicts the "Manichean conflicts" of "early 
capitalist economics" (73) because of a hegemonic literary technology, but in the cinematic 
melodramas of Sirk, Minnelli, Ray and Cukor—because of "the fact that commercial necessities, 
political censorship and the various morality codes restricted directors in what they could tackle 
as a subject" and therefore "entailed a different awareness of what constituted a worthwhile 
subject" (77)—"alienation is recognized as a basic condition" (86) and what is shown is "how the 
economics of the psyche are as vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation as is a person's 
labour" (88).  
Under the affective alibi of an arbitrary change in the techne of narrative, because, for 
example, "speech in the American cinema loses some of its semantic importance in favour of its 
material aspects as sound" (76), Elsaesser claims that "the domestic melodrama in colour and 
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wide screen, as it appeared in the 40s and 50s" represents a formal "sublimation of dramatic 
conflict into décor, colour, gesture and composition of frame" (76) that manages "to present all 
the characters convincingly as victims" rather than motivated by private interest and personal 
psychology (86) and thereby provides "a devastating critique of the ideology which supports" 
(85) the bourgeois subject.  In other words, the auteurism of cinematic melodrama subverts the 
"exalted vision of man" contained in "the American dream" (89) that personal liberty necessarily 
leads to the social good.  On this reading, what is also subverted, however, is the critique-al 
subject whose positive knowledge of the objective world is necessary for transformative praxis. 
Elsaesser's "anti-melodrama" represents a cynical opportunism in which the general lack of 
"class consciousness" (Elsaesser 86) is conveniently read as a spontaneous and culturally 
liberating de-moralization: a lack of affect toward meta-narratives that subverts their rule. The 
displacement of class to morality—which has always been the effect of melodrama—is attributed 
to changes in technology, but this is in fact simply a new-er twist in an old story about "ethical 
socialism" (Marx and Engels, The Holy Family).  Elsaesser reproduces class in the 
superstructure (as differences in values) even as he erases it in the base (where it is a matter of 
which class produces and which consumes surplus-labor).  He does so by arguing for melodrama 
as "a conscious use of style-as-meaning," as "the very condition of a modernist sensibility 
working in popular culture" (77) that "privileges the spectator" because it "activates very 
strongly an audience's participation, for there is a desire to make up for the emotional deficiency" 
(88) of the characters in the film.  In Elsaesser's cultural theory there stands on the one side 
technically conscious auteurs who know how melodrama is "emotionally exploitative" and who 
"privilege the spectator" by "giving" them this knowledge for a profit while on the other side 
stand the masses with their "ignorance of the properly social and political" (72) changes that 
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have taken place in melodrama and how it is used in exploitative ways and are hungry for 
spectacle.  Elsaesser thus provides the social division of labor with a complimentary, co-
operative and harmonious façade in the popular need for ideology.  Melodrama in this 
opportunist sense is "the last word and the only seriously meant word of bourgeois Socialism. It 
is summed up in the phrase: the bourgeois is a bourgeois—for the benefit of the working class" 
(Marx and Engels, Reader 497). 
By the eighties the cynical criticism of affirmative culture was no longer acceptable 
because of its residual critique of liberal ideology.  Because of the expansion of capitalism and 
contraction of socialism in the world it became normative to think that society had entered a 
"post-ideological" zone in which what socially mattered was how to manage the new post-
industrial "knowledge" economy that was ushering in the "end of history" with the "death of 
class."  As a result, there emerged a neo-melodrama that returns to the liberal ideology of the 
subject of the classic melodrama, not in the mode of a universal critique for a utopian society, 
but as the sovereign consumer, the subject of pleasure celebrated in the later Foucault.  This neo-
melodrama makes "desire" foundational to the social by dissolving social relations in the 
performatics of subjectivity.  In the process of endlessly reiterating the normative codes and 
conventions of culture the subject finds moments of liberation by extracting "pleasure" in the 
subtle displacement of their normative significance.  Neomelodrama is a form of cultural 
pluralism in which a Rortyean pragmatics displaces power analysis as tied to structural positions 
of intelligibility.  Neo-melodrama, as articulated in Hays and Nikolopoulou's reading of it as 
performing the "overdetermined" status of culture, reflect the securing of neoliberalism in the 
eighties and the de-regulation of the State.  With the growing class polarization that has taken 
place under this regime, however, there is a return to a universal concept of ideology as the 
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anchorage of the subject in the social relations and cultural theory begins to talk about 
globalization and neoliberalism.  With the return of the concept of an ideological social totality, 
critique becomes a prerequisite for political agency and instrumental in making social change. 
However, the return, as do all returns, presupposes a debt.  And the debt here is marked by the 
emptying of the concept of ideology as "false consciousness" of class, as in the writings of 
Althusser for example, in favor of ideology as therapy to suture the "trauma" of subjectivity—
what Zizek calls "the absent center of political ontology" or Lyotard "the incredulity toward 
grand-narratives"—as in the (re-turning) religious writings of Benjamin which place the affective 
as central to the community.  
What I am calling (post)melodrama is dominant in the nineties under the crisis of 
globalization and returns to neomarxist writers like Althusser for a political critique of capitalist 
hegemony.  It accepts the post-al dogma of the pan-insidism of ideology as brought about by the 
"absent cause" of the proletariat at the center of global capitalism but in such a way as to 
authorize activist subjects who identify their desire with a utopic social real.  Desire is now not 
simply the pluralized desire of neoliberal ideology motivated by the constitutive lack of social 
attachment as discursivist cultural theory celebrated in the eighties but the alienated desire of the 
Symbolic order itself which makes subjects into bearers of utopian ideals because it totally 
excludes their feelings.  For example, a recent text in Rethinking Marxism repeats Derrida's call 
for a "hauntology" that "will blow to pieces the stasis of the present and free it from what 
Benjamin would term the homogenous 'continuum of history'" (71), as an argument for a "queer 
politics" manned by "gay incendiaries" because "what is the messianic in relationship to the 
contemporary symbolic order if not the death drive?" (Wegner 76).  On these terms the subject 
becomes the figure of an impossible desire for universality that cannot be realized and which 
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mobilizes illusions and fantasies as the basis of a re-newed popular life.  Wegner thus argues that 
the blockbuster movie Independence Day (Roland Emmerich, 1996) offers "a figure of the 
revolution itself" in the alien's "eradication of a worldwide archive of the cultural heritage" (71) 
because such images "tap into contemporary desires for a radical change of affairs" (72) at a time 
of "collective inability to do anything that might transform the social, cultural, and political 
landscape" (67).  This text assumes that a "radical" theory of popular culture consists of re-
describing its libertarian rhetoric in a "revolutionary" way—as reiterating what it calls "the 
classical Marxist resistance to the thoroughly utopian idealist project of representing a new social 
order before its actual material achievement" (69)—and thus attaching to it the significance of a 
popular "desire" for change without the need of theory.  Wegner assumes that what is 
revolutionary are "marginalized" (?) lifestyles without a future and thereby accepts the 
volunteerist dogma of bourgeois agency that mystifies collectivity by making change a question 
of local rearrangements of discourse.  Wegner doesn't seem to realize that what he calls 
"restoring to Marxism its revolutionary energies" (70) is simply a relay—more and more put 
forward in a religious language in the academy—of what bourgeois economists like Schumpeter 
call "creative destruction," which is deployed in times of overproduction to "bolster consumer 
confidence" as the Fed puts it, i.e., to stimulate consumption.  To celebrate popular consumption 
as a revolutionary desire by "reappropriating the discourse" of "pleasure" within class society has 
nothing to do with Marxism.  It is a libertarian practice to "pleasure" the self at the expense of 
the other.  What Wegner's text proves is how anarchism has become vital to big business in the 
US.  In other words, as Scott Forsyth recently put it, this is a "strangely elitist brand of populism" 
("Marxism, Film and Theory" 272) which finding "subversion is everywhere" in popular culture 
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because of its "textuality" (273) has helped define cultural studies as "the rule and triumph of the 
market" (273) in the academy.   
The dominant cultural studies of melodrama today has become the scene of a staged 
contest between: (1) those who extend its meaning so as to cover all forms of representation, 
making it a meta category synonymous with the de-centered real of (post)modernity (e.g., 
Brooks, Lang, Zizek), and, (2) those who locate it more and more specifically within local 
"regimes of power/knowledge" in which the possibility of knowledge of the social totality is 
considered to be constitutively lacking (as in Butler and Hays and Nicolopoulou for example).  
Like all debates this one too is staged for the mutual benefit of the participants because of its 
exclusion of an other (class) position which brings to bear the needs of the global working class 
against the regime of profit.  Both participants to the official debate presuppose the same matrix 
of assumptions which forms the contemporary common-sense of what Mas'ud Zavarzadeh calls 
"post-ality":  "a regime of class struggle against the workers" (1) which dis-connects cultural 
practices (power relations) from their implication in labor relations (exploitation) giving them an 
independent basis in knowledge (values).  
I am proposing an other reading of cultural practices that will have a significant effect on 
how melodrama is read.  My reading re-situates melodrama as a global mode of intelligibility in 
the dialectic of social production and class praxis.  My argument is within the problematic of 
cultural studies broadly considered in so far as it socially situates melodrama within an historical 
context but it does not reduce that context to the contingencies of the local (a historicity without 
the materiality of labor).  Rather it implicates the local in the global, but not the global as the 
"real" locus of subjectivity, a regime of general and generic ideas or meta-narratives competing 
for Symbolic status against others.  By global I mean the objective historic class relations of 
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capitalism (mode of production) and its laws of motion.  My reading therefore goes outside the 
imag(in)ed debates of the post-al culture industry—the affirmative post-Marxist cultural studies 
which fetishizes the local and presupposes we live in a post-labor regime based on knowledge 
(values)—by engaging with popular culture as symptomatic of the necessity of and need for class 
consciousness (knowledge of social totality).   
Like all commodities, what I am calling global melodrama (the culture industry of films 
and theory providing an occult critique of neoliberalism) meets certain general human needs (i.e., 
has a "use-value") under the specific social and historical conditions imposed by capitalism 
(production for exchange and profit).  To understand what are widely seen as extra-economic 
cultural practices like melodrama as a commodity it is first necessary to explain what is 
capitalism which is not at all self-evident given the absolute dominance of the bourgeois 
knowledges.   
In the dominant knowledges capitalism is itself considered post-capitalist by reading the 
social in terms of "power" (itself considered to be de-centered) rather than labor (which is 
historically determinate).  Antonio Negri, for example, evacuates capitalism of its class basis by 
following Foucault, who reads capitalism as a mode of "governance," a regime of "biopower" 
that is "nothing less than the entry of life into history, that is the entry of phenomena peculiar to 
the life of the human species into the order of knowledge and power [which] undertook to 
control and modify them" (History 141-2).  Foucault provided an alibi for capitalism by marking 
"the 'right' to life, to one's body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs" (145) as a 
zone "outside history" (143) because life itself had become a "political object" (145) of techno-
science.  On such a reading, it is knowledge, not labor, that becomes central to the social.  
"Knowledge" is what Negri calls "immaterial labor" which he places in the center of capitalism.  
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Immaterial labor represents for him the "real communism" of the "immaterial, abstract, 
cooperative characteristics of social work" ("Later Althusser" 60) that he reads as "autonomous" 
of the logic of capital and which makes existing society post-capitalist already so that revolution 
is not necessary (Empire).  Capitalism is thus rejected as an object of analysis because such a 
global theory privileges the economic as basic to the social and therefore repeats what is 
considered to be the basic function of what Negri elsewhere calls "constituted power" (Savage 
Anomaly), which is to marginalize alternative social practices. Capitalism is thus diffused 
throughout the social as a logic ("constituted power") which by definition must always deny the 
performance of power in "fixing" the social real.  The object of Foucauldean power analysis is to 
block a class theoretics of the social and present the new as lying in the localities of the system.  
Thus post-Marxists like Foucault call capitalism the regime of "biopower," Deleuze and Guattari 
talk about "terriotoriality" and "coding," and Gibson-Graham reject capitalism as "capito-
centrism" and valorize local pragmatics and marginal economies. Capitalism is explained away 
on these readings as a mode of production of material life by being made into an overdetermined 
political order without a center, following Althusser.  Capitalism is therefore always already 
post-capitalist because as an overdetermined social formation it depends for its stability on the 
hegemonic articulation of different economic practices not necessarily tied to wage-labor which 
the transnational left rejects as central to the social by rejecting the orthodoxy (as fixed ideas) of 
Marxist "economism."  Capitalism is thus understood as a constitutively "out of joint" (Derrida, 
Spectres of Marx) social formation that has hegemonized the social and marginalized alternative 
economic practices that exceed the logic of capital explained by classical Marxism.  It is by re-
signifying marginal economic practices into the primary constitutive of capitalism against the 
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orthodox Marxist reading of them as secondary to class exploitation that the transnational left 
thinks social change will be brought about. 
In actuality, capitalism is still basically capitalism—and this explains the emergence of 
the purely superstructural readings of capitalism as a discursive regime held in place by fixed 
ideas—because of the basic expropriation of labor from the workers.  All anti-capitalist theories 
which foresee social change being brought about without the abolition of exploitation in the base 
are in fact sentimental morality tales masquerading as critiques of capitalism (which is what 
makes the flexodox economics so useful as the imag(in)ed social relations of global melodrama). 
Capitalism, as classical Marxism explains, is the global mode of social production in which labor 
has been transformed into a commodity by totally separating the worker from the means of 
production.  The result of this global expropriation is the class binary (that taboo term of 
mainstream theory) between exploiters and exploited because it forces those who have only their 
labor-power to sell to work for the owners of the means of production and produce profit for 
them or starve.  It is this systematic exploitation of labor that makes capitalism capitalism, not its 
maintenance of oppressive regimes of labor outside the logic of capital.   
The forms of oppression thought to exceed the logic of capital on the transnational left 
are in actuality part of capitalism not "autonomous" of it.  Their existence testifies to the degree 
to which capitalism has rationalized productive labor.  Oppression (extra-economic coercion) is a 
secondary contradiction of capitalism because it is an effect of its uneven development.  This 
uneven development is the contradiction between the advanced sectors of capitalism, based on 
free labor markets, coming into conflict with, firstly, pre-capitalist social relations (e.g., 
communal, feudal) based on "unfree labor" or "extra-economic" coercion, and, secondly, a mode 
of capitalism in which labor has only formally rather than really been subsumed under 
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capitalism, i.e., a stage in the development of the capitalist mode of production before scientific 
mastery of the production process has been instituted and the only way to generate surplus-value 
is through the extraction of absolute surplus-value (by lengthening the working day, for example, 
or cutting wages directly).  However, as soon as capitalism organized itself historically into 
monopoly capitalism, modes of production based on extra-economic coercion were bound to 
disappear and have in fact disappeared.  The "extra-economic" forms of exploitation in the world 
today are residual of an older capitalism which has been displaced from the center of the social 
by more productive forms of labor.  In other words, they are not outside capitalism or residual of 
pre-capitalist forms of appropriation based on extra-economic forms of coercion but marginal 
forms of capitalism itself based on the exploitation of the center.  The cultural and real violence 
done to women, people of color, and lesbigay people in other words stems from the persistence 
of the economic exploitation of the working class central to capitalism and is not an independent 
political domination held in place by a separate patriarchal, homophobic, Eurocentric regimes of 
fixed ideas demanding their own special theory of change as identity politics maintains.  By 
disarticulating the totality of production practices the cultural left authorizes capitalism without 
gender, race, discrimination and thus accepts economic inequality as an integral part of human 
societies.   For them capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its 
cruelties more tolerable, more humane.  This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the 
sole goal of all contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . .) as well as the 
imag(in)ed real of global melodrama. Global melodrama is what I call the cultural process 
whereby social relations are reified into dramatic representations of crisis and conflict and turned 
into "indirect apologetics" (Lukács) for late ("moribund, " Lenin) capitalism.  The fact that this 
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process of cultural reification has become systemic and thus conscious testifies to the very real 
material possibility of transforming culture to serve human needs. 
 The Butcher Boy provides an occasion to investigate a contemporary melodramatic text 
as popular culture for global capitalism.  On the surface it appears to be the (conventionally 
melodramatic) life-story of Francie Brady (as told by himself in recollection), a young working-
class boy living in a small town in Ireland at the height of the Cold War who, under the impact of 
a dysfunctional family situation and the death of his parents, becomes a delinquent and is 
institutionalized.  However, it is the "excessive" tale of the film that shatters conventional 
narrative coherence and imag(in)es the subject in the autonomy of the affective for global 
capitalism that makes the text (post)melodramatic in the activist sense which I have argued 
above is central to global melodrama.   
As the film unfolds, Francie is shown to be a split-subject who is subject to a paranoiac 
fantasy that leads him to brutally murder a petty-bourgeois woman of the town, Mrs. Nugent, 
under the delusion that she is the "alien" cause of the loss of his childhood happiness with his 
"blood-brother" Joe Purcell.  In the first scene—which, as is later revealed, takes place in the 
"garage," the place where people who "break down" go (i.e., the local mental institution)—young 
Francie, in answer to the melodramatic question, "Why Francie, why you'd have broken your 
poor mother's heart?" explains (as his older self in voice-over narration) that  
 
When I was a young lad 20 or 30 or 40 years ago, I lived in a small 
town were they were all after me on account of what I done on 
Mrs. Nugent. If she hadn't poked her nose in between me and Joe 
everything would have been all right. Of all the wrong things I'd 
done I suppose the apples were the first. They started all the 
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trouble.  And Francie Brady didn't need any old snake to give him 
one.  He robbed them himself.  
 
The film will systematically disrupt this origin story of paradise lost by revealing the fantasmatic 
basis of the subject of the narrative, which is not Francie Brady the socially  "victimized" boy 
who is shown bandaged from head to toe in the "garage," but the older Francie Brady narrating 
the story who, having finally realized he is the "snake" who "robbed… himself" of paradise, we 
later learn, is finally being released from the mental institution into what his doctor tells him is 
"the real world" it was about time he "joined."  The film depicts a split in Francis Brady's 
personality—between a "heroic" self-determining character the film-text marks as "Mr. Francie 
Brady"; "The Incredible Francie Brady" who, like "The Great Algernon Cruthers," "travels 
through the wastes of space and time"; "Al Capone"; "Francie-Brady-The-Butcher-Boy"; and 
Francie Brady, the neglected and despised boy who becomes the "reformed" narrator of the story 
of a more conventional melodramatic tradition.  The film rehearses the narrative that Francie's 
self-alienation is the result of traumatic experiences of abuse, neglect and abandonment by his 
mentally ill mother and alcoholic father in colonial Ireland.  Because of the flashback narration, 
however, the tale is unreliable not only because it includes impossible delusional elements (e.g., 
the persecution fantasy of Mrs. Nugent), but also because in the process of narration itself the 
older Francie actively participates in the re-narrated action as young Francie's spectral 
interlocutor (as, for example, in the scene where young Francie vandalizes the Nugent house 
under the "instruction" of the older Francie in the voice-over).  This de-centered subjectivity is 
an index of the "structure of feeling" the film foregrounds and is tied in the narrative to the 
replacement of "the family" (the traditional structure for the private reproduction of socially 
necessary labor under capitalism based on heredity) with "the friend" (the commodified private 
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sphere of reproduction under cyber-capitalism which even more leaves up to the individual the 
private reproduction of labor-power).  Through these moves and displacements the film argues 
that people are basically "free" to "make" themselves what they are and should not be artificially 
limited by traditional social institutions and conventions.  The connection of the free subject and 
commodification is clear in the film because Francie and Joe's voluntary association as "blood 
brothers" as well as its fantasmatic support as a protection against the alienating effects of Mrs. 
Nugent is modeled on the latest export products of the emerging post-war metropole: Cold War 
television, comics, film noir and science fiction.  Mrs. Nugent represents a global threat of 
annihilation in the film as in Francie's fantasy she is synonymous with a "Cuban-Communist-
alien" invasion that destroys the world "as we know it."  The destruction of the world "as we 
know it" is the precondition for a utopian aesthetic of "hope" later in the film which frames the 
narrative as a movement from the sublime to the beautiful that parallels Francie's feelings of 
attachment to and detachment from the social.   
 The (post) melodramatic text of the film does not consist of the "story" or its 
"context," but in what Althusser called its "dynamic and latent structure" ("'Piccolo Teatro'") and 
in how its contradictions lead to "the production of a new spectator, an actor who starts where 
the performance ends, who only starts so as to complete it, but in life."  This is the post-al subject 
of the "post-ideological" moment—one who has left behind both the narcissistic status of 
"innocent victim" with its constitutive ignorance of "personal responsibility," and the reformed 
"voice" of the "real world," who assumes control of the narrative and re-writes his own life over 
the suppressed voice of his youth.  It is this post-al subject that provides the activist alibi that 
what matters is knowledge (of textuality, of affectivity,. . . ), rather than the extra-textual real of 
class, that is needed by contemporary cyber-capitalism. The post-al subject is imag(in)ed in the 
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narrative of The Butcher Boy by its systematically representing a world divided in two, the cause 
of which is constitutively absent because of the "traumatic" kernel of subjectivity at the basis of 
the social real.  By placing the origin story of the film in the mouth of a split subjectivity The 
Butcher Boy argues that the social totality is in actuality a performative construct that yet 
remains unchanging in its essence rather than an effect of class society open to change.  As in 
Zizek, this construct serves the post-al ideology by arguing that   
 
externalization of the cause into 'social conditions' [the patriarchal 
family, its role in the totality of the reproduction of the capitalist 
system, and so on] is… false, in so far as it enables the subject to 
avoid confronting the real of his or her desire. (Mapping 6) 
 
In other words, the object of the (post)melodramatic text is to disrupt a causal explanation of the 
global division of labor on moral grounds—because to do so "discharge[s] us of responsibility 
for it" (Mapping 30).  That this is not seen as a newer return to liberal ideology of the subject is 
due to the increased commodification and pluralization of symbolic commitments in cyber-
capitalism that the film references and performs in the context of colonial Ireland in the fifties.  
The return to the "personal" as constitutive of the political is considered enabling because it 
positions the subject in the market for a politics thereby "refusing" to accept a socially fixed form 
of politics under the alibi that fixed ideas are "hegemonic" (what Negri calls "constituted 
power") while flexible ideas are "subversive" or "constitutive power" (Savage Anomaly, 
Preface).  The resulting display of lifestyle as politics goes along with the commodification of 
the real that characterizes globalization.  Change becomes a matter of pietistic belief, choosing 
the metaphysics that chooses you, as in the contemporary neomarxist writings which model 
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themselves on messianic theology.  This flexi-theology serves to naturalize the global market as 
a post-class social real constituted by ideas. 
The Butcher Boy performs the reversal of causality not only by making the subject of the 
narrative an unreliable source but by building up tension in the narrative between a series of 
absolute binary oppositions the global logic of which is itself arbitrary because, as one of the 
town women says to Francie, "the problem is you just don't know who you're dealing with" 
anymore from one moment to the next.  Although she is referring to the Communists in their 
struggle against US imperialism over the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba, later in the film 
her statement is repeated in a dream sequence of Francie's in such a way as to give it the global 
meaning that the "time is out of joint" and it is up to the subject to "make it right" (Derrida 
Spectres of Marx).  Significantly, in this scene Francie is sedated and dreaming that the 
"Communists-aliens-Mrs. Nugent" have finally dropped the bomb and annihilated the town. As 
he and Joe walk amidst the rubble and view the corpses of the town's people, who are pigs in the 
fantasy, phrases from the past, such as the one from the woman in town, are repeated.  On 
"hearing" in the dream "the problem is you just don't know who you're dealing with" again, 
however, Francie replies to the woman/dead pig, "So who's the pig now ladies?" and in this way 
appropriates the social trauma of "not knowing" who "they are" into his own personal narrative.  
In Francie's fantasy the feared other is not only known and annihilated but known because they 
are annihilated in Francie's personal fantasy.  In other words, the materiality of the "other" is 
inverted: it is not an effect of the class binary (what the film codes as American/Communist) but 
a matter of value coding (margin/center) that is contingent on merely subjective belief systems. 
The scene thus stages the (post)melodramatic logic of global capitalism by making the subject 
and his affective desire the cause of the social rather than the reverse.  
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In order to displace global knowledge of the social cause of the contradictions the 
(post)melodramatic text must segregate the social into a field of plural flexi-attachments ruled by 
an occasionalist knowledge of "desire."  In this way it produces an opportunist subject who 
rejects "taking sides" as an unnecessary imposition on the pleasures to be found in re-fashioning 
and re-narrating the social contradictions on an ad hoc basis.  Such a subject of course does take 
sides by displacing class contradiction into merely local differences and thus making knowledge 
(values) central to the social and not labor (praxis).  In other words, it is a subject who supports 
the bourgeois culturalist ideology that change only happens in the superstructure and not in the 
base.  In The Butcher Boy there is a series of binary oppositions including: the Kennedys (i.e., 
Irish-American elites whose portraits are ubiquitously placed next to the religious icon of "Our 
Lady") and the Communists ("Krushev bastard"); England (source of Mrs. Nugent's "airs and 
graces" with which she "walked all around the place as if she owned the town" and where Uncle 
Alo has employment with "10 men under 'im") and "the town" (a "big garage" and "pig pen" 
where Francie's father is an underemployed alcoholic horn player); the town (where Francie has 
"adventures" that provide him with knowledge of mass psychology he uses to mimic the State by 
"inventing" a "pig poll tax" with which to intimidate Mrs. Nugent on her walks and to teach the 
"bog-men" how to follow and protect him in his identity of "Al Capone") and country (land of 
follow-the-leader "bog-men" who all "dance like wading through manure" because of their "ass 
in the air and nose to the ground" mentality); the Catholic "home" for juvenile delinquents ("the 
house with a hundred windows just like the one Da and Alo spent all those happy days") and 
"home" (where "Ma" the "bun woman" who acts like a "cake machine" is abused by "Da" who 
treats her "like a pig" and is most of the time passed out and whom Francie comes to see as "Mr. 
and Mrs. Monkey"); the "garage" (the place where the locals go who "break down") and the 
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church (a place filled with "bog-men who think they're at a football game" through which 
Francie must go to get the "Francie-Brady-Not-A-Bad-Bastard-Award"); the "old town" (before 
the death of Francie's parents that he compares to "a great big ocean liner lying at the bottom of 
the ocean") and the carnivalesque "new town" (that was "rising up getting ready to sail anywhere 
you wanted to go" and that "looked like the brightest and happiest town in the whole world" 
because it was putting on "the end-of-the-world-show" in which everybody is "holy-ing out" 
with a "we're all in this together" spirit because of the fear of nuclear annihilation); and finally 
the "real world" (filled with all these contradictions) and the "alien world" (the narrative in which 
"communists-aliens-Mrs. Nugent" are out to destroy "all the beautiful things" especially the 
"blood brother-hood" between Francie and Joe).  
The subject that the (post)melodramatic text valorizes by imagining the world in 
localities is one whose emotionally intense experiences serve as the source of an "inventive" 
imagination that symbolically competes with the hegemonic grand-narratives of established 
institutions and conventions and in the process reveals them to be themselves performances 
anchored in desire.  The film in fact offers a tour of these normative institutions in Francie's 
"travels through the wastes" of Irish colonial society that reveals them to be, like the town as a 
whole according to Joe, "cracked", i.e., unable to secure consent.  They are shown in this way 
because they are unable to contain the spontaneous "dissensus" Francie introduces into them, not 
as a free subject who "naturally" rebels against their authority because they are unjust and who 
thereby supports the principle of individual "sovereignty" underlying  that authority, but as a 
subject of surplus desire who over-identifies himself with public figures of authority in order to 
himself become the object of popular desire and who therefore represents the "illogic" of desire 
standing in for social authority.  For example, take the way he, Francie, assumes the role of the 
 104 
"pig toll tax" collector, a "business," he tells the women of the town who gossip in the general 
store, he "invented" in order to "prove" to them that Mrs. Nugent is a public nuisance because 
she refuses to pay it.  Another example would be when in the Catholic home for delinquent boys 
Francie first becomes an altar-boy so as to get the "Francie-Brady-Not-A-Bad-Bastard-Award" 
so that he can more quickly be released and be "right at the foot of the fountain again with Joe 
Purcell, KING OF ALL TIME" and then pretends to have visions of "Our Lady" because the 
priests tell the boys stories like this as proof that "she knew that the soul of a child is purest of 
all."  The universal desire for transcendence that constitutes the social in The Butcher Boy is 
called "the beautiful" and it is associated with the end of the social (as class antagonism).  It is 
symbolized in the final scene when Francie learns to accept the fact that "the world goes one way 
and we go another" and thereby abandons his passionate attachment to (his Christ like ideal of) 
Joe and in return is given a "beautiful" snowdrop flower by "Our Lady" on entry into the "real 
world"—the same flower that rained as fallout from the nuclear blast that annihilated the town in 
his fantasy.  The movement from the sublime (end-of-the-world nuclear holocaust) to the 
beautiful (enter-the-world single flower) parallels the movement from the dead family ("Mr. And 
Mrs. Monkey") to performative family ("blood brother") and from lost blood-brother to entry 
into the "real world."  The "real world" is thus a place beyond social struggle or solidarity, a 
place of pure aesthetic "hope" in the subject to be "inventive" and take care of himself.  This is 
the socially necessary subject of global capitalism that (post)melodrama must perform if it is 
going to be effective ("popular") in containing contemporary social contradictions.   
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2.0  MATERIALITY AND THE PRAXIS OF THE OUTSIDE 
2.1 POST-THEORY 
One of the crisis texts of cultural theory is the Critical Inquiry conference on "theory" held 
recently in Chicago (April 2003).  The conference was a defense of the "spectral" (anti-
foundational) theory that has dominated the academy in the eighties and nineties, but because 
this theory of theory has since lost its credibility with the loss of US economic hegemony and 
political legitimacy in the world the presentors all had to acknowledge in different ways the need 
for an "other" theory, hence the popularity of "ethics," "aesthetics," and "activism" at the 
conference.  Because it was typical I will focus on Bruno Latour's essay that formed the initial 
statement of the issue of Critical Inquiry that covered the conference.   
In his text Latour claims that theory is dead because it has cancelled itself: it has been 
"eaten up by the same debunking impetus" it used to reserve for "matters of fact" (232).  Theory 
forgot, according to Latour, that matters of fact are really "renderings of matters of concern" 
(232) that reflect "the things really close to our hearts" like "the God to whom I pray, the works 
of art I cherish, the colon cancer I have been fighting, the piece of law I am studying, the desire I 
feel, indeed, the very book I am writing" (243).  Theory, he claims, has traditionally mistaken its 
own concern "toward the conditions" (231) that make facts possible in the first place as a 
universal concern and thus "distanced" itself from matters of the "heart." 
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Latour's story about the death of theory and the re-birth of the spiritual depends on 
representing theory in a technological guise against the naturalness of the "heart": he calls theory 
"equipment" (231) and compares it to armaments (225, 231) on the one hand and contrasts it to 
the "new" theory as a "rendering of matters of concern" on the other.  It is the function of the 
"equipment" of theory to "debunk": "debunking" is what Latour calls the search for "causal 
explanations" (229) that "reveal the real objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the 
illusions of prejudices" (227).  The effect of making theory-as-critique a kind of "tool" is to reify 
theory from the social relations and to consider that what happens in theory is self-caused and 
self-involved.  Thus, his claim that  "causal explanations" have "outlived their usefulness" (228) 
because they depend on "the whole notion of social and society" (230) which he dismisses as a 
"social neverland" (230) that no longer exists anyway "since… the proletariat… passed away" 
(226).  But it is Latour's understanding of theory as "equipment" that has consumed itself that is 
an illusion and not the connection between theory and labor.  If the material rootedness of theory 
in the labor relations was simply false after all and theory stands revealed as an illusion why 
would Latour need to spend so much time "debunking" it by the "facts" of the "heart"?  Latour 
gives one indication of why—his paycheck.  He mentions, as if it were the result of theory eating 
itself and not the privatization of the university by big buisness, that "after that, the lights of the 
Enlightenment were slowly turned off, and some sort of darkness appears to have fallen on 
campuses" (232).  The life and death of theory is a matter of the rise and fall of profit, in short, 
not self-caused.   
Theory was needed during the Cold War to counter the critique of capitalism by 
socialism and at that time it served in the humanities to deconstruct all binaries turning them into 
formal equivalents and thus serving the dominant.  After the Berlin Wall was destroyed theory 
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changed and the anti-foundationlism that was once the result of a highly mediated and literate 
deconstruction in the founding texts of theory became normalized as a social theory of 
difference—in the writings of Foucault and Laclau for example—and theory legitimated the new 
borderless capitalism.  Today the West has lost its economic hegemony to emergent capitalist 
regimes such as China and theory is declared to be over. Culturalism, which puts values in place 
of concepts, has taken its place to manage the crisis. By turning theory from a rigorous inquiry 
into the conditions of knowledge production to an ethics that adjusts itself to existing prejudices 
Latour distances theory from the daily to make it more amenable to capital.  A sign of this fact is 
that he has to represent theory in the guise of technology and even as he argues theory is dead he 
defends a new "rendering" of it, theory with a heart, that will "inspire respect for… the objects of 
science and technology" (232) in the same way it inspires respect for God or art.   
Latour assumes that theory is a tool (equipment) and that with changes in the types of 
tools used today a fundamental change has taken place that changes theory.  In his story about 
the end of theory, theory-as-critique loses its claim to legitimacy since the public has absorbed "a 
popularized, that is teachable version of social critique" (228) —a conclusion he seems to have 
reached by noticing the marketing campaign of a recent film he alludes to—that is out of touch 
with "the challenges of the present" (231).  According to Latour, because the public practices a 
form of "gullible criticism" (230) in which "Everything is suspect… Everyone is for sale… And 
nothing is what it seems" (quoting L.A. Confidential, 230) it is necessary to "no longer… debunk 
but to protect and to care… to inspire respect for… the objects of science and technology" (232).  
On the one hand Latour claims that theory (as root knowledge) is dead because there no longer 
exists a class for whom such "equiptment" is necessary, while on the other hand, he declares the 
popularity of such root inquiry as itself a deligitimation of theory, which he assumes is supposed 
 108 
to "care" about things and "inspire respect" for "things of the heart" and not give praxical 
explanations.  Latour constructs a theory of theory that fetishizes theory as technology and 
makes it the spiritual essence of history.  In his narrative theory is a self-moving technique of 
thought without a subject whose changes produce the world we see.  Hence according to him 
theory as critique is dead because the proletariat no longer exists and "there is no greater crime 
than to address with the equipment of an older period the challenges of the present one" (231).  
The "present" in this story demands an end to causal knowledge of the world because history has 
produced a new "sacred" relation to science and technology.  Such a theory of theory as a self-
enclosed activity that functions on its own independently of the social simply passively reflects 
the fact that the present is characterized by a drive for technological innovation in the context of 
ruthless transnational competition for profits that demands of that the population care about the 
needs of big business.  What the death and rebirth of theory that is represented by Latour as a 
shift from the heartless theory-as-critique to an ethical theory with a heart shows is that what is at 
stake in theory is not in actuality the morality of theory but the class function of theory.  
Latour's assumption that theory is a kind of "equipment" that cancels its own origins is in 
actuality itself rooted in the mode of production.  Engels after all, who thought of "theory" an an 
"appititude for purely scientific investigation," had already long ago recognized (in his text on 
Feurebach) that the traditional social basis of theory had disappeared with the dominance of 
capitalism.  He explained that because theory depends for its exercise on the freedom of inquiry 
"irrespective of whether the result obtained" is "practically applicable or not" or wether it is 
"likely to offend the police authorities or not" (241), it "disappear[s] completely" (242) at a time 
when "an anxious concern for career and income, descending to the most vulgar job hunting" and 
"patronage from above" (242) becomes a necessity.  However, unlike Latour who presently at 
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such a time calls for the dismantling of theory and a turn toward sentimentality Engel's argues 
that it is precisely at such times that theory is most of all necessary if thought is not to become 
"an ideology, that is, occupation with thought as with independent entities, developing 
independently and subject to their own laws" (237), which would effectively make theory merely 
a reflection of the given estrangement of men and women from their own productions, 
enshrining the monopolization of material resources by the powers that be.  It is at such times 
that theory as critique becomes revolutionary according to Engels because "the more ruthlessly 
and disinterestedly science proceeds" despite such economic obstacles "the more it finds itself in 
harmony with the interests and aspitrations of the workers" who have "no concern for careers" or 
"profit making" (242). In short, Engels draws the exact opposite conclusion from the "end of 
theory" as does Latour and finds in it not the dissappearence of material causality and positive 
knowledge and a new age of faith-based initiatives but further evidence of the link between ideas 
and their material basis in class relations.    
Theory is not "equipment" or the "box of tools" Deleuze reduced it to the easier to claim 
the end of ideology and the death of critique (A Thousand Plateus).  The reason to consider 
theory as a "tool," as the writings of Heidegger show with their consideration of theory as 
"ready-to-hand" explanations of the world, is to mystify the social conditions which alone 
explain why theory is a necessity and make the agent of theory the individual, the private 
property owner, and thus turn theory into a commodity.  The privatization of theory has always 
been the not so hidden agenda of Western Humanism since Plato and it needs to be sharply 
contrasted with Marx's understanding of theory as "conscious life activity" (Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts 68) in common (species-being), theory as the "appropriation of man's 
essential powers… in thought" (129), a necessary precondition for what he calls "consistent 
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humanism" (92) or "communism".   Theory in this sense "represents a class" (Postface to the 
Second Edition of Capital, 98) who "have no ideals to realize" (Marx, Civil War) because of 
their position in the division of labor with only their labor power to sell and who are thus forced 
"to face with sober senses [their] real conditions of life" (Communist Manifesto).   
Theory as critique is under attack today by culturalist discourses because it exposes the 
complicity of knowledge with class and thereby compromises the ideology of knowledge as the 
source of value that is central to cyber-capitalism.   Because of the need of capital for science, 
however, the attack on theory is forced to take on the form of a defense of theory, but a theory 
shorn of its root knowledge and turned into a speculative value, hence the spectral theory 
represented by Critical Inquiry.  In its attack on the "gullible criticism" of the masses Latour's 
defense of the spectral theory is ultimately not a very effective way of marketing theory in the 
knowledge industry.  Now the most effective defense of the emptying out of theory in the name 
of theory itself is when the spirit of theory is pitted against the injustices of capitalism, as in 
Terry Eagleton's After Theory.  Eagleton offers what he claims is a marxist defense of theory, 
but effectively abandons the materialist project of critique by giving a highly reified notion of 
theory that repeats the dominant (ghost) story about it in another guise.  Eagleton defends 
materialist theory by uncovering the need for a concept of "materiality" as that which "gets in the 
way" (118) of the "capitalist success ethic" (116) which depends on the idea that "we might be 
able to know what it was to live well just by looking into ourselves, or simply by instinct" (110).  
Because capitalism according to Eagleton depends on a "ruthlessly instrumental logic" (119) that 
demands "everything… must have its point and purpose" (116) so as to build up the expectation 
of a "reward" for "acting well" (116), and reserves punishments for acting in ways which do "not 
have a goal" (115), he argues that defending the idea of "the material 'species being' of 
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humanity" (120) is a radical act of transgression (119) because he sees this concept as positing 
humanity as having a cultural root while culture for him is understood as purposeless activity for 
its own sake.  But is "the idea of fulfilling your nature" Eagleton finds exemplified in aesthetics 
really "inimical to the capitalist success ethic" (110)?  Capitalism after all depends on constant 
technical innovation to realize relative surplus value by cutting the amount of time workers 
engage in necessary labor to reproduce the value equalivalent of their wages and increasing the 
amount of time spent in surplus labor which forms the basis of the capitalist's profit.  To argue 
that "it is in our nature to go beyond ourselves" and "give birth to culture, which is always 
changeable, diverse and open ended" (119) is to naturalize the law of value that drives capitalism 
by embedding the drive for innovation in human nature.  Making culture the root of humanity 
also homogenizes culture as reflecting a universal "sense of belonging" (21) rather than a space 
of class antagonisms over the material resources of society. 
But what about Eagleton's argument that not only is culture essentially anti-capitalist but 
that it is the material root of human nature and as such an incontestable "absolute truth" (After 
Theory 103)?  On this argument he says that in the same way that "you cannot ask why a giraffe 
should do the things it does" (116) one cannot ask why humanity produces culture, or, in other 
words, ask what is the purpose of culture.  In both cases, however, nature is taken as static and 
unchanging, as if giraffes ever existed outside a changing material environment which, actually, 
always does explain why they should do what they do and not something else, which, of course, 
is what Darwin's theory of natural selection is all about.  Not only does Eagleton assume that 
what makes a giraffe is immanent to the giraffe outside the material context in which it must find 
food, shelter and other giraffes, thus effectively giving the giraffe in place of its actual nature a 
normative cultural identity, but he also naturalizes human culture by treating it as a kind of 
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secretion that is spontaneously produced by human beings as such.  Eagleton, following an 
aesthetic tradition within Western (Hegelian) Marxism since Adorno, defends "the concept of 
culture" as "the cultivation of human powers as ends in themselves" (24) on the argument that 
not only is an immanent understanding of culture "resistant" to the law of value it is also 
embedded in human nature.  But such a self-reflexive concept of culture is not coincident with 
humanity as a species and a long period of natural evolution from bipedalism and the oppossable 
thumb to economic (i.e., socially conscious) organization and tool making precedes language and 
"art," the first cultural practices which have the formation of the subject specifically as their 
purpose.  It is only by suppressing knowledge of human evolution and the origins of culture in 
labor that culture can be made to seem "purposeless" (i.e., naturally subjective rather than 
socially objective).  But, not only is culture purposeful because it is economic in essence—it 
produces a consciousness of the material process necessary to sustain human life and helps wrest 
control over nature so that humans are not the slaves of chance—it also has cross-purposes that 
arise, for instance, when short and long term purposes come into conflict, such as when the needs 
of immediate survival conflict with long term sustainability, or, as when culture serves to contain 
antagonistic class interests. 
Culture in the sense Eagleton uses it is held to be "disinterested" activity that is carried 
out for its own sake rather than instrumentally as a means to an end, as Kant argued.  But 
whereas Kant believed that culture was grounded in and reflected transcendental truths Eagleton 
maintains that "cultural ideas change with the world they reflect upon" (After Theory 22).  
Although he calls this world the "historical context" (22) or, simply, "reality" (23), clearly if 
ideas are determined by what they "reflect upon," rather than what they reflect, no matter what 
one calls the "thing-in-itself," what is being claimed is that ideas reflect themselves in the sense 
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that ideas when put to work take themselves for their own material. Thus, Eagleton's  
understanding of theory is totally spectral; he calls it "critical self-reflection" (27), "a reasonably 
systematic reflection on our given assumptions" (2), which is just another way of saying that 
ideas are self-caused, that "ideas change with the world they reflect upon" rather than change 
with changes in the structure of necessity. On Eagleton's logic, ideas "reflect" reality and the 
reality that theory "reflects" is its own ideas!  So, not only is Eagleton's concept of "species-
being" in the end not a materialist understading of humanity but a cultural one, culture itself is 
thought of as merely reflecting ideas thus effectively defining the human spiritually.  To define 
theory as an "end-in-itself" in the way Eagleton does is simply to uncritically accept a highly 
reified notion of reality where thought is held to exist in itself in contradistinction to the real 
world lying "out there" and thus to relegate change to the level of ideas and posit "nature" as an 
untransformable and therefore incontestable "bottom-line concept" (116).  Not only is such a 
theory of theory not anti-capitalist, capitalism actually necessitates such theory in which relations 
between human beings are seen as relations between determinate things on the one hand while 
ideas are essentially free on the other because it specializes labor into different technical 
activities that require special skills and in the process mystifies the social process as a whole.  To 
"cultivate" such a reified notion of human activity as a cultural "end-in-itself" against the "is-
ness" of the world simply facilitates the process of reification, which is grounded in exploitation, 
and helps privatize knowledge, thus strengthening the grip of necessity of bourgeois rule. 
In Marx's terms Eagleton's culturalist theory is trying to end the "ideal" estrangement of 
humanity at the level of ideas by returning culture to its root in species-being while forgetting the 
dependence of humanity on the "real" or "practical" estrangement of private property.  Such a 
distinction is "metaphysical" for culturalist theory of course—if culture is both the root of human 
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nature and an absolute truth in itself what real distinction is there between ideas and material 
reality?  But this is to elide a very important distinction that Marx raises.  Marx's argument is not 
that "real" estrangement (private property) is more important than ideal estrangement (cultural 
alienation) so that ending it must come first, he actually argues that "the nature of the movement 
[the re-appropriation of estranged human life] initially depends on whether the actual and 
acknowledged life of the people has its being more in consciousness or in the external world, in 
ideal or real life" (Early Writings 345).  Neither does real for Marx mean "absolute" or 
"categorical" for defining the moral essence of Man.  Marx is using real in the sense of practical 
or material in that the movement to abolish "real" estrangement "embraces both aspects" (349) of 
estrangement at once—the estrangement of ideas from their social basis when they are 
considered self-caused and the estrangement of human powers embodied in private property—
whereas the opposite is not true.  What is radical about Marx's critique of estrangement and the 
theory of humanism he advances is that it foresees the need of overcoming the necessity of 
expressing humanity negatively through the concept of the "re-appropriation" of its estranged 
essence as a whole, as he argues it is "only when we have superseded this mediation—which is 
however a necessary precondition—will positive humanism, positively originating in itself, come 
into being (345).  In other words, the question is not about whether alienation is primarily ideal 
or material in essence, which is an idealist way to present the issue because the cause of 
alienation is histrocially realtive, but about de-fetishizing theory, the root knowledge necessary 
to end alienation.  If the cause of alienation if considered purely a matter of ideology then Hegel 
would be right and the end of "objectification" would come about through the movement of 
concepts, when the subject realizes that what he assumed to be "substance" is in actuality 
"subject" and therefore concludes that the "real is rational" and thereby learns, in effect, to 
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identify agency with support of the status quo.  On the other hand, if alienation is seen as having 
purely natural causes, either lying in the brain or simply personal hardships, then ending it would 
simply be a technical problem like changing one's lifestyle or brain chemistry.  Both these 
positions turn theory into therepy and adjust themselves to getting along within the existing 
conditions. As in spiritual discourses they represent agency as the negation of the object world 
rather than its productive transformation through collectivive labor.  Marx's "consistent 
humanism" is thus "distinct from both idealism and materialism, and constitutes at the same time 
the unifying truth of both" (135) in that it overcomes the traditional one-sidedness of both these 
positions with a concept of critique-al praxis, in short, labor as the creative self-objectification of 
humanity. 
Latour and Eagleton's idealizations of theory as a self-enclosed cultural activity represent 
a return in the contemporary to the Enlightenment view of theory, or, in other words, humanist 
cultural theory, which posits culture as the other of materiality. Humanist cultural theory since 
Kant considers culture—grasped as essentially spiritual and aesthetic values—as free of material 
and conceptual conflicts.  Culture is above politics, economics, and sharp conceptual 
distinctions, and provides a soothing compensation against the dehumanizing imperatives of 
modern life as well as a timeless expression of our basic humanity.  Humanism is supposed to 
put Man as he is at the center of things, but the subject of humanism is not humanity as it is 
encountered in nature but a timeless individual who embodies "our dignity as moderately rational 
creatures" (Eagleton After Theory 109) who is arbitrarily placed in opposition to the general 
cultural decay.  Culture, as a consequence, is considered "a harmonious totality" (Eagleton 25) 
that distinguishes Man as unique in nature because he is spiritual in essence and history is seen 
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as "the steady unfolding… of the essence of humanity" (33) from out of itself rather than as part 
of natural history. 
It is within this idealist humanist tradition that Heidegger claims that "every humanism is 
either grounded in a metaphysics or is itself to be the ground of one" ("Letter on Humanism" 
225) and effectively collapses the distinction between idealism and materialism.  Where Marx 
argues that the "unifying truth" of idealist and materialist theory is labor, Heidegger claims 
"labor" is a "metaphysical determination" (243) and that "language is the house of Being" (217) 
thus negating the distinction and placing language outside the material series of social practices.   
But even Heidegger's concept of language is a material activity inserted into socially abstract 
labor.  His own "liberation of language from grammer into a more original essential framework" 
is articulated in opposition to the "technical interpretation of thinking" (218), "objectification" 
(221), and the "dictatorship of the public realm" (221), and in a materialist framework can be 
seen as an idealist appropriation of estranged labor.  It is idealist because the language of 
"multidimensionality" that Heidegger claims resists the "deliberate linguistic formulation[s]" of 
the sciences ("'philosophy'" [220] as well as 'logic,' 'ethics,' and 'physics," 219) is itself a highly 
rationalized discourse that presupposes a high level of social production.  But in his resistance to 
"objectification" Heidegger embraces "feeling or mood" as "more reasonable—that is, more 
intelligently perceptive—because more open to Being than all that reason" ("The Origin of the 
Work of Art" 151) and tries to present his concepts in the guise of spontaneous insights into the 
essence of things.  Heidegger reinscribes "experience" as the basis of knowing, not the 
experience of John Locke, but an inverted form of it in which the knowledge said to inhere in the 
object is always culturally mediated by the "world" of the subject: 
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We never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones 
and noises, in the appearance of things, as this thing-concept 
alleges; rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear 
the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate 
distinction from  the Volks wagen. Much closer to us than all 
sensations are the things themselves. (151-2) 
 
The thing in itself on this reading is an effect of the subject who "bestows essence as a 
gift" (220) on something whenever he "loves" (220) it, in much the same way that Latour argues 
that theory is always a "rendering of matters of concern" or Eagleton's understanding of culture 
as self-realization, rather than an inquiry into materiality.  It is the opposition made between 
culture (language, concern, self-realization) and materiality as mere "technique" in these 
discourses that exemplifies what I have been calling humanist cultural theory, as distinct from a 
materialist humanism which sees in ideal as well as real things the objectifications of social labor 
transforming nature in accordance with human need. 
2.2 MIMESIS AND IDEOLOGY 
It has become almost impossible to distinguish idealist and materialist theory today because 
cultural theory is almost totally discussed in terms of language and what is thought to distinguish 
theories is their position on "language" rather than their orientation to labor.  Without such a 
distinction being possible cultural theory remains bound to culturalism and simply updates a 
rather traditional humanist (idealist) aesthetics rather than move beyond it toward a consistent 
and positive (materialist) humanism.  Because, as one text on the new humanities puts it, "One of 
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the most important contemporary forms of the debate about humanism centers on the relation 
between language and meaning" (Fuery and Mansfield, 4), it is necessary to investigate questions 
revolving around mimesis and theory of language to explain the contestations over humanism in 
contemporary cultural theory.   
Humanist cultural theory since Plato understands language as mimesis.  Mimesis is the 
imitation, or, in terms of linguistics, the "representation" of nature in human rationality.  Culture, 
on these terms, is transcendent of the material world and the depository of reason.  The classical 
theory of "representation" (mimesis) as rational was considered necessary for giving men 
mastery over their own nature.  For example, the play of light and shadow in Plato's cave is an 
allegory of knowledge "to illustrate the degrees in which our nature may be enlightened or 
unenlightened" (The Republic vii 514) and is a highly value coded mediation on representation: 
hence if the "prisoners" chained in the cave in such a way so as to be only able to see the 
shadows cast by the light behind them "could talk to one another, would they not suppose that 
their words referred only to those passing shadows?" (vii 514), while "release from the chains… 
of meaningless illusion" brings one "nearer to reality" able to see "things themselves" which are 
"the cause of all" (vii 515-16).  Such knowledge of cause is considered necessary for "healing" 
the "unwisdom" (vii 515) of those who take appearances as real.  Understanding the place of 
representation as secondary (effect of a cause) is thus necessary for establishing the good and is 
also what subordinates representation to a pedagogical purpose that necessitates a distinction 
between orders of the real in nature.  Plato's allegory is after all analogous to the "puppet show" 
being viewed by the prisoners in that it contains images of "persons carrying along various 
artificial objects" (vii 514) that merely represent "things themselves" indirectly to people who if 
they did view the objects directly would be "perplexed and believe the objects now shown… to 
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be not so real as he formally saw" (vii 515).  Because representation is at one and the same time 
"meaningless illusion" and a necessary pedagogical mediation, Plato must make a distinction that 
will prove the power of man's judgment and mastery of himself as a maker of men.  Thus 
"representation in general" (x 595), or mimesis, is a mere semblance of knowledge because it 
presumes to name a "real mastery" of "not only all technical matters but also all about human 
conduct" (x 599) without in actuality possessing such knowledge as would qualify one "to 
educate people and make them better men" (x 600).  It follows that an "artist" merely works in 
"images" so as "to impress an audience which is equally ignorant and judges only by the form of 
expression" (x 600) while the true master changes men by revealing to them "what courses of 
conduct will make men better or worse as individuals or as citizens" (x 600).   
As Plato's text shows, culturalism is not new.  It has even recently codified its own canon 
(The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism), which dates its beginning to ancient Greece.  
What has always distinguished culturalism from materialism is its giving priority to "ideas" in 
the understading of nature and the separation of ideas from the natural world.  Materialism on the 
contrary has always insisted that "ideas" themselves are the result of a certain organization of 
objective reality.  Culturalism represents nature in a reified way, or, in another way of saying the 
same thing, it has ascribed objectivity to ideas and considered the material world a "bad" copy.  
Central to culturalism has always been the question of "value" as a spiritual essence that gives 
meaning to the material world rather than being a social relation.  The question of "value" is one 
of the intellectual issues that has shaped the entire course of Western philosophy.  In Plato's 
Phaedo, for example, value is made central to Socrates' discourse on method, which consists of 
assuming "some principle… judged to be the strongest" which allows the individual to affirm as 
"true whatever seemed to agree with this… and that which disagreed" to be regarded as "untrue" 
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(100a).  In Aristotle too the goal of philosophical inquiry is to secure the "good" through the 
judicial use of "reason" (logos).  The subject of reason was the subject capable of making a value 
judgment considered as a "free choice" between the "good" and its opposite.  In ancient Greek, 
logos names the principle of "computation," "accounting," "proportion," and "measure," as well 
as "ground," "reason," and "law," and was synonymous with axios ("good") and axia ("value").  
Applied to persons, value judgment was believed to adhere to an individual's essential 
"character" or "disposition" which is what makes them "unique" ("character" in ancient Greek 
means to "engrave," "stamp" or "brand" and is synonymous with "ethos," a person's "bearing," 
which indicates "rank" or "status," what in Latin is called habitus).  To be able to determine 
"value" (what a thing "is" by nature or a person's essential "character") was connected to 
determining what it would become, so the question of value is therefore also a question of 
"causality" (how things enter being) and "agency" (the power to make change).  Acquiring 
knowledge of the self or "soul" (the origin of which was considered Divine) was connected with 
"action" (the power to make change).  Determining a person's worth or value was essential to 
making and maintaining the "good life" for all, i.e., a life lead in accordance with Divine law 
(which in ancient Greece meant accepting a highly unequal slave society).  Knowledge of value 
was therefore connected to "culture" and "pedagogy."    
Value is a layered historical discourse that has traditionally been used in culturalist 
theories to privatize the subject in her own experience.  Experience is made the zone of "feeling" 
(the aesthetic) and placed in static opposition to rationality (knowledge of the object world) and 
morality (the practical realm of society and politics), as in Kant for example.  In the  discourses 
of the Enlightenment, of which Kant's writings are exemplary, aesthetic value was considered 
crucial for an understanding of the "free subject" which had seemed to become overdetermined 
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in philosophy up to that time because of the emphasis on "reason" as central to understanding, 
not least of all by Kant himself in his Critique of Pure Reason.  If the project of Enlightenment 
was to liberate the subject from "self incurred tutelage," as Kant put it in his What is 
Enlightenment?, and such freedom was defined solely from the point of view of the possession 
of a priori logical precepts, this did not seem to leave much room for understanding the self-
motivations of individuals on which the bourgeois revolution pinned its democratic hopes of a 
more equal society than was then offered by feudal absolutism.  In these terms, the aesthetic was 
considered a kind of knowing without concepts, a "purposiveness without a purpose" 
("Zweckmäsigkeit ohne Zweck"), as Kant put it, that everyone equally possessed and exercised in 
judgments of taste and which was considered to be prior to the logical understanding of things 
(science).  "In all judgements by which we describe anything as beautiful," Kant explains, "we 
tolerate no one else being of a different opinion, and in taking up this position we do not rest our 
judgement upon concepts, but only on our feeling. Accordingly, we introduce this fundamental 
feeling not as a private feeling, but as a public sense" (Critique of Judgment §22).  It was this 
"sensus communis" (or "common sense") that was supposed to found the free subject in German 
idealist philosophy in the period when the aesthetic first emerged as a disciplinary formation.  
Inscribed in the idealist doctrine of the aesthetic is the notion that "experience" is a 
bedrock knowing that exists independently of conceptuality and which gives to knowledge its 
objects in sensual form.  This set of assumptions taken over from empiricism inscribes a closely 
related idea about governance which assumes that a social order most effectively constitutes 
itself (or not) to the relative degree that it incorporates the "hearts" as well as the "minds" of its 
subjects by getting them to identify the realization of their desires with its reproduction.  The 
founding discourse of the aesthetic in the Enlightenment thus contained a contradiction: on the 
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one hand it argued that sensual immediacy was prior to knowledge and unavailable to the rule of 
reason, and, on the other, that such an irrational knowing was the basis of the social consensus on 
which the ideal State was founded.  In later more Romantic writers this contradiction was 
exploited and the aesthetic was valorized over science as the source of freedom.  An appreciation 
of the "poetic" qualities of language and representation were then considered more important 
than the earlier attempt to locate the aesthetic in the order of reason which was seen as necessary 
for basing politics on rational principles of governance, as Kant's Critique of Pure Reason tried 
to do.  Freedom came to be defined exclusively in terms of "taste" or "culture" rather than the 
rigors of scientific inquiry or the "excesses" of democracy whose instrumental manipulations of 
the natural and traditional orders were seen as tied to the horrors of modernization by the ruling 
classes. 
This brief look at the question of aesthetic value is a necessary precondition, to my mind, 
in understanding a labor theory of culture. For one thing it helps to show that the aesthetic has 
always been the site of ideology and is not a spontaneous form of knowing that comes from 
experience.  In other words, a labor theory of culture shows how the specificities of experience 
that are described as aesthetic because they demarcate a zone of knowing free of conceptuality is 
in actuality an historically produced way of knowing tied to social relations.  My point in this 
brief excursus has not been to provide a genealogy of "value" but to give some indication of its 
connection to a series of concepts with which it is related philosophically in the Western 
humanist tradition.  My reason for doing so is because I will argue that the question of value—
which is the question in theory of what has priority, "ideality" or "materiality"—is not simply an 
epistemological issue about "how" meaning is constructed (as in poststructuralist discourses), nor 
is it a question about what matters to people (as the cultural common-sense leads us to believe), 
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but is at root the question of what makes the social and why (labor).  Humanist cultural theory 
assumes that the social is an effect of ideas, the "free choices" of "individuals," and thereby 
naturalizes the free market in labor that makes profit for the ruling class and exploits workers.  
The discursive cultural theory, although it problematizes the humanist theory by showing how 
the subject is always mediated through cultural systems, ultimately reinscribes the ideological 
function of humanism in the way it makes culture into a self-enclosed regime of signification.  
The "autonomy" of culture as textuality is not very different ideologically than the "autonomy" 
of the subject in humanism.  Both separate culture from its material basis in the economic 
arrangements that metabolize nature and humanity.  The reification of culture from labor 
relations in discursive cultural theory is the same in terms of its ideological function as the 
reification of the human from its material basis in social production that is found in humanist 
thought. Materialist cultural theory provides a critique of the ideology of culturalist theory of the 
subject by implicating the subject in "the ensemble of social relations" (Marx "Theses on 
Feuerbach") of which it is an effect, showing how what makes the subject is always tied to labor 
arrangements.  Materialist theory explains language and mimesis as "reflection" of nature 
through social labor. Culture is a relay of material forces, especially labor relations (class).  
The labor theory of culture in which basic economic laws of motion arising from class 
relations explain superstructural practices is dismissed by culturalist theory as "mimetic" and 
therefore conservative.  Mimetic, that is, in the way Derrida for instance argues in his 
theorization of mimesis in "The Double Session" that "the whole history of Western philosophy" 
(191) depends on "a certain interpretation of mimesis" (183) which "implies that somewhere the 
being of something that is, is being imitated" (206) and so conceives of language as simply a 
"detour" through which "the element of the same, always aims at coming back to the pleasure or 
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the presence that has been deferred" ("Differance" 72).  In his text Derrida problematizes the 
relation "between literature and truth" (177) which in Western philosophy since Plato has 
subordinated the former to the latter on the assumption that the reflection of reality in human 
understanding given by philosophy was more essential than the appearances of things given in 
sense perception, which is imitated in art.  In an initial move "'Truth'," Derrida argues, "has 
always meant two different things" ("Double Session" 192): "dialectics and ontology" (185).  In 
other words, truth has never been singular and originary as defined in essentialist terms because 
although truth has always been defined as refering to "things as such" (185), on the one hand, or, 
in other words, a "sole standard of measurement" through recourse to which "one can always 
decide" what "is or is not true" (185), it has as well been understood self-reflexively or 
discursively as "the truth of truth" (192), or "the history of the essence of truth" (192), that is as 
contingent and dialectical, within the same tradition.  Derrida thereby shows that the difference 
within Western philosophy between the dialectical and ontological conception of truth has been 
covered over by "classical semiology" or "mimesis," of which Plato's writings are exemplary, 
which makes "the substitution of the sign for the thing… both secondary and provisional" 
("Differance" 61). By considering ontology and dialectics a "difference" in the order of truth 
rather than a consequence of the material dependence of knowledge on the objective world 
(mimesis), Derrida makes difference (the structure of knowledge) rather than reference (the 
authority of experience) "originary" (62).  In other words, by uncovering the "two different 
things" that "truth" has always stood in for in Western philosophy that remains hidden by a 
mimetic theory of language in which the sign is always assumed to be "secondary and 
provisional" in relation to the true, Derrida shows how truth is always differential (or dialectical 
in the classical terminology) and not referential (or ontological) in its origins.  But the 
 125 
deconstruction of truth set out in "The Double Session" is not simply the uncovering of 
difference at the origin that has been sutured over by essentialism because the act of revealing 
itself effects a reversal of the order of priority between dialectics (signs, writing, culture) and 
ontology (things, speech, nature) as authorized by mimesis.  Whereas mimesis places nature as 
originary and writing or art in a secondary position as its imitation, such reversal demands 
conceiving the contrary to be true, that experience does not provide the truth of the world but is 
itself a cultural inscription.   
However, Derrida argues for going beyond such a necessary reversal calling it merely an 
"apparent" inversion (192) of Platonism which shares "the same root" ("Double Session" 192) 
with it and he associates such an apparent reversal with aesthetics, the view which "strongly 
stressed that art, as imitation (representation, description, expression, imagination, etc.) should 
not be 'slavish'… and that consequently… art can create works that are more valuable than that 
which they imitate" (192).  Derrida's deconstruction of the order of truth that conceptually 
organizes Western culture is thus not to be understood as a materialist inversion of idealism 
which places language in the primary position and understands concepts as superstructural. He 
actually maintains that "any attempt to reverse mimetologism or escape it in one fell swoop by 
leaping out of it with both feet would only amount to an inevitable fall back into its system" 
(207) by maintaining the dialectic between "writing" (as mimesis) and "reality" as the "outside" 
of representation. However, the explanation of the referential conception of language (mimesis) 
as a form of differance makes the dialectic of truth, the history of philosophy and writing 
generally, which Derrida reveals to be the cultural figuration of the true, more important than 
inquiry into "things as such" or ontology, which besides being simply mimetic and subordinate 
to an idealized understanding of nature as it has been in the idealist tradition since Plato has also 
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been dialectical and concerned itself with the social interaction of labor and nature.  Rather than 
a materialist inversion that would provide a critique of  idealism from outside its premises 
Derrida argues for an awareness of the "materialism of the idea" (207) of "value" as a certain 
opacity of conceptuality inscribed in the order of signification of Western culture that has served 
an essentially reproductive function to police the boundaries of knowledge.  In Mallarme's 
Mimique for example Derrida finds not simply the reversal of mimesis which installs figuration 
as the basis of intelligibility but the preservation of its structure without its Platonic or 
metaphysical interpretation, the interpretation that always implies that somewhere the being of 
something that is, is being imitated" (206), as in Mallarme's text "the mime imitates nothing" 
(194).  Because the mime performs an imitation without reference to an original in other words, 
"we are faced with mimicry imitating nothing… a reference without a referent" (206).  Writing is 
thus understood as mimesis without reflection, a "speculum" that "reflects no reality" but rather 
"produces reality-effects" (206) while performing the structure of reference in which it appears 
that reality is being imitated or reflected.  But by identifying materiality with that which is 
opaque to consciousness Derrida also contains a critique from the historical outside of culture, 
which is the structure of labor relations and its necessary ideological reflection.   
Derrida brackets the socio-economic function of Platonism and considers it in purely 
epistemological terms, which are expanded in such a way that the traditional understanding of 
concepts as referring to things themselves is disrupted and these concepts are treated materially 
as the things in themselves which delimit thinking thereby producing an immanent awareness of 
the coercive basis of thought.  The classical representation of "representation" (mimesis) is of 
course a highly value coded mediation on representation in which knowledge is considered 
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necessary for acquiring that which gives men mastery of nature for the social good.  But, 
Platonism is not strictly an epistemological matter—at root it is economic.    
The Platonic separation of  "reason" (logos) and "materiality" (appearance) was not 
simply a cultural bias inscribed in the structure of philosophy but a reflection within theory of the 
class structure of ancient society in which the socially necessary labor was carried out by slaves 
at a low level of technological capacity.  The "logocentrism" of Plato is actually the result of the 
undeveloped economic structure of slave society which did not allow for a view of culture in 
other than vulgar materialist terms as little more than instrumental working upon raw materials.  
The rudimentary transformation of nature produced the view of knowledge as changeless and 
fixed as well as beyond the mundane world because technical innovations did not yet have an 
economic incentive to augment wealth. The modern "reversal of Platonism" Derrida dismisses as 
merely aesthetical also reflects changes in the division of labor.  With economic development 
and more complex division of labor it became impossible by Kant's time, for instance, to 
maintain a simple distinction between "logos" and social praxis and this was reflected in shifts 
within humanist theory, in the demotion of "reason" and the new valorization of the "aesthetic" 
and emotional, most notably in Kant's Critique of Judgment (1790) for example.   By the time 
Kant writes his third critique the socialization of wage labor and the production of capital had 
revolutionized humanity's relationship to nature, placing such a premium on innovation that 
"modernity" was seen as a threat to "reason" and as the unleashing of "irrational" forces, such as 
"democracy" (rule by the majority).  Kant attempted to harness these material forces by 
providing "reason" a more material foundation than the ancient canon allowed.  He argued that 
the apriori rules of reason, which his own Critique of Pure Reason itself understood as 
"transcendental" categories, were ineffectual without an understanding of their anchorage in the 
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manifold of sense perception (what for Plato was the origin of illusion), which Kant took to be 
the work of the "imagination" and found exemplified in aesthetic experience.    If "reason" was 
not "free" of the material for Kant in the way that Plato assumed, his understanding of materiality 
was itself still highly reified.  For Kant the "thing in itself" is always mediated and the "medium" 
of consciousness is only considered purely subjectively, as "categories" of understanding and the 
aesthetic apperception of "mere form."  Such an understanding of materiality as the other of 
subjectivity reflects a high degree of social commodification in which labor is alienated from the 
producers and circulates as exchange value so that people can only fulfill their needs in an 
alienated way through the market and in the process submit to being exploited.  The subjective 
"freedom" of the human in the natural exercise of his "imagination" was in actuality a reflection 
of the submission of the worker to the status of a passive consumer alienated from social praxis. 
Derrida's deconstruction and reinscription of mimesis as a purely epistemological 
problematic indicates that what is at issue in the rejection of the labor theory of culture is not in 
actuality mimesis, but, rather, about which theories go along with the dominant ideology and 
which do not.  Derrida's theorization of differance represents itself as a more rigorously 
materialist critique of idealism than the labor theory of culture because it does not posit a Truth 
around which to organize its own authority but rather relies on a close reading of the act of 
signification itself which frames all linguistic claims.  The labor theory of culture would thus 
seem to depend on a "referential" theory of language in which language is conceived 
instrumentally as referring to a reality independent of consciousness, which is thereby given 
transcendental status, what Derrida calls "Platonism" ("The Double Session" 191).  "Platonism" 
depends, according to Derrida, on the elision of the difference between two different figures of 
truth whose hierarchal ordering constitutes the story of Western philosophy.  But, by remaining 
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immanent to the cultural superstructure Derrida repeats the dominant ideology of culturalism 
which disconnects ideas from their class basis and thus naturalizes the existing.  Differance is a 
thus made a "general law" ("Differance" 67) that is held to be incontestable as such.  Derrida 
inscribes the "outside" (the relation of labor to nature) in the "inside" (the binaries of figuration) 
and thereby re-inscribes the cognitive as the limit text of knowing, a move which is itself 
constitutive of Western metaphysics.  His theory of difference informs the postmodern 
understanding that culture is material in itself (simulacral), which assumes that what at any time 
is considered natural and given the status of the real is an effect of signification.  Such an 
assumption is not very different than the humanist one that nature is the origin of truth in that 
both maintain the self-evidence of the world as it is as the basis of knowing by making 
intelligibility a purely formal matter of representation.  There is not much difference between 
considering truth the site of "inscription" of the codes and conventions of culture, or, considering 
it as the final "guarantee" of meaning, in that both views place subjectivity above the material 
conditions of its production in class society.   
Humanist cultural theory has changed since Kant's time of course.  For one thing it has 
come to define itself in more materialist terms. The conservative cultural critic Roger Scruton, 
for instance, represents a new kind of humanist in so far as he positions himself as a materialist 
against "the idealist doctrine" that art is free of the political, "that art does not advise, describe or 
moralize" (Aesthetic Understanding 4).  Such an idealist view as classical humanist theory 
assumed, he argues, cannot "lead us to a general aesthetics" (6) as it cannot serve "to demarcate 
the exact place of imaginative experience in the life of a rational being" (13).  On the other hand, 
the value of culture is not a matter of its reflecting an "idea" that exists outside it either, 
according to Scruton.  Rather, he argues that value is found immanently within culture, which he 
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sees as a mode of signification bound up with the "abrogation of reference" (19) and 
"indeterminacy" (18) that he believes is more "true to life" (17) than true to fact (concept).     
The "abrogation of reference" is, according to Scruton, more "true to life" than a theory 
that relates the aesthetic to "ideas" (the true-to-fact) or, more importantly, to "its origin in 
productive activity" (Aesthetic Understanding 8).  For him what explains the aesthetic is "not a 
property of the text itself" (19), nor is it a matter of "the economic conditions under which it is 
conceived" (8), rather it is a question of "the response of the observer" (28) who has come to 
possess "the requisite intellectual and emotional capacities" (28) and learned to appreciate the 
"penumbra of significance" (14) issuing from artistic "indeterminacy."  In other words, the 
aesthetic is experiential and made the other of abstraction, a theory of the place of art in the 
totality, and is thus "material" for Scruton.  And yet, at the same time materiality is 
sentimentalized and considered a purely affective matter: "an education of the heart" (Scruton, 
Guide to Modern Culture, 149). 
Because capitalism is at root dependent on wage-labor it is no surprise to find that 
discussion of value and what makes the social still takes the idealist form it assumed in ancient 
slave society which denies the basic class logic that underlies the cultural.  Humanist cultural 
theory situates "value" exclusively within the superstructure of society in which the subject is 
hailed as a free agent of free market forces and occults the relation of this subject's freedom and 
the unfreedom of the material base where the class antagonism between capital and labor is 
articulated.  The result is an idealist theory of the social as constituted by the everyday agency of 
"desire" (an "education of the heart") rather than "labor" (class consciousness).  The subject of 
"desire" normalizes the status quo by valorizing singular acts of consumption that occult why 
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whatever everyday pleasure there is for a few is connected to the coerced surplus-labor of the 
many in what Marx calls the "workday" (Capital Vol. 1, pp. 283-344).   
Humanism as a whole makes a fetish of subjectivity and agency by cutting theory of the 
subject off from the social totality in ways that reflect the dominance of exchange value in 
capitalism; humanism thereby helps produce the mass dehumanization, inequality and slavery 
that humanism usually defines itself in opposition to (especially in its modern forms such as in 
the Enlightenment or Romanticism).  Although culturalism strictly speaking emerged as a 
critique of idealist cultural theories such as humanism—in the writings of Nietsche and 
Heidegger for example—it reinscribes the same ideological function that humanism served in 
previous moments of capitalism.  Humanist cultural theory places Man at the center of the world 
as the bearer of "reason" and marginalizes differences.  It considers culture to be at once a 
monument  testifying to the dignity of the individual and an archive of progress which gives the 
highest expression of his innate freedom.  Humanism posits Man as outside nature and the result 
has been to see culture as "above" politics and economics.   
Although its origins lie in ancient (pre-Socratic) Greek philosophy humanism 
consolidates itself with the rise of capitalism in Europe and the beginings of colonial conquest in 
the sixteenth century and receives further impetus with the spread of the world market in the 
eighteenth century.  Its insistence on universal codes of knowledge and ethics helped establish a 
common market within the framework of European nation states and it equated such a 
development with the goal of history itself.  Under the impact of imperialism, however, 
humanism was implicated in the practices of oppression and barbarism it formally denounces.  
The crisis of humanism has led to its immanent critique in the discourses of postmodernism 
which questions the value of its central concepts such as universality, progress and emancipation.  
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And yet such critique is limited to teasing out the immanent contradictions of humanist discourse 
and therefore reinscribes the central logic of humanism which posits culture as the other of class.   
What makes the texts of Plato and Rousseau humanist is not simply, as Derrida has 
argued, because they maintain a logocentric binary in which writing is subordinated to "speech" 
(the "presence" of human experience).  What makes humanism is not strictly an epistological 
matter at all but is at root economic—humanism has always refied the division of labor and 
represented it in epistemological terms, as cultural differences.  And yet, culture is always a 
reflection of the economic base.  It is the division of labor (class), and not "differance," "re-
signification," or "transvaluation," that determines the meanings available in a society's 
signifiying practices.  "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the 
class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force" 
(Marx and Engels, The German Ideology).  It is one's relation to the means of production or class 
position, in other words, that determines one's access to culture and the means of representation 
which in turn determines one's place in the cultural series.  In short, how "smart," "good 
looking," "reliable," "trust worthy," "literate," etc., one is depends on one's class position, which 
is what allows access to the practices that constitute such values.   
Culturalist theory rejects the materialist theory of culture as "bad" epistemology—what 
Derrida calls "the tyranny of transparency"—on the grounds that it is blind to and therefore 
subordinates the materiality and agency of the signifier to a secondary position on the 
metaphysical basis of a privileged "transcendental signified" (Derrida).  But it is itself 
"metaphysical" to claim that differance is "neither a word nor a concept" and the law of 
conceptuality, which only shows that the point is not what is or is not metaphysical but what is 
the political economy of metaphysics and whose interests it serves.  Because labor is held to be 
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basic to a materialist cultural theory and used as an explanation of superstructural practices it 
stands accused in discursive cultural theory of supporting what de Man calls "aesthetic ideology" 
on the grounds that the mode of intelligibility it authorizes collapses the phenomenal and the real 
as in referential theories of language.  According to de Man, "ideology is precisely the confusion 
of linguistic with natural reality, of reference with phenomenalism" (Resistance to Theory 11) 
that disguises "the linguistics of literariness" (11), which "more than any other mode of inquiry, 
including economics… is a powerful and indispensable tool in the unmasking of ideological 
aberrations, as well as a determining factor in accounting for their occurrence" (11).  On such a 
view, the "rhetorical or tropological dimension of language" (17), or, in other words, the 
"materiality of the letter" (de Man Aesthetic Ideology 90), represents the limit text of materiality 
and because it is "impossible to maintain a clear line of distinction between rhetoric, abstraction, 
symbol, and all other forms of language" (49) is thought to ground "the universal theory of the 
impossibility of theory" (Resistance to Theory 19). Because every "decoding of a text leaves a 
residue of indetermination that has to be, but cannot be resolved" (15) such an anti-theory theory 
is considered "subversive" (8) of all "totalizing (and potentially totalitarian)" (19) ways of 
thinking.  The formal operations of language are assumed to be primary and material in 
discursivist cultural theory and to argue for implicating language into the social division of labor 
is considered the mark of a totalitarian imposition on the differential logic of the social inscribed 
in the free play of signification where it is claimed that "whoever loses wins, and in which one 
loses and wins on every turn" (Derrida, "Differance" 72-3). If all reading is a matter of tropes 
then one text is as true as any another and rather than being a matter of social inequality the 
social is seen as a semiotic democracy where all are equal in relation to language.  The attack on 
materialist cultural theory in terms of a semiotic democracy fails to engage with materialist 
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theory through the relay of an epistemological ruse that displaces the question of materiality 
from social praxis to rhetoric, thus conflating material agency with the experience of "pleasure" 
that is held to be the effect of the opacity of errant tropes in a text which exceed its normative 
meanings. The linguistic turn in cultural theory is deeply conservative because on its terms it 
becomes impossible to connect the inside of culture to its outside in class which is necessary for 
explaining why life chances on the market are brutally determined by the structure of 
exploitation that sacrifices worker's needs to the pleasures of the capitalist while at the same time 
it gives to capitalism the alibi of the a-logic of desire and attributes to pleasure a universal 
significance, as demanded by consumerism.  Nothing could be more comforting to the ruling 
class than such an anti-theory theory which turns the source of profit in unpaid labor into a trope 
of pleasure and pronounces all conflicts to be "undecidable" stalemates so that nothing need 
change.  Differance is not immanent to language as such, however, but, rather such a view of 
language is itself an effect of the ratio of exploitation in which labor stands in a historically 
necessary relation to capital.  It was not until the rising organic composition of capital produced 
the step decline of profits beginning in the mid-1970s that post-structural theory of language 
emerged and gained institutional legitimacy as a general cultural theory.  The pan-insidism of 
language and the "death of the subject" reflects the degree to which labor has been subordinated 
to capital on a global scale.  In short, the labor relations explain the cultural logic and not the 
other way around.  To assume the opposite is to "imagine… false or seeming motive forces" in 
place of "the real motive forces," as Engels says.      
The rejection of the labor theory of culture as "mimetic" also reveals the lack of 
engagement of the dominant theories of culture with the labor theory of culture as can be seen 
when one turns to Lenin's understanding of culture as "reflection."  Lenin's understanding of 
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culture as "reflection" is not intelligible if one only sees in it the secondary issue of 
epistemology, the familiar question of how a text constructs meaning through (dis)simulation at 
the level of its immanent formal properties.  Even such an otherwise careful reader of Lenin as 
Pierre Macherey in his Theory of Literary Production argues that Lenin's materialist 
understanding of writing as "reflection" is not effective because it fails to grasp the immanent 
"literariness of the text" (119), which for him is a matter of how the text performs "an internal 
displacement of ideology" (133) that resists "all attempts to 'demystify'" (133) it from its outside.  
Lenin, according to Macherey, by failing to grasp the immanent function of literature "to present 
ideology in a non-ideological form" (133), as a text must always "include an ideology—which 
by itself does not belong to it" (127), is thus a slave to the idea of historical "content" in the same 
way as "bourgeois criticism" (119) despite the oppositional use Lenin makes of its concepts.  But 
it is Macherey who in this way is reinscribing the bourgeois ideology of the literary text by 
placing it in a zone held to be immune from ideology critique.  The understanding of "reflection" 
in bourgeois criticism has always done this by focusing on the means of representation as 
determinate to the exclusion of the economic function of representation in the social.  For Lenin, 
however, "reflection" is a recognition of the working of necessity behind all acts of knowledge 
production in which writing is implicated in social praxis.  Writing, that is, as reflecting not the 
"free" consciousness of the writer as in humanist discourses, or the "excess" of "desire" as it is in 
culturalist theory, but rather writing as inserted into the revolutionary dialectic of the social real 
(the class struggle).  This is a reflection without mimesis: writing "reflects" the class struggle 
behind culture of which writing itself has a more or less active part and is therefore in no way to 
be understood as a static and transparent reflection (as mimesis, verisimilitude, naturalism, e.g.). 
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When Lenin reads Tolstoy, for example, he first emphasizes that by "reflection" he does 
not mean simple "mimesis," a purely formal operation of adequation between the codes and 
conventions of language, conceived as a pure medium of expression, a vessel of a timeless 
consciousness, or, a mirror held up to a presumably static and inert reality: 
 
To identify the great artist with the revolution which he has 
obviously failed to understand, and from which he obviously 
stands aloof, may at first sight seem strange and artificial. A mirror 
which does not reflect things correctly could hardly be called a 
mirror. ("Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution" 202) 
 
Reflection, in Lenin's terms, is thus not about the "transparency" of "meaning" 
(verisimilitude). It is about reading effects at the level of culture in terms of their more primary 
causes in an unfolding revolutionary social process or, in other words, their "historical and 
economic conditions" (208).  Furthermore, Lenin recognizes that "transparency" is not the issue 
because what is being reflected is itself contradictory, that the historical and economic conditions 
themselves are conflicted such that any reflection is bound to be partial and to a certain extent 
distorting as it must reflect partial and contrary class interests.  At the same time he does not fall 
into a liberal pluralism and dogmatic eclecticism by maintaining that the complexity of the real 
makes it finally impossible to have a true representation of things but argues for dialectics on the 
grounds that despite the fact that truth "is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely" 
the continual approximations made toward it act as a "guard against mistakes and rigidity" and 
an "indicator of its connection with human wants," its "use and connection with the surrounding 
world"  ("Once Again on the Trade Unions," Collected Works Vol. 32, 70-107).   
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Lenin thus reads for social and ideological contradictions that militate against the 
ahistorical and abstract understanding of reflection as posited by (post)modern formalist reading 
strategies.  What Lenin reads as a reflection is the way in which contradictions at the level of 
consciousness—between Tolstoy's "merciless criticism of capitalist exploitation," on the one 
hand, and "crackpot preaching of submission, 'resist not evil' with violence" ("Tolstoy" 205) on 
the other, for example—are tied to contradictions in the social relations:  
 
The contradictions in Tolstoy's views are not contradictions 
inherent in his personal views alone, but are a reflection of the 
extremely complex, contradictory conditions, social influences and 
historical traditions which determined the psychology of various 
classes and various sections of Russian society in the post-Reform, 
but pre-revolutionary era. ("Leo Tolstoy" 325) 
 
Lenin's materialist reading is not dependent on a naturalistic view of the text as a stylistic 
mode of reflecting on a static and fixed reality, whether located in the mind or in the material 
world.  Rather, it directs reading to the interaction of the text as a locus of ideological struggles 
over the social real and the conflictual reality of social struggles in the ongoing material praxis of 
labor interacting with the objective world.   
Contrary to the view that says a materialist cultural theory is disenabling because it 
reduces "agency" (the agency of consciousness, the agency of the signifier, etc.) to a secondary 
position, the direct opposite is true. Without the recognition of the determination of culture 
(consciousness, affects, signification, etc.) by labor, what is called agency is really a symptom of 
reification as a part of social reality is placed in the position of being the whole of reality thus 
stabilizing the dominant order by protecting it from critique.   
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2.3 WHAT IS ORTHODOX MARXISM?. 
The question of agency if it is not to be simply a code for free-market volunteer-ism must engage 
the nature of the objective world that determines historic change and why the material world 
conditions what is socially possible.  I argue that "agency" is not a matter of individuality in its 
bourgeois sense, but a materialist question.  More specifically, agency is a question of class.  I 
am arguing, in other words, that the most rigorous theory of the subject has to be located in a 
class theory and class itself has to be understood not in cultural terms but on a materialist and 
objective basis that goes beyond the logic of profit.  Such a theory of agency will not only 
provide guidelines for collective action for reorganizing the existing social institutions and 
practices but will also have deep consequences for contemporary theory and cultural studies.  
Any effective cultural theory therefore will have to do at least two things: it will have to 
offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated 
knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument in the remainder of this chapter is 
that among all contesting cultural theories now, only classical Marxism has been able to produce 
an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to 
building a society free from necessity.  
But first I must clarify what I mean by classical Marxism. Like all other modes and forms 
of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Marxism is itself contested—not just from 
non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under 
free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from 
within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing 
marks of classical Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over classical 
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Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing 
about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity.  
I will argue that to know contemporary culture—and to be able to act on such 
knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that 
the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of 
economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, 
transportation,… ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, 
disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined 
by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and 
labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these 
secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. 
Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and 
thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny 
capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but 
economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it 
has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main 
reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, 
Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . .  For 
all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, 
more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of all 
contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ).   
Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental notion that the 
source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the 
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human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical 
relations of labor and capital. Only classical Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its 
primacy as the source of all human wealth.  I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be 
founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the 
technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social 
theory.  
Finally, it is only classical Marxism that recognizes the inevitability and also the 
necessity of communism—the necessity, that is, of a society in which "from each according to 
their ability to each according to their needs" (Marx) is the rule. 
A parody of politics has taken over left politics in the U.S. and Europe. A parody in 
which—after the dead-end of the designer socialisms of postmarxisms—suddenly everyone is an 
"orthodox" Marxist: from Zizek who in the introduction to a selection of his work writes of the 
need to "return to the centrality of the Marxist critique of political economy" (Reader ix); to 
Michael Sprinker who referred to himself as a "neo-conservative marxist" ("Forum" 68). In 
calling himself a "neoconservative" Sprinker was embracing with pride Butler's definition of the 
term in her "Merely Cultural" in which she equates it with "leftist orthodoxy" (268). Then there 
is Paul Smith who now, after mocking classical Marxism in Discerning the Subject and 
Universal Abandon, says he has a "fairly orthodox understanding of what Marx and the Marxist 
tradition has had to say about capitalism" (Millennial Dreams 3).  
Parody is always the effect of a slippage and the slippage here is that in spite of the 
sudden popularity of "orthodox" Marxism, the actual theories and practices of the newly 
orthodox are more than ever before flexodox. It seems as if once more Lenin's notion that when 
the class antagonism emerges more sharply "the liberals. . . dare not deny the class struggle, but 
 141 
attempt to narrow down [and] to curtail. . . the concept" ("Liberal and Marxist Conceptions of the 
Class Struggle," 122) has been proven by history.  
"Orthodox" Marxism has become the latest cover by which the bourgeois left 
authenticates its credentials and proceeds to legitimate the economics of the ruling class and its 
anti-proletarian politics.  
Take Paul Smith, for example. In classical Marxism class is the central issue. (I put aside 
here that in his writings, on subjectivity for example, Smith has already gotten rid of the 
"central" by a deconstructive logic). What Smith does with class is a rather interesting test of 
how Marxism is being used to legitimate the class interests of the owners. Smith reworks class 
and turns it into a useless Habermasian communicative act. He writes that "classes are what are 
formed in struggle, not something that exists prior to struggle" (Millennial Dreams 60). To say it 
again: the old ideological textualization of the "new left" is not working any more (just look at 
the resistance against globalization), so the ruling class is now reworking the "old left" to defend 
itself. Against the classical Marxist theory of class, Smith evacuates class of an objective basis in 
the extraction of surplus labor in production, and makes it the effect of local conflicts. In short, 
Smith reverses the classical Marxist position that, "It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their 
consciousness" (Marx, Contribution, 21), and turns it into a neomarxist view that what matters is 
their consciousness. In this he in fact shares a great deal with conservative theories that make 
"values" (the subjective) as what matters in social life and not economic access.  
Zizek provides another example of the flexodox parody of Marxism today. Capitalism in 
classical Marxism is explained as an historical mode of production based on the privatization of 
the means of subsistence in the hands of a few, i.e., the systemic exploitation of labor by capital. 
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Capitalism is the world-historic regime of unpaid surplus-labor. In Zizek's writings, capitalism is 
not based on exploitation in production (surplus-labor), but on struggles over consumption 
("surplus-enjoyment"). The Marxist concepts that lay bare the exploitative production relations 
in order to change them are thus replaced with a "psycho-marxist" pastiche of consumption in his 
writings, a revisionist move that has proven immensely successful in the bourgeois cultural 
criticism. Zizek, however, has taken to representing this displacement of labor (production) with 
desire (consumption) as "strictly correlative" to the concept of "revolutionary praxis" found in 
the texts of orthodox Marxism (e.g., "Repeating Lenin"). Revolutionary practice is always 
informed by class consciousness and transformative cultural critique has always aimed at 
producing class consciousness by laying bare the false consciousness that ruling ideology 
institutes in the everyday. Transformative cultural critique, in other words, is always a linking of 
consciousness to production practices from which a knowledge of social totality emerges. Zizek, 
however, long ago abandoned classical Marxist ideology critique as an epistemologically naïve 
theory of "ideology" because it could not account for the persistence of "desire" beyond critique 
(the "enlightened false-consciousness" of The Sublime Object of Ideology, Mapping Ideology,. . 
. ). His more recent "return to the centrality of the Marxist critique" is, as a result, a purely tropic 
voluntarism of the kind he endlessly celebrates in his diffusionist readings of culture as desire-al 
moments when social norms are violated and personal emotions spontaneously experienced as 
absolutely compulsory (as "drive"). His concept of revolutionary Marxist praxis thus consists of 
re-describing it as an "excessive" lifestyle choice (analogous to pedophilia and other culturally 
marginalized practices, The Ticklish Subject 381-8). On this reading, Marxism is the only 
metaphorical displacement of "desire" into "surplus-pleasure" that makes imperative the "direct 
socialization of the productive process" (350) and that thus causes the subjects committed to it to 
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experience a Symbolic death at the hands of the neoliberal culture industry. It is this 
"affirmative" reversal of the right-wing anti-Marxist narrative that makes Zizek's writings so 
highly praised in the bourgeois "high-theory" market, where it is read as "subtle" and an example 
of "deep thinking" because it confirms a transcendental position considered above politics by 
making all politics ideological.  If everything is ideology then there can be no fundamental social 
change only formal repetition and reversal of values (Nietzsche). Zizek's pastiche of psycho-
marxism thus consists in presenting what is only theoretically possible for the exploiter—those 
few who have already met, in excess, their material needs through the exploitation of the labor of 
the other and who can therefore afford to elaborate fantasies of desire—as a universal form of 
agency freely available to everyone.  
Psycho-marxism does what bourgeois ideology has always done—maintain the bourgeois 
hegemony over social production by commodifying, through an aesthetic relay, the 
contradictions of the wages system. What bourgeois ideology does above all is deny that the 
mode of social production has an historic agency of its own independent of the subject. Zizek's 
"return" to "orthodox" Marxism erases its materialist theory of desire—that "our wants and their 
satisfaction have their origin in society" (Marx, Wage-Labour and Capital, 33) and do not stand 
in "excess" of it. In fact, he says exactly the opposite and turns the need for Marxist theory now 
into a phantom desire of individuals: he makes "class struggle" an effect of a "totalitarian" desire 
to polarize the social between "us" and "them" (using the "friend/enemy" binary found in the 
writings of the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt, Ticklish Subject 226).  
What is basic only to classical Marxist theory, however, which is what enables it to 
produce class consciousness through a critique of ideology, is its materialist prioritization of 
"need" over "desire." Only classical Marxism recognizes that although capitalism is compelled to 
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continually expand the needs of workers because of the profit motive it at the same time cannot 
satisfy these needs because of its logic of profit. "Desire" is always an effect of class relations, of 
the gap between the material level and historical potential of the forces of production and the 
social actuality of un-met needs.  
In spite of their formal "criticality," the writings of Smith and Zizek, and other theorists 
of designer socialisms such as Hennessey, Jameson and Negri, produce concepts that legitimate 
the existing social relations. The notion of class in their work, for example, is the one that now is 
commonly deployed in the bourgeois newspapers. In their reporting on what has become known 
as the "Battle of Seattle," and in the coverage of the rising tide of protest against the financial 
institutions of U.S. monopoly capital which are pillaging the nations of the South, the bourgeois 
media represents the emergent class struggles as a matter of an alternative "lifestyle choice" (e.g., 
the Los Angeles Times, "Hey Hey, Ho Ho, Catch Our Anti-Corporate Puppet Show!"). On this 
diffusional narrative, "class" is nothing more than an opportunity for surplus-pleasure "outside" 
the market for those who have voluntarily "discarded" the normal pleasures of U.S. culture. It is 
the same "lifestyle" politics that in the flexodox marxism of Antonio Negri is made an 
autonomous zone of "immaterial labor" which he locates as the "real communism" that makes 
existing society post-capitalist already so that revolution is not necessary (Empire). What is at 
the core of both the flexodox marxism and the popular culture of class as "lifestyle" is a de-
politicization of the concepts of classical Marxism which neutralizes them as indexes of social 
inequality and reduces them to merely descriptive categories which take what is for what ought 
to be. Take the writings of Pierre Bourdieu for example. Bourdieu turns Marx's dialectical 
concepts of "class" and "capital" which lay bare the social totality, into floating "categories" and 
reflexive "classifications" that can be formally applied to any social practice because they have 
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been cut off from their connection to the objective global relations of production. Bourdieu, in 
short, legitimates the pattern of class as "lifestyle" in the bourgeois media by his view that 
"class" is an outcome of struggles over "symbolic capital" in any "field." I leave aside here that 
his diffusion of the logic of capital into "cultural capital," "educational capital" and the like is 
itself part of a depoliticization of the relation between capital and labor and thus a blurring of 
class antagonism. What Bourdieu's "field" theory of class struggle does is segregate the struggles 
into so many autonomous zones lacking in systemic determination by the historic structure of 
property so that everyone is considered to be equally in possession of "capital" (ownership is 
rhetorically democratized) making socialist revolution unnecessary. What the reduction of 
"class" and "capital" to the self-evidency of local cultural differences cannot explain is the 
systemic primacy of the production of surplus-value in unpaid-labor, the basic condition of the 
global majority which determines that their needs are not being met and compels them 
collectively into class struggles.  
Without totalizing knowledge of exploitation—which is why such dialectical concepts as 
"capital" form the basis of classical Marxist class theory—exploitation cannot be abolished. The 
cultural idealism of the de-politicized voiding of Marxist concepts fits right in with the 
"volunteer-ism" of the neoliberals and "compassionate" conservatives that they use to justify 
their massive privatization programs. Considering class struggle politics as a matter of cultural 
struggles over symbolic status is identical to the strategy of considering the dismantling of social 
welfare as an opportunity for "local" agency freed from coercive state power, i.e., the bedrock of 
the "non-governmental" activism and "community" building of the bourgeois reformists. When 
George W. Bush seeks to mobilize what he calls the "armies of compassion" against the 
"Washington insiders" and return "power" to the "people" it is the old cultural studies logic that 
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all politics is "people vs. power bloc," a warmed over popular frontism that makes politics a 
matter of building de-politicized cross-class coalitions for bourgeois right, utopic models of a 
post-political social order without class struggle possessing equality of representation that 
excludes the revolutionary vanguard. As Marx and Engels said of the "bourgeois socialists" of 
their day, such utopian measures "at. . . best, lessen the cost, and simplify the administrative 
work, of bourgeois government" (Manifesto of the Communist Party, Selected Works, 59). 
Zizek's "affirmation" of revolutionary Marxism as a "totalitarian" desire that polarizes the 
cultural "lifeworld" between "friends" and "enemies" is another relay of "class-as-an-after-effect 
of 'struggle'" of the networked left. What the parody does is make class struggle a rhetorical 
"invention" of Marx(ists) analogous to the bourgeois "rights" politics of the transnational 
coalitional regime of exploitation ruling today, and erases the need for a global theory of social 
change. Classical Marxism cuts through the closed atmosphere of the "friends" of the networked 
left and their embrace of a voluntarist "compassionate" millenarianism with a critique from 
outside so to expose the global collective need for a revolutionary social theory and red cultural 
studies to end exploitation for all.    
The hollowing out of Marxism in the name of (orthodox) Marxism by such theorists as 
Smith, Sprinker and Zizek is based on the ideological un-said of the bourgeois right of property 
and its underpinning logic of the market which are represented as natural ("inalienable") "human 
rights," or more commonly, in daily practices, as individual rights. Revolutionary struggles 
against these "rights" (of property) are assumed to be signs of dogmatism, ruthless impersonality, 
vanguardism and totalitarianism—all "obvious" markers of orthodox Marxism. The remedy put 
forward by these theorists is to resist the revolutionary vanguard in the name of "democracy from 
below," which is itself a code phrase for "spontaneity." Spontaneity—the kind of supposed 
 147 
"freedom" which is the fabric of bourgeois daily life—is itself a layered notion that, in its folds, 
hides a sentimentalism that in reality constitutes "democracy from below" and its allied notion of 
the "individual," and the "human subject." Zizek and other "high theorists" manage to conceal 
this naïve emotionalism in the rather abstract language of "theory." What is subtly implicit in the 
discourses of "high theory," however, becomes explicit in the annotations of middle theory—that 
is, in bourgeois cultural commentary and criticism. Hennessy's Profit and Pleasure is the most 
recent and perhaps most popular attack on classical Marxism in the name of Marxism itself.  
On this view, orthodox Marxism is dogmatic and totalitarian. So to "correct" its "faults," 
Hennessy empties its revolutionary vanguard of its commitment and puts feeling (manifested by 
"heartache") in its place. What is, of course, so significant is that Hennessy installs such 
sentimentality as the ultimate layer of her Marxism in the name of Marxism itself. This is what 
makes the work of bourgeois writers like Zizek, Smith, Sprinker and Hennessy effective and 
welcome in the academy and the culture industry: they do not (like regular right-wingers) attack 
Marxism but they reduce its explanatory power and its revolutionary force by substituting 
spontaneity for revolutionary praxis. For these writers social transformation is the effect not of 
revolutionary praxis but of a spontaneous and emotionally intense exchange between two 
kindred "spirits." It is the spirit that moves the world. What in Hennessy is presented as Marxism 
or feminism turns out to be a souped-up version of the old bourgeois cultural feminism which, 
running away from revolution, retreats once again into community, spontaneity, affectivity, and 
above all the autonomous subject who gives and receives love above and beyond all social and 
economic processes.  
One of the ways such writers hollow out Marxism of its Marxism and produce a Marxism 
beyond Marxism is by their overt acknowledgement of the way Marxism is treated in the 
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bourgeois culture industry. Hennessy, for example, writes that Marxism in English Departments 
(the trope of the culture industry) is both "courted and tamed" (Profit and Pleasure 2). In other 
words, by announcing her awareness of the way that Marxism is tamed, she hopes to inoculate 
herself from the charge that she is doing so. The message the reader is supposed to get is this: 
because she knows Marxism is always being "tamed," she herself would never do that. Under 
cover of this ideological self-inoculation, Hennessy then goes on to produce her "tamed" version 
of Marxism that is only metaphorically "marxist" because it is void of all the concepts and 
practices that make Marxism Marxism.  
My larger point is of course that the most effective writings for the ruling class are 
located in the middle register, in that register of writing usually praised as lucid, clear, jargon-
free and above all "readable." Zizek is abstract; Hennessy is concrete. This is another way of 
saying that the work of Hennessy and other such "tamers" of Marxism is always a work of 
synthesis and consolidation—they make concrete the work of high theory: it is for this reason 
that their work forms the very center of the culture industry. Finally, to be clear, the question 
here is not to play a game of determining the "good" from the "bad" Marxism. What is good 
Marxism—what is effective in overcoming inequality—is determined by history itself. The 
question is whether what is being done actualizes the historical potential made possible by the 
development of the forces of production and thus brings about change in the existing social 
relations of production (overcomes class inequality) or whether it plays within the existing 
actuality and thus turns the limits of the actually existing into the very limits of reality as such. 
And in doing so, reifies the present social relations of production. Flexodox Marxists like 
Hennessy accept the proposition that capitalism is here to stay and thus reject as "impractical" 
any pressure put on the external supports of capitalism (capital and labor relations) and then 
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work within capitalism—on the basis of community and emotional intensity—to make its 
ongoing process of the exploitation of the labor of the world's workers more "humane" and 
tolerable.  
Capitalism is, according to Hennessy's soap-operatic leftism, something that one should 
always keep in mind but not seriously consider overthrowing. She is too cynical to take even her 
own views seriously: "This means that eliminating the social structures of exploitation that 
capitalism absolutely requires and so violently enacts at the expense of human needs must be on 
the political agenda, at the every least as the horizon that sets the terms for imagining change" 
(Profit and Pleasure 232). Capitalist exploitation is a heuristic consideration not a revolutionary 
imperative.  
Beyond the theatrical moves of the bourgeois left, however, classical Marxism is 
emerging as the only understanding of the new global formations that lead to transformative 
praxis. Orthodox Marxism has become impossible to ignore because the objective possibility of 
transforming the regime of wage-labor into a system in which the priority is not profit but 
meeting the needs of all is confronted as a daily actuality. The flexodox left turns the emergent 
class struggles into self-enclosed struggles for symbolic power so to represent class hegemony in 
the relations of production as capable of being changed through cross-class "coalitions" when in 
fact exploitation is everywhere in the world maintained by such coalitions which are losing their 
legitimacy and breaking apart under the weight of their own contradictions precisely because the 
class divide is growing under their rule and beyond their borders. Only classical Marxism 
demonstrates that the productive forces of capitalism have reached tremendous levels and have 
the ability to feed, clothe, and house the world many times over but are fettered by capitalism's 
existing social relations: its fundamental drive to privately consume the social resources of 
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collective labor. That the left today has, in dramatic fashion, been forced to return (if only 
rhetorically) to orthodox Marxism marks the fact that the struggle to transform capitalism has 
reached a stage of development that necessitates a systemic theoretical basis for revolutionary 
praxis. The hegemonic left now wants to incorporate orthodox Marxism into its dogmatic 
coalitional logic as a discourse which depends for its identity on "class" as "real": which is a 
code for the "lived experience" or the transcendental ineffable politics (Lacan) of class as an 
outside inferred from the inside (the side of subjective "values") and as such held to be 
unavailable for positive knowing. Which is another way of saying that class is a matter of 
"persuasion" and "seduction" rather than production. What the resulting flexodox marxism 
cannot explain therefore is that class  
 
is not a matter of what this or that proletarian or even the 
proletariat as a whole pictures as its goal. It is a matter of what the 
proletariat is in actuality and what, in accordance with this being, 
it will historically be compelled to do (Marx-Engels Reader 135).  
 
Orthodox Marxism does not consist of raising "class" as a dogmatic banner of the "real," but in 
the critique of false consciousness that divides the workers by occulting their collective interest 
by shifting the focus from their position in social production, their material antagonism with the 
capitalist class. "Class as real" (a spectral agency) cannot explain, and therefore cannot engage 
in, the material process through which capitalism, by its very own laws of motion, produces its 
own "gravedigger" in the global proletariat. What the flexodox return to and hollowing out of the 
concepts of orthodox Marxism proves, among other things, is that "the ideas of the ruling class 
are in every epoch the ruling ideas" (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology 67) and history 
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progresses despite this ideological hegemony through the agency of labor. In short—"The history 
of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."  
 Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for 
orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and 
Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left 
Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them 
into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance 
to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or 
"conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as 
"original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so 
forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: 
thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and 
hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups.      
 The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of 
ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from 
the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts 
through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption 
are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers 
spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and 
cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. 
Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to 
orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the 
flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas 
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of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class 
struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false 
consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory 
ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, 
revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice.  
 Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of 
value is an elemental truth of Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central 
dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that 
exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" 
between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only 
orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity 
like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-
power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means 
of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of 
time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value 
of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited 
tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight 
fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and 
above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit 
when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the 
exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the 
after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private 
ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" 
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core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of 
the (scientific, ie, positive and reliable) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from 
exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges 
(ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only 
be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" 
distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of 
labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."  
  It is only classical Marxism that explains socialism as an historical inevitability that is 
tied to the development of social production itself and its requirements. Orthodox Marxism 
makes socialism scientific because it explains how in the capitalist system, based on the private 
consumption of labor-power (competition), the objective tendency is to reduce the amount of 
time labor spends in reproducing itself (necessary labor) while expanding the amount of time 
labor is engaged in producing surplus-value (surplus-labor) for the capitalist through the 
introduction of machinery into the production process by the capitalists themselves to lower their 
own labor costs. Because of the competitive drive for profits under capitalism it is historically 
inevitable that a point is reached when the technical mastery—the amount of time socially 
necessary on average to meet the needs of society through the processing of natural resources—
is such that the conditions of the workers worsen relative to the owners and becomes an 
unbearable global social contradiction in the midst of the ever greater mass of wealth produced. 
It is therefore just as inevitable that at such a moment it begins to make more sense to socialize 
production and meet the needs of all to avoid the explosive social conflicts perpetually generated 
by private property than to maintain the system at the risk of total social collapse on a world 
scale. "Socialism or barbarism," as Rosa Luxemburg put it, is the inevitable choice faced by 
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humanity because of capitalism. Either maintain private property and the exploitation of labor in 
production, in which case more and more social resources will go into policing the growingly 
desperate surplus-population generated by the technical efficiency of social production, or 
socialize production and inaugurate a society whose founding principle is "from each according 
to his ability, to each according to his needs" (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, Selected 
Works, 325) and "in which the free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all" (Manifesto of the Communist Party, Selected Works, 53).  
 The time has come to state it clearly so that even the flexodox opportunists may grasp it: 
Orthodox Marxism is not a free-floating "language-game" or "meta-narrative" for arbitrarily 
constructing local utopian communities or spectral activist inversions of ideology meant to 
seduce "desire" and "mobilize" (glorify) subjectivity—it is an absolute prerequisite for our 
emancipation from exploitation and a new society freed from necessity. Orthodox Marxism is the 
only global theory of social change. Only Orthodox Marxism has explained why under the 
system of wage-labor and capital communism is not "an ideal to which reality will have to adjust 
itself" but "the real movement which abolishes the present state of things" (The German 
Ideology 57) because of its objective explanation of and ceaseless commitment to "the self-
conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense 
majority" (Manifesto of the Communist Party, Selected Works, 45) to end social inequality 
forever.  
It is my understanding that by drawing out the ways in which culture is shaped by the 
developments of labor, a labor theory of culture works to connect the most pressing cultural 
questions to the economic and political structures which determine how people live their lives.  
This understanding is based on the recognition that labor, as Marx explains, is the "process by 
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which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between 
himself and nature" (Capital 283). Before there can be a culture of consent and resistance over 
the socially consequential meaning(s) that shape people's lives, there first needs to be their 
material life itself.  From this material dependence of culture on the metabolism between labor 
and nature it follows, as Marx goes on to explain, "that the man who possesses no other property 
than his labour power, must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men 
who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labour" ("Gotha 
Programme" 81). Thus, for Marx, labor is not simply a natural material process necessary to 
sustain life but is also a historical zone of conflicts over control of the means of production.  
Culture, therefore, is the arena "in which men become conscious of this [economic] conflict and 
fight it out" (Critique of Political Economy 21); culture is the place, in other words, where the 
awareness of labor as the source of all value is articulated, as well as contested and resisted in 
"ideology" (21).  The boundaries of culture are thus defined by the possibilities of labor as both 
the material basis of culture (what people need to consume), and the meanings attached to these 
practices (as essential and consequential or not), are dependent on the collective social project of 
production (the global class division of labor).  
Culture is at root labor. Culture is always coextensive with the social relations men and 
women must enter into in order to live and it participates in shaping these relations.  As Marx 
explains: 
 
Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and 
Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, 
regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and 
Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, 
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setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces 
of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a form 
adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and 
changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He 
develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in 
obedience to his sway. (Capital, CW Vol. 35, 187) 
 
The material dependence of human beings on nature in turn acts to shape human nature 
and this "metabolism," as Marx calls it, between the two is what establishes culture.  Culture is 
thus at root the material realization of human purposes in the natural world necessary to support 
life itself at a given level of development.   
As human beings realize their vital purposes in the natural world they are also required, 
as Marx explains, to pay "close attention" to their own labor process and thus come to be aware 
of how it "determine[s] the mode of [their] activity with the rigidity of a law" (Capital, CW Vol. 
35, 187). Culture is thus not only the realization of human ends in the material world but also the 
awareness and internal compulsion of these ends themselves which we subjectively experience 
as needs.  In other words, "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they 
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances 
directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past" (Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire" 
CW Vol. 11, 103). Culture is thus also the medium for the transmission of needs that have arisen 
under particular social circumstances and that are required to be satisfied and which in being 
realized reproduce the social relations, as well as compel further changes.  
Such an understanding of culture as co-extensive with the labor process presupposes the 
materiality of language.  But such an understanding of the necessary coexistence of language and 
social praxis demands that we understand its materiality historically and not as a self-enclosed 
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system of signs. By "material," what I, therefore, do not mean is the body (Judith Butler, Bodies 
that Matter), the signifier (J. Hillis Miller, "The Work of Cultural Criticism in the Age of Digital 
Reproduction" in his Illustration), or the general resistance of language to conceptuality 
(Christopher Fynsk, The Claim of Language: A Case for the Humanities). Instead by material, I 
mean what Marx (Capital, 1, 198; 290) calls, "social metabolism"—the relation of labor, its 
circulation in society, and its relation with nature. Language is material not because the signifier 
exceeds all signifieds and therefore is a non-translatable "this-ness" that resists all abstract 
concepts but because it is part of "social metabolism"—it is a form of labor: "language is 
practical, real consciousness that… only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with 
other men" (Marx, The German Ideology 49). Language is material due to the "close attention" 
required by a growingly complex labor process which gives to it "the rigidity of a law" which is 
indispensable to social life.  It is the relative rigidity of language that allows it to be a tool of 
scientific abstraction capable of being applied elsewhere than the location of its emergence 
which helps produce new changes in nature. It is the co-extension, but non-coincidence, of 
culture and the labor process that therefore distinguishes "science" as the kind of knowledge that 
is self-aware of the non-identity of consciousness and the material world which determines it, 
and "ideology," the "false-consciousness" of real socio-economic necessity, compulsion and 
development. 
The material changes effected by social labor in the abstract come to compel social 
changes, and the consciousness of the necessity of such changes and the need to bring them 
about is also cultural.  Culture thus comes to have the function of planning future labor to bring 
about required changes that have arisen due to material changes that have been effected in the 
past.  Culture, therefore, in its totality is the product of past labor, the awareness of present labor, 
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and the plan of future labor.  In short, culture is the superstructural relay that is always 
coextensive with the ongoing necessity of labor. The labor theory of culture of Marx explains the 
historical specificity of culture (which emerges with socially abstract labor), the place of culture 
in the social totality of practices (as a superstructural relay determined by labor arrangements) as 
well as the necessity of culture for humanity (as scientific knowledge of progress). 
It is the underlying dependence of human beings on nature that explains the emergence of 
culture as specifically a reflex of human labor.  Marx gives a two part answer for this that 
explains how and why. In the first place the labor theory of culture entails recognizing that 
 
Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by 
religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to 
distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to 
produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by 
their physical organization. By producing their means of 
subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life. 
(The German Ideology 37) 
 
What this means is that "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness" (Preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 21).  Before looking at the social productions 
of human beings we have to recognize the production whose product they are, which means 
looking at the material structures of nature and society that shape their lives.  This first premise 
of a labor theory of culture is important because it clarifies a basic problem of cultural theory 
which is the problem of how to objectively determine "value" given that it is always the 
evaluation of a subject.  Marx argues it is possible to have a cultural theory at all because it is 
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always possible to distinguish between "the economic conditions of production" (21), or, in other 
words, the "social metabolism" of humanity and nature, and "the legal, political, religious, 
artistic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this 
conflict and fight it out" (21).  Without such an awareness culture will be naturalized as a self-
enclosed type of activity whose meaning is purely auto-referential that is assumed to give the 
rule to nature.  In other words, without the recognition of the dependence of culture on nature 
culture becomes sacralized and serves to mystify the place of humanity in the material world.   
The second part of Marx's explanation for how labor explains culture rather than the 
reverse entails recognizing that it is in fact a necessary by-product of capitalism that we come to 
see culture as a thing in itself reified from the material conditions of its emergence.  It is for this 
reason that in his discussion of "labor" Marx is very careful to avoid naturalizing the category by 
considering it only a concrete activity, or, on the contrary, as the essence of humanity as such 
(Grundrisse 100-8).  Labor is not a "transcendental signified," that demands we see the world as 
a homologous type of activity or the sign of a singular meaning.  Labor is simply a concept for 
how "the ensemble of the social relations" ("Theses on Feuerbach" 145) is the ground which 
determines what makes "meanings" meaningful in the first place because it is that matrix of 
conditions over which we are always struggling and attempting to make sense.  If this is inverted 
and labor is taken to mean just another word that attempts to give meaning to something which 
spontaneously resists conceptuality then it is impossible to have any cultural theory or anything 
like an explanation of culture and we are left with surface description and nominalism, the belief 
that names make the world, and both the world and the names are assumed to be free of history. 
The dependence on nature which necessitates and explains culture is what makes it 
possible to discuss objects of art, commodities, social practices, and discourses in the singular 
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form of culture and not the obvious fact that such activities carry meaning for the subject.  
Meaning is always a secondary effect of the social relations. The idea that discourse constitutes 
culture is a formalist move that belies the claim of a discourse theory of culture to respect the 
specificity of culture which is always a matter of "paying close attention," as Marx puts it, to the 
interaction of the social labor process and the material world. 
2.4 MATERIALITY WITHOUT MATERIALISM 
Because almost all contemporary cultural theories regard themselves to be material, if not 
materialist, the first issue to be addressed in putting forward a labor theory of culture now is what 
materiality is in contemporary cultural theory.  To clarify the issues involved in the contestations 
over culture, materiality and the project of cultural studies, I begin with a close reading of Tom 
Cohen's writings, which offer one of the most advanced articulations of the project for a 
discursive cultural studies as well as a sustained argument against any attempt to move toward 
what I am calling a materialist cultural studies.   
Cohen claims that there are, on the contemporary scene, three modes of "cultural 
studies": the cultural studies that are grounded in a "mimetic" theory of language, one which 
represents itself as recognizing the non-mimetic of language but remains mimetic, and a third 
truly non-mimetic cultural studies, which he sees as the only advanced mode of reading culture. 
He finds that most of what passes for cultural studies now "evades the problematic and 
programming of inscription" (Material xi) by "relapsing" into mimetic codes of "a pragmatic, 
everyday, referential, socio-historicist 'politics'" (Ideology 102) that serves to "preclude 
alternative modes of thought, or action… that remain key... to addressing the accelerated 
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evisceration of terrestrial resources in the machinery of mimeto-capitalism" (107). In his 
emphasis on the mimeticism (or not) of language, what becomes clear is that Cohen's reading of 
cultural studies is an attempt to absorb the cultural turn in an earlier linguistic turn and to 
therefore argue that culture, far from being a site of plenitude (which he seems to think is the 
underlying idea of mainstream cultural studies), is itself a language effect. Language, he argues, 
is a material formation that determines meaning in a culture independently of labor.  In other 
words, unlike Marx for whom language is material only to the extent that as "practical 
consciousness" (German Ideology 49) it is inserted in the "process by which man, through his 
own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature" 
(Capital 283), for Cohen language is material in itself.  It is thus in the terms of this immanent 
materiality of language that Cohen advances what he claims is a "materialist" understanding of 
culture.    
For Cohen, what is material is the excessive differential slippage (free play) of the 
signifier over the series of signifieds as without origin or end.  Since all concepts (signifieds) 
emerge in the process of signification, and because human practices are conventionally made 
intelligible through the habitual repetition of linguistic codes, the material is thus a language 
effect—what Cohen calls the "inscription of anteriority" in discourse—in relation to which all 
other values are then determined.  In the discursive cultural theory represented by Cohen, culture 
is thus itself material because it is the singular means as well as the medium in which the "sense 
of the real" is constructed in language and the place of the subject primarily determined.  This 
immanent cultural theory assumes that "the entities discourse refers to are constituted in and by 
discourse" (Hindess and Hirst 19-20).  Culture, in other words, is not the other of a real world 
lying "out there" beyond the means with which we attempt to grasp it—what is "outside" (e.g., 
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nature or truth) is always already an effect of the "inside" of the modes of signification available 
in a culture.  Moreover, according to Cohen, the concept of ideology should be equated with 
"mimesis"—"ideology is always mimetic," (Material xii)—because referentiality in language 
fails to reflect the immanent cultural process of the inscription of meaning.  In other words, as 
Paul de Man puts it, "ideology is precisely the confusion of linguistic with natural reality, of 
reference with phenomenalism" (Resistance 11) and not "false consciousness" of the outside of 
labor relations, as I am arguing.     
How then, does this theorization of the materiality of culture as opposed to the 
mimeticism of ideology bear out in the project of a discursive cultural studies as a mode of 
opposition to the dominant social relations that Cohen is advancing?  In fact, for Cohen, 
"mimesis" is more than simply a mode of representation that "reflects" on the world.  It is the 
mode of rule of an "aesthetic state"—a "ghost state" that actually "does not exist" (Material 120) 
because it is "an entire regime of cognition, interpretation and experience" that exceeds "political 
ideology" (118) and the "logics attributed to capital" (121)—that "is designed to efface a 
materiality of inscription" (120).  The "ghost state" is, like ideology and materiality for Cohen, a 
purely cognitive matter with no connection to an outside in labor arrangements.  He argues that 
the mode of intelligibility authorized by the "aesthetic state" dissimulates its own production of 
meaning in natural reality and thus deflects awareness of the "eventfulness" of history.  Historic 
change, in other words, comes from knowing that the past is always retroactively constructed in 
the present, which provides a sense of the otherness of the future for Cohen.  It is then this 
"eventfulness" of history that is represented by Cohen, citing Benjamin, as the project of a 
"material historiography" (ix) which would found a discursive cultural studies for the 
contemporary and which would constitute  an operation of "deinscription" that is a "performative 
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intervention at the site of prerecordings" (x) which articulate "a radical (re)programming of the 
(historical) archive out of which the 'sensorium' would be alternatively produced" (x).   
Cohen understands his project of a discursive cultural studies that is more attentive to 
inscription to be materially embedded in texts themselves.  Specifically it is a matter of the way 
texts perform the impossibility of their own signification in their very tropes and testify to the 
ghostly power of inscription over reality.  And yet, by locating the impossibility of self-same 
meaning in the text itself Cohen reinscribes the very mimetic logic he claims to be opposing.  
But, the logical contradiction—the fact that what Cohen deploys as the most oppositional 
narrative toward mimesis is itself mimetic—points to the fact that what is at issue here is not 
epistemology, as Cohen seems to think, and not an ethical question of "bad" (mimetic) versus 
"good" (post-mimetic) epistemic models of culture. Rather, the fact that in Cohen's writings the 
post-mimetic is mimetic with a vengeance indicates that representation, as Jameson has argued, 
is always mimetic because it presupposes a relation to history:  
 
Indeed, no working model of the functioning of language, the 
nature of communication or of the speech act, and the dynamics of 
formal and stylistic change is conceivable which does not imply a 
whole philosophy of history. (Political Unconscious 59)   
 
What Cohen's writings thus show despite themselves is that at stake in the debates over 
mimesis is not mimesis, but different ways of knowing the world that have different and opposed 
political consequences in terms of the ongoing class conflicts over the cultural real. To clarify 
this point, it will be useful here to look at a specific cultural reading that Cohen proposes as a 
model for discursivist cultural studies, his reading of Alfred Hitchcock's The 39 Steps.    
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According to Cohen, The 39 Steps demonstrates the "sheer exteriority" of meaning and 
subjectivity as the effect of inscription and the "resistance" to it that comes from the 
impossibility of its project to program the culture and police its boundaries.  The 39 Steps is thus 
made to tell a story about history and culture in which the origin and limits of domination are 
purely formal and emerge from within cultural processes, either within the code of mimesis and 
its "inscription of anteriority," or, oppositionally, in what Cohen calls "allographics," a writing 
that reveals its own processes of inscription as purely textual and arbitrary.  
In his reading of The 39 Steps, Cohen makes Mr. Memory (the vaudeville performer who 
serves as a pawn between the rival spy agencies in the story) the agent subverting the dominant 
ideology because he articulates the purely linguistic basis of its rule when he utters a 
"meaningless" string of numbers and words at the moment in the narrative when he reveals the 
state secret that stands to undermine its power if it gets into the enemy state's hands.  Because in 
the climactic scene the secret words Mr. Memory utters are audible to the viewer only as sounds 
they do not signify except in a purely literal way: what they thus signify, for Cohen, is that the 
State's secret is its own performativity and what they thus teach the viewer is that the way to 
resist the dominant is to mime it and reveal the cultural process of inscription and subjection to 
the dominant order.  Because the significance of Mr. Memory's statement is purely discursive, 
the meaning of the utterance is not that of a subversive state secret as referred to in the story but 
rather what for Cohen is the secret of the State itself: that the State is an effect of a relation in 
discourse between signifiers that are actually lacking any order of priority.  Thus what Cohen's 
"deinscriptive" reading from the "inside" proposes is that the agency of resistance to the culture's 
dominant meanings and values is not based on a materially oppressed subject that has been 
foreclosed from representation and that therefore stands as a critique of it, but comes from within 
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the dominant order itself at those moments when its own textual performativity is revealed to be 
the basis of its power (as opposed to any objective, "outside" order of causality.)  Yet what such 
a reading itself forecloses is how the text of The 39 Steps is the scene not of a self-dismantling of 
the State but in fact of a hegemonic struggle over the state.   
How does The 39 Steps reveal this hegemonic struggle?  What Cohen codes as a 
difference within discourse that is relayed as the contestation between (on the one hand) the State 
and its mimetic agents and (on the other) the subject of (de)inscription, is actually a conflict 
between basically opposed social orders, the State of capital based on the logic of exchange and 
an other emergent State within the State based on the materiality of need.  The alternative 
hegemony is dismissed by Cohen when he fails to read the political economy of significance 
behind the "unnamed enemy state" (Material xiii) Mr. Memory is en route to in the story. 
What the material conditions under which anyone would want to be going to an enemy 
state are is an important subtext of the film from its very opening scenes when, during Mr. 
Memory's performance in the music hall, there is a class struggle over the use of his ability to 
recall facts.  Not only does the scene make clear that different classes and groups need to know 
different facts, but the scene also shows that they are competing for the power to represent their 
needs as socially real; a farmer is so preoccupied with his cattle as to repeatedly ask his question 
about horticulture, while a proletarian is so consumed with Mae West and alcohol as to instigate 
a fight when he does not receive the reply he is looking for.   
This class struggle over the means of representation is carried through the film and it 
effectively reveals that the central issue involved in the State is not whether it is "representative" 
(mimetic) or not, but the fact that there are different social orders demanding representation.  
Thus, when Hannay, whose run from the police for a false murder charge carries the bulk of the 
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story, ducks into a public assembly hall and poses as a politician it doesn't matter that he is acting 
and his utopian speech in which all social conflicts are overcome is met with popular enthusiasm.  
The enthusiasm in fact indicates a popular need to overcome what are intractable social conflicts 
that have reached the point where they can be spontaneously represented by Hannay as a fight 
between "nation and nation" as well as "neighbor against neighbor." These moments, in short, 
point to the popular need for a State where material need has priority over the politics of 
representation—the false question of whether the State is or is not representative of an extra-
discursive real that transcends the class struggle. 
For Cohen, most of what passes for cultural studies "evades the problematic and 
programming of inscription" (Material xi) by "relapsing" into mimetic codes of "a pragmatic, 
everyday, referential, socio-historicist 'politics'" (Ideology 102).  But how effective is Cohen's 
argument for focusing on inscription as the hegemonic logic of the political in order to contest 
the logic of capital?  Cohen proposes that getting rid of "reference" (mimesis) is more important 
for changing the world than combating exploitation (the appropriation of surplus labor in the 
daily). In fact, in advancing such a position Cohen himself comes perilously close to articulating 
the logic of transnational capital in relation to the State by proclaiming in effect its material 
irrelevance, as when he claims that the State cannot be explained according to the "logics 
attributed to capital" (Material 121).  Because the ideological function of the State is primarily 
programming the "sensorium" and hegemonizing consciousness, according to Cohen, such as to 
create belief in "a pragmatic, everyday, referential, socio-historical 'politics'" (Ideology 102), his 
own theory which argues for "de-inscribing" the State in actuality itself aestheticizes the State 
and fails to see it as a site of social conflicts.  Indeed, the "ghost state" is, like ideology and 
materiality, for Cohen a purely cognitive matter.  Thus, the matter of how social relations shape 
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consciousness is occulted and capitalism is aestheticized as "mimeto-capitalism," a cognitive 
regime ruled by a "ghost state" that can only be known at the level of its effects on subjectivity 
and not in relation to its material pre-conditions.  Far from being "materialist,"  Cohen's war on 
the referent—the objective relations which precede their "conceptualization"—is in fact a return 
to a form of neo-Kantian idealism in which "matter" is understood ahistorically as that which 
produces effects at the level of consciousness but which itself cannot positively be known.  But 
what this occludes, as opaque to consciousness, is precisely the labor relations that precede it, the 
fact that, as Marx and Engels argue in The German Ideology, the "first premise of all human 
existence" (including the operations of the linguistic and cultural realms8) is that "men must be 
in a position to live in order to 'make history'," and 
 
life involves before everything else eating and drinking, housing, 
clothing and various other things. The first historical act is thus the 
production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of 
material life itself. (47)   
 
By supplanting this production of material life and the agency of labor, what Cohen in 
fact does is limit any understanding of the material to the terms of the cultural and thus privilege 
the regime of "ideas" (tropes) as instrumental in shaping the world.  History is dematerialized of 
labor and made strictly a matter of shifting tropes. 
                                                 
8 Even "poetry," as George Thomson explains, which historically has been the most non-mimetic of the cultural arts, 
produces "a closer communion of imaginative sympathy" (Marxism 23), which as much as it may express a 
"weakness in the face of nature" (24), yet "succeed[s] to some extent in overcoming it" (24) to the extent that it 
serves to focus on and to clarify the "subjective aspect" (29) of labor, that is, "the inner, psychical struggle" (29) 
labor produces in the worker. 
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Cohen believes that a non-mimetic cultural studies captures the materiality of culture in 
ways that mimetic types do not and is oppositional because it frees culture from the tyranny of 
transparency and phenomenalism he sees as the primary ideological support of contemporary 
capitalism.  However, his theory of materiality as a language effect is itself the dominant 
understanding of culture as is evidenced by the fact that it shares with overtly representational 
theories of culture a hostility to any cultural analysis that implicates the text in the class conflicts 
which precede and constitute the internal dynamics of cultural texts.  Indeed, Cohen's own "post-
mimetic" understanding of culture as immanent and constitutive of the contemporary real is 
actually just as much in evidence in liberal humanist cultural theories such as Scruton's which 
argue that representation reflects "timeless" truths about human beings.  While they remain 
formally opposed in terms of the cultural politics of representation they are nevertheless 
underwritten by a common emphasis on the autonomy of culture, an autonomy that severs the 
cultural from its material determinations. 
In the remainder of this chapter I wish to turn to Kafka and his readers as an example of 
the crisis of the contemporary totality so as to make my arguments above regarding culture as a 
site of conflict over materiality more concrete in terms of cultural practices, addressing the 
question what is to be done for a transformative cultural theory. Kafka is popularly seen as the 
opposite of a "realistic" writer because of the attenuated view of the world in his texts and the 
impossibility of an authentic human response to these conditions.  This view fails to read Kafka's 
text as reflecting on social relations because it conflates reflection with "reference" and assumes 
that as Kafka does not refer directly to the shape of social relations, or, indeed, any metanarrative 
of explanation, his texts cannot be said to be "about" social relations.  The conclusion is that 
because Kafka's writing lacks systemic awareness of society and modalities of change it must be 
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read in "existential" or "metaphysical" terms that are common-sensically assumed to be above 
politics and free of labor.  However, as I will show, the labor theory of culture is needed in order 
to penetrate the fog of "aboutness" (reference) and uncover the necessary reflection of labor 
relations in the text: on such a reading if class relations are absent in the narrative this is more 
than a problem of reference (knowledge), it is a social problem (ideology) while classes exist.  
The conflation of reflection with reference that concludes class is absent in Kafka is itself a class 
narrative that not only provides an apologetic for inequality but also distorts the intelligibility of 
narratives which are not exhausted by their content, as Lenin's labor theory of reading shows in 
its understanding of a non-mimetic reflection.  The labor theory of reading is needed to turn 
reading from being quietist and complicit with the dominant culturalist ideology and make it a 
struggle practice for social emancipation and equality.   
2.5 EPILOGUE: BEFORE THE LAW—READING CULTURE MATERIALLY 
Kafka's writings and their "readings" have become not only a layered cultural signpost but also 
a threshold in critical and cultural theory. In their analyses of Kafka, Lukács and Derrida, to take 
two of his most careful readers, bring out not only the complexities of his texts but also mark 
the the way in which the act of reading itself has become a complex and materially consequential 
cultural practice.   In this epilogue I will investigate these readings, but first I reproduce Kafka's 
Before the Law here. 
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BEFORE THE LAW 
 
Before the Law stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper there comes a man from the country and 
prays for admittance to the Law. But the doorkeeper says that he cannot grant admittance at the 
moment. The man thinks it over and then asks if he will be allowed in later. "It is possible," says 
the doorkeeper, "but not at the moment." Since the gate stands open, as usual, and the doorkeeper 
steps to one side, the man stoops to peer through the gateway into the interior. Observing that, the 
doorkeeper laughs and says: "If you are so drawn to it, 'just try to go in despite my veto. But take 
note: I am powerful. And I am only the least of the doorkeepers. From hall to hall there is one 
doorkeeper after another, each more powerful than the last. The third doorkeeper is already so 
terrible that even I cannot bear to look at him." These are difficulties the man from the country has 
not expected; the Law, he thinks, should surely be accessible at all times and to everyone, but as 
he now takes a closer look at the doorkeeper in his fur coat, with his big sharp nose and long, thin, 
black Tartar beard, he decides that it is better to wait until he gets permission to enter. The 
doorkeeper gives him a stool and lets him sit down at one side of the door. There he sits for days 
and years. He makes many attempts to be admitted, and wearies the doorkeeper by his 
importunity. The doorkeeper frequently has little interviews with him, asking him questions about 
his home and many other things, but the questions are put indifferently, as great lords put them, 
and always finish with the statement that he cannot be let in yet. The man, who has furnished 
himself with many things for his journey, sacrifices all he has, however valuable, to bribe the 
doorkeeper. The doorkeeper accepts everything, but always with the remark: "I am only taking it 
to keep you from thinking you have omitted anything." During these many years the man fixes his 
attention almost continuously on the doorkeeper. He forgets the other doorkeepers, and this first 
one seems to him the sole obstacle preventing access to the Law. He curses his bad luck, in his 
early years boldly and loudly; later, as he grows old, he only grumbles to himself. He becomes 
childish, and since in his yearlong contemplation of the doorkeeper he has come to know even the 
fleas in his fur collar, he begs the flea ' s as well to help him and to change the doorkeeper's mind. 
At length his eyesight begins to fail, and he does not know whether the world is really darker or 
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whether his eyes are only deceiving him. Yet in his darkness he is now aware of a radiance that 
streams inextinguishably from the gateway of the Law. Now he has not very long to live. Before 
he dies, all his experiences in these long years gather themselves in his head to one point, a 
question he has not yet asked the doorkeeper. He waves him nearer, since he can no longer raise 
his stiffening body. The doorkeeper has to bend low toward him, for the difference in height 
between them has altered much to the man's disadvantage. "What do you want to know now?" 
asks the doorkeeper; "you are insatiable." "Everyone strives to reach the Law," says the man, "so 
how does it happen that for all these many years no one but myself has ever begged for 
admittance?" The doorkeeper recognizes that the man has reached his end, and, to let his failing 
senses catch the words, roars in his ear: "No one else could ever be admitted here, since this gate 
was made only for you. I am now going to shut it."9 
 
 
In reading Kafka's Before the Law, Derrida, with meticulous attention to the working of 
rhetoric in the text, makes reading the practice of teasing out the singularities that put in question 
all generalizations about the text, including its own laws of genre. Before the Law, he argues, is a 
text of "subversive juridicity" (Acts of Literature 216) that, "owing to the referential 
equivocation of certain linguistic structures" (216), "does not tell or describe anything but itself 
as text" (211) and therefore "tells us perhaps of the being-before-the-law of any text" (215)—
including the law of literature that, Derrida maintains, is evident "when the categorical engages 
the idiomatic, as a literature always must" (213).  Derrida problematizes the law of literature 
(fiction) through the idiomatic in the way that the title Before the Law is both positioned 
                                                 
9Translation of Franz Kafka, "Before the Law" in Wedding Preparations in the Country and Other Stories, trans. 
Willa and Edwin Muir (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978). 
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"before" the "story" of the law as well as within the first sentence of the story ("Before the Law 
stands a doorkeeper."), a doubling that renders the identity of the literary "undecidable": 
 
The former, the title, is before the text and remains external if not 
to the fiction then at least to the content of the fictional narration. 
The latter is also at the head of the text, before it, but already in it; 
this is a first internal element of the narration's fictive content. And 
yet, although it is outside the fictional narrative or the story that is 
being told, the title (Before the Law) remains a fiction... We would 
say that the title belongs to literature even if its belonging has 
neither the structure nor the status of that which it entitles, to 
which it remains essentially heterogeneous. (Acts of Literature 
189) 
 
This doubling suggests that "the law had entitled itself" (189) in the displacement of the 
words "Before the Law" from its place in the fiction to the place of the title, which is supposed to 
be the "non-fictional" identity that grounds the text in the institution of Literature, as it simply 
"refers" to the "story."  The law of literature, whose "inside" is supposed to be fictional while 
"outside" it theory (science) and practice (politics) are not, is thus deconstructed and the text 
reveals a "fictive narrativity... without author or end" (199) which is as much "the origin of 
literature as the origin of law" (199).  Before the Law is thus a text that enacts the performative 
"idiomatic" basis of the general (law) by showing how the general is always dissected by the 
singularity of its performative iteration.   
Derrida goes on to show how the law—which, as the country man assumes, "should 
surely be accessible at all times to everyone,"—never materializes its presence because of a 
series of delays and deferrals.  The country man for example only prevents himself from entering 
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as he is not prohibited ("'It is possible,' says the doorkeeper…") so much as delayed by the 
"guarded" appearance of the Law and the "terrible" aspect of the doorkeeper ("in his fur coat, 
with his big sharp nose and long, thin, black Tartar beard"). The undecidable appearance of the 
Law as both accessible and guarded, a prohibition which does not prohibit anything so much as 
perform it as the doorkeeper suggests by his own placement outside the Law because of another 
absent doorkeeper ("so terrible that even I cannot look at him"), reveals, according to Derrida, 
that the Law is in actuality a fiction as "nothing really presents itself in this appearance" (Acts of 
Literature 191).  Rather, the appearance "fuels desire for the origin" (197) and in this sense, 
Derrida argues, "Kafka's text tells us perhaps of the being-before-the-law of any text" (215) that 
"the law of the law... is neither natural nor institutional" (205), its origin does not lie in class 
oppression for example, and its secret is rather that it does not repress so much as allow "oneself 
[to] be enticed, provoked, and hailed by the history of this non-history" of "pure morality" (191), 
as the categorical command that says "you must not" (192) always just as much says "you must" 
(192). Derrida seems to argue that, if power is necessary to thinking about the law (or, as he puts 
it, "if the nobility is necessary" [205]), that is so only because of the desire of "the lot of 
'guardians,' critics, academics, literary theorists, writers, and philosophers" (215) that depend on 
"the legal personality of the text" (185) as a form of property and who therefore presumably have 
an interest in deferring access to the "secret" of the law: that, "The secret is nothing" (205). "This 
is the secret that has to be kept well" (205), in Derrida's reading, in order to "fuel desire for the 
origin": the desire which authorizes the contemporary "system of laws and conventions" (185) as 
much as the desire for their subversion.  But what could be more comforting to the dominant 
than that their dominance has no basis to critique and that it is merely a conventional 
(consensual) mode of capturing desire?  Derrida's "desire-full" reading is a commodified reading 
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that places desire in a beyond and thereby naturalizes the division of labor that systematically 
produces desire in opposition to need, providing the exploiters with the means to desire from the 
labor of others and relegating the majority to unmet needs.  To read the problem of reading as a 
desire for proprietary rights and to propose an endless deferral of such rights as Derrida does is 
to install an ethical reading practice in which the individual is empowered over the collective and 
which thus fails to problematize the bourgeois right to exploit workers.   
Derrida provides an immanent reading of Before the Law that subverts the binary of truth 
and fiction in order to conclude that conclusions are not only unnecessary but impossible and 
that any law defers us to other signifiers without end—"The work, the opus, does not belong to 
the field, it is the transformer of the field" (Acts of Literature 215) and "none receives an answer" 
in reading the cultural text "that does not involve différance: (no) more law and (no) more 
literature" (215).  In this way Derrida underwrites the very ideology he puts in question by 
maintaining the fiction that law is "pure morality," a merely formal and empty universal standing 
outside the political economy of the contemporary real.    
Deleuze and Guattari's reading of Kafka although putting itself forward as a "political" 
(Minor Literature 7) and even "revolutionary" (18) reading, turns the political into a question of 
free speech—by, for example, detailing the ways the tropic reversals of the Kafka text 
demonstrate the blockage and flow of "desire" which is itself presented in an ahistorical and 
post-ideological way.   
Deleuze and Guattari's reading of Kafka is a rather traditional close reading that severs 
the text from its social and historical reality on the grounds that their reading is non-interpretive 
and thus closer to the way the text itself works.  "We believe only in a Kafka politics that is 
neither imaginary nor symbolic" (Minor Literature 7), they assert, because of what are basically 
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stylistic considerations; because, they argue, the signifiers in Kafka are not attached to definite 
signifieds but rather are "lines of flight" or, in other words, moments of conceptual opacity that 
are taken to exceed and to spontaneously resist "meaning."  What is being called "political" here 
is a violent reinscription of bourgeois reading, reading as a transcendental moment of plenitude 
above and beyond social conflicts.  Such an ahistorical ideology of reading of course relies on a 
rather traditional empiricism that assumes that knowledge of the object or text adheres in the text 
itself and is unmediated by language and ideology: "We believe only in a Kafka experimentation 
that is without interpretation or significance and rests only on tests of experience" (7).   
Not only is their reading itself, however, a reading that dogmatically takes its own 
presuppositions as self-evidently factual and therefore mystifies its own participation in the 
ongoing contestations in reading, but it does not do what it says it will, which is demonstrate the 
way in which Kafka's text is "free" of "reflecting" the social real.  What they in fact do is take the 
very thing about Kafka that needs to be explained, which is the question how to read the way in 
which he inscribes agency at the level of materiality, and explain it away by repeating an idealist 
theory of agency as absolutely "free" of material conditions.  
Deleuze and Guattari's is a speculative reading because it cuts off Kafka's text from its 
implicatedness in ongoing social praxis by treating it as a self-enclosed relay of tropes that open 
up ("deterritorialize") and close off ("reterritorialize") the pleasure of the subject in reading 
(Minor Literature 4). They claim that they "aren't even trying to interpret, to say this means that" 
(7) and that they are simply describing those moments of pure material opacity in the text itself, 
such as "how the intrusion of sound occurs in Kafka" in such a way that it "cuts it off from all its 
connections" (4), for example. 
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What interests Kafka is a pure and intense sonorous material that is 
always connected to its own abolition—a deterritorialized musical 
sound, a cry that escapes signification, composition, song, words—
a sonority that ruptures in order to break away from a chain that is 
still all too signifying. (Minor Literature 6) 
 
Their assumption of course is that "signifying" is "territorializing" and contains desire to 
normative conventions of pleasure, as against the significations of experience (as "non-
signification") in a text which provides a kind of pleasure in subverting the containing drive in 
signification.   
The reader is thus taught to read Kafka in a post-ideological matrix that Deleuze and 
Guattari take as the limit of the political.  Thus, the "problem is not that of being free but of 
finding a way out" (Minor Literature 7) of this problem by always reading "within" the terms of 
the text as a "rhizome," "assemblage," or "desiring machine"—as a self-enclosed and free 
floating space filled with "states of desire, free of all interpretations" (7).  What such an 
immanent reading does is reinscribe "territoriality" as a systemic logic while displacing it to the 
locality of the text so as to immunize the text from a symptomatic reading whereby its tropic 
moves are seen to reflect ongoing and consequential social conflicts of intelligibility over the 
shape of the social real. 
When Deleuze and Guattari consider the politics of the text in an extra-textual way at all 
it is a merely cultural politics that opposes a "minor literature" to a "major" one on the grounds 
that "minor literature" is "revolutionary" because it uses the "major literature" for constructing a 
"collective assemblage of enunciation" (Minor Literature 18), or, in other words, it seeks to 
extend the freedom of speech to cover marginalized cultures. Not only is this not a revolutionary 
reading, because it contains freedom to merely formal terms and does not grasp the need for 
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economic freedom, but its politics do not go very far either if the point is to advance collectivity.  
Where is the advance in collectivity if all politics must reinscribe the dominant terms and 
collectivity be always already assumed to be "minor"?   This is the reduction of the political to 
the stylistic.  Furthermore, it does not take style very seriously by cutting it off from the class 
struggle. 
Lukács begins his materialist reading of Kafka at this very point because he reads in 
Kafka's style —"the attenuation of reality" in his texts—a reflection of the "terror generated by 
the world of imperialist capitalism... where human beings are degraded to mere objects" 
(Literature and the Class Struggle 52).  In Lukács terms, to cut Kafka's style off from "its social 
basis" (47) is to mystify the politics of style, which is a matter of how "the social structure of 
imperialism" impacts on "the bourgeois intelligentsia" (73).  Thus "the crucial question" posed 
by Kafka, Lukács argues, is  
 
whether a man escapes from the life of his time into a realm of 
abstraction —it is then that angst is engendered in human 
consciousness—or confronts modern life determined to fight its 
evils and support what is good in it. The first decision leads to 
another: is man the helpless victim of transcendental and 
inexplicable forces, or is he a member of a human community in 
which he can play a part, however small, towards its modification 
or reform? (80-1)    
 
The task of the reader in materialist reading is thus a "critical" and not "libidinal" one: to 
"establish by examination of the work whether a writer's view of the world is based on the 
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acceptance or rejection of angst, whether it involves a flight from reality or a willingness to face 
up to it" (83).  This entails asking a rather sharp question in reading the text:  
 
is it able to include—or, better, demands—a dynamic, complex, 
analytical rendering of social relationships, or whether it leads to 
loss of perspective and historicity. (82) 
 
Lukács' reading of Kafka is critical and dialectical.  It is not a dogmatic reading in the 
way that an immanent culturalist reading is because it does not assume the text as "static" and 
self-enclosed, spontaneously resistant to the production of "meaning" ("the Law of differance").  
My reading of Lukács thus argues against a "formalist" interpretation of his work as providing, 
as Lunn puts it, a "philosophical underpinning for... socialist realism" (77).  Lunn argues that 
because Lukács "reduced works of art (including literary techniques) to reflexes of class 
ideology... modernist forms such as those of expressionism were apparently tied indissolubly to 
late bourgeois ideological decay and thus could not be transformed to serve other purposes" (85).  
This view of Lukács' work fails to take into account his dialectical account of literary form 
which militates against all formalist solutions in art for what are in actuality intractable class 
conflicts.   Rather, than imposing some set of formal prescriptions as a guarantee of a pre-
determined meaning and effectivity, Lukács' materialist reading of culture grasps the meaning of 
the text and of literary technique as the site of conflicting class structures that militate against 
any singularity of meaning in a world more and more "transfer[ed] into the proletariat" (Marx 
and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party 494).  Furthermore, his materialist cultural theory 
does not fetishize the way that literature must inevitably reflect the reification of social life under 
capitalism because, as Lukács' argues, texts carry an inevitable protest of "the diabolical 
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character of the world of modern capitalism" (77) as well.  In Kafka's case, this protest of 
capitalism is precisely located in the very realism of detail that Derrida, for example, sees as the 
"idiomatic" expression of a disavowed desire inscribed in law that is essentially "free" of history.  
Derrida can only see in the "terrible" aspect of the doorkeeper a trope of castration 
because "in his fur coat, with his big sharp nose and long, thin, black Tartar beard" the 
doorkeeper suggests the phallus in imagery as well as effect, since in seeing him the man from 
the country "decides that it is better to wait until he gets permission" to enter. Yet Derrida does 
not see in this detail the trappings of feudalism and its symbols of rank radically out of joint with 
the impersonality of the Law and the abstract freedom it demands under capitalism.  While the 
"terrible aspect" of the doorkeeper is in keeping with the extra-economic form of coercion 
demanded by the feudal division of labor, with which the "man from the country" is familiar we 
can assume, at least his reaction seems to suggest so as it gives him fearful associations, its 
application on the Law as he encounters it, "open, as usual" and precisely "accessible at all times 
and to everyone" as he expected to find it, reflects the contradiction of the Law under capitalism 
in which the worker must freely submit to his own exploitation.  Thus, whereas Derrida 
concludes that the appearance of the Law, which precisely prohibits while provoking a desire 
because of its categorically imperative form ("you must-/not"), thus placing the man in a position 
to "decide" to prohibit himself, a materialist reading finds in such self-contradictory details a 
trace of the "silent compulsion of economic relations" (Marx, Capital 899) that is the real 
"secret" of the Law under capitalism.  The Law under capitalism does not need the extra-
economic coercion of pre-capitalist social formations because in capitalism inequality is 
primarily economic not political.  What the text reflects, therefore, using the terms of Lukács' 
materialist reading, is not a "fixed" (logical) contradiction good for all and for all time, as 
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Derrida's deconstructive reading posits, but an historical contradiction that has unavoidable 
effects on representation rendering it internally inconsistent as well as socially and personally 
unsettling. 
 Lukács' reading of the material real in Kafka is the opposite of Derrida's non-reading of 
the real as displaced desire.  For Lukács: 
 
Kafka is one of the very few modernist writers whose attitude to 
detail is selective, not naturalistic.  Formally, his treatment of 
detail is not dissimilar to that of a realist.  The difference becomes 
apparent only when we examine his basic commitment, the 
principles determining the selection and sequence of detail. With 
Kafka these principles are his belief in a transcendental force 
(Nothingness)… But the problem cannot be approached 
formalistically.  There are great realistic writers in whose works 
immediate social and historical reality is transcended, where 
realism in detail is based on a belief in a supernatural world... In 
Hoffmann, realism in detail goes hand in hand with a belief in the 
spectral nature of reality... Kafka is more secular than Hoffman. 
His ghosts belong to everyday bourgeois life; and since this life 
itself is unreal, there is no need of supernatural ghosts... But the 
unity of the world is broken up, since an essentially subjective 
vision is identified with reality itself.  The terror generated by the 
world of imperialist capitalism...  where human beings are 
degraded to mere objects—this fear, originally a subjective 
experience, becomes an objective entity. (Realism 53) 
  
Lukács is here implicating a deconstructive reading which assumes that "extreme 
subjectivism, the static nature of reality, and the senselessness of its surface phenomenon, are 
 181 
absolute truths requiring no proof" (72) by revealing the class basis of this view as "a certain way 
of looking at reality" (73) that does not see "what goal history is moving"(59) toward due to the 
"strong counter forces" (91) at work in the world that are productive of social collectivity. 
"Kafka" is a cultural sign of the logic of reification in capitalism—what has already been 
theorized above as the immanent culturalism of the dominant discourses. Kafka's Before the Law 
follows a (post)modern culturalist logic by his surfacing of the contradictions of daily life under 
monopoly capitalism and mystifying any causal systemic explanation for them. What the spectral 
reading of Kafka is blind to and what materialist reading emphasizes is its "protest" of the system 
of monopoly capitalism which transforms daily life into a regimented life regulated by the logic 
of the commodity (exchange value)—culture as "mere training to act like a machine" (Marx and 
Engels).  In the spectrality of its details Before the Law registers the fact that capitalism as it 
develops must alienate all social activity and productions to serve the rule of profit so that 
nothing in the end is able to remain a local and self-enclosed activity but rather entails an 
invisible global system for its production.  The fetishism of detail in Kafka is in reaction to this 
impersonal machinery that has overtaken the social relations.  Derrida limits the materiality of 
Kafka's text to epistemological terms by only seeing in its details an "idiomatic" implication of 
the concept of the general (law). 
However, materialist reading does not idealize the "protest" embedded in Kafka's text as 
it is finally merely cultural in its assumptions and effects.  Kafka's works presuppose a kind of 
bureaucratic reason run amok—where even those institutions which are supposed to provide a 
space of freedom from the market logic for the subject (such as the family, romantic love, the 
law, etc.) are themselves reproducing the dominant logic—that finds its negation in a voluntary 
leap into "absurdity," an existential act of empty negation that puts a seal of condemnation of the 
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system as a whole—"inhuman" ("since this gate was made only for you. I am now going to shut 
it.'"). What Kafka shows is the systematicity of commodity fetishism in daily life. What he does 
not show is the equally systemic negation of this logic in the production of the collectivity of 
labor, the material force that has produced and is alone in a position to control the "machine."    
The one-sided presentation of the socialization of production in Kafka has effects on the 
understanding of "reflection" in materialist cultural theory.  On Lukács' reading, Kafka 
capitulates to the general process of reification necessitated by extension of the logic of capital 
over more and more areas of social life, which as a consequence turns literature from being a 
force for change to one of reaction by strengthening the grip of necessity over cultural 
productions.  For Lukács the role of literature is to "de-reify" the social and, "demand… a 
dynamic, complex, analytical rendering of social relationships" that can guide humanity in its 
struggles toward a realm of freedom.  On Lenin's terms, however, this means that culture is 
expected to have a realistic "mimetic" function rather than an ideologically "reflective" one 
because it assumes that "consciousness" can take the place of collective praxis as the agency of 
social change.  Social relations cannot be "de-reified" in consciousness while classes continue to 
exist.  The socialization of consciousness can only assume a class basis under capitalism and 
every representation of social relations and the relationship of humanity to nature until then is 
necessarily class divided, supporting either bourgeois or proletarian interests.  For a materialist 
cultural theory to advance the cause of social equality it must base itself on a labor theory of 
culture or risk reifying materiality and falling into a merely pragmatic understanding of culture 
that works within the dominant terms that construct the naturalness of the cultural real rather 
than challenge these terms with the root knowledge of class.  
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3.0  LABOR AND THE POETICS OF CAPITAL 
3.1 IMMATERIAL APOLOGETICS 
The discourse theory of canonical poststructuralism is today being challenged by a materialist 
cultural theory that questions the exclusive focus on textuality as not very different from the 
humanist idealization of culture as free of the social.  Contemporary cultural studies has 
practically become obsessed with what it calls the "economic" in ways that challenge the textual 
materialism of the past.   In new books such as Cultural Studies in Question and Marxism and 
Modernity and Postcolonial Studies, for example, there is an increasing call for cultural studies 
to return to its "roots" in discussions of capitalism and inequality. Also significant, is Lawrence 
Grossberg, editor of the influential journal Cultural Studies, writing that having replaced a class 
politics with a semiotic politics, cultural studies "continues to leave the relationship between 
culture and capital unexamined" ("Speculations" 16). In contrast to his own years of denying any 
causal relationship between capitalism (base) and culture (superstructure) (e.g., Bringing it all 
Back Home: Essays on Cultural Studies), Grossberg now declares the necessity of "return[ing] to 
questions of economics" and "the exploitation of... labor" if cultural studies is going to be able to 
understand, respond to, and transform "the changing configurations of... systems of inequality" 
("Speculations" 16).   
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The recent turn to economics in contemporary cultural theory contests the reification of 
the social in terms of discourse.  This economic turn has, however, both a rhetorical mode, 
represented above by writers such as Grossberg who yet continue to assert that "economics is 
itself a discourse" ("Speculations" 17), and a more serious mode which returns to Marxist 
concepts of the social totality in order to investigate the materiality of culture, in the texts of neo-
marxist writers such as Fredric Jameson and Antonio Negri for example. In the neo-marxist 
cultural theory, however, social relations are dematerialized as symbolic production. Relying on 
Althusser's revision of base/superstructure, Negri and Jameson argue that the root of the 
contemporary social formation is "immaterial" and unavailable as a basis for transformative 
materialist critique because it has become primarily symbolic. In order to articulate the classical 
Marxist labor theory of culture today it is therefore necessary to look at the contemporary 
cultural theories that put themselves forward as materialist critiques of the dominant cultural 
theory of immanence. 
In "The Specter's Smile" for example, Negri uses Derrida's Specters of Marx to show 
how the spectral materialism put forward there remains immersed in "the phenomenology of 
capitalist production" (7) in a way that "corresponds with common experience" (9) and that fails 
to describe its "ontological" basis, the "new productive reality" (9) of the laboring subject whose 
experience it is.  As Derrida ignores the fact that "human labor, both mental and manual, is 
increasingly implicated in exploitation" (11) he is thus "a prisoner of the ontology he critiques" 
(13).  Negri thus explicitly re-privileges ontology in ways that Derrida rejected as classically 
idealist (Platonism) on the grounds that the hierarchy between writing and reality authorized by 
this binary subordinates conceptuality to the general cultural economy.  But, Derrida's textualism 
itself reinscribes the dominant ideology in which culture is understood immanently and fails to 
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investigate the conflict in ontology which reflects antagonistic class interests.  Ontology has 
always maintained that being determines consciousness, but has disagreed about the organization 
of being: whether being is a static and inert category as in mechanical materialist theories of 
nature (such as Eagleton's) or whether it is historical and changes according to knowlable laws as 
in dialectical materialism.  Negri's position in so far as according to him labor has become 
primarily "immaterial" and "directly produces social relationships and forms of life" (Multitude 
110) must be seen as a speculative ontology that posits "'society as the subject'" (Marx and 
Engels, The German Ideology, 59) and regards the "interrelated individuals... as a single 
individual, which accomplishes the mystery of generating itself" (59). Negri maintains that labor 
is the central organizing factor of the contemporary, but his concept of labor is so general 
("creative capacities" Multitude 105) that it effectively becomes a trope of experience, which is 
what he means by ontology ("a common experience," "Specter's Smile" 9).   
While prioritizing concepts central to a materialist theory of culture such as labor, 
production, exploitation, and revolution, Negri evacuates them of their historical and material 
basis in the capitalist mode of production, however, by maintaining that in the contemporary "the 
law of value no longer works in describing the entire process of capital" (10).  Thus, while, on 
the one hand, exploitation is global, according to Negri—and explains the "spectral" logic of the 
discursivist cultural theory, which Derrida claims exceeds all (mimeto)logics, as in fact miming 
the logic of capital—on the other hand exploitation no longer concerns the extraction of surplus-
value from labor, as Marx explained the source of profit.  "Accumulation nowadays," Negri 
claims, consists of "fixing hierarchal and expropriative dividing lines" in the "acquisition of 
knowledge and social activity taking place within... communicative horizons" (11) such as "the 
Internet" (11).  Negri thus displaces a theory of material exploitation with an analytics of cultural 
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domination on the grounds that labor has become "immaterial" and primarily cultural.  In his 
bestseller Empire, he occults any structure of necessity behind labor by treating labor as a trope 
of desire, describing it as "a horizon of activities, resistances, wills, and desires that refuse the 
hegemonic order, propose lines of flight and forge alternative constitutive itineraries" (48).  
While claiming that "immaterial labor" constitutes a voluntary "refusal" of the hegemonic order 
Negri also makes it a "figure of labor that exerts hegemony" over all other kinds of labor 
(Multitude 107) such that service work—"labor that produces or manipulates affects" (108)—is 
made the model of labor globally.  In this way Negri's labor theory reifies global labor by 
reducing it to the form of labor located in the West which no longer produces anything at a time 
when productive labor (i.e., profitable investment) has shifted elsewhere (China, India, etc.). His 
theory takes the lack of investment in labor in the West as a voluntary refusal of labor that 
liberates it from the rule of capital and because this non-productive labor is the global model of 
labor for Negri labor is understood in a purely subjective way such that "even when labor is 
subjugated by capital it always necessarily maintains its own autonomy" (Multitude 54).   
For all his criticism of Derridean spectrality, Negri basically agrees that "there's no longer 
an outside" ("Specter's Smile" 9) to capitalism and "no longer a measuring gauge of value" (8) 
upon which to base an emancipatory critique of it.  His criticisms of the spectral are thus 
themselves spectral.  They are no more than semantic differences in a merely cultural war, what 
he calls "the new class wars that define [the] exploitation of labor in a world of immateriality and 
spectral production" (11).  "New class wars" indicates that the base of the social is not up for 
contestation, which is why Negri displaces social theory of the contemporary for "ontology"—"a 
common experience of spectrality as clear as the sun" (9) which takes as a given that Marxism is 
"out of date" (10) because "no reasonable person could... affirm exploitation's identical form then 
 187 
and now" (10).  Negri argues for implicating Derrida's spectral concepts in "productive reality" 
only to end up appealing to the self-evidence of experience as the limit text of the "reasonable."  
But "reason" is not independent of class interest.  To assert as "unreasonable" the materialist 
theory of exploitation as based on the expropriation of surplus-labor in production on the 
grounds that production is an "affective" experience in which "despite the myriad mechanisms of 
hierarchy and subordination" (Multitude 129) yet makes workers feel "extraordinarily wealthy" 
(131) in spirit is to take the side of the owners who find "reasonable" whatever maintains and 
justifies the source of their wealth.  To claim that "common experience" provides the truth of the 
contemporary and the non-truth of the law of value is simply to take the continued existence of 
capitalism for granted and turn it from something historical to something eternal.   It is also to 
dissolve the necessity of theory in general and put thick description in its place as in a rather 
traditional empiricism.  But as Marx argues "all science would be superfluous if the outward 
appearance and the essence of things directly coincided" (Capital Vol. III, 804).  "Immaterial 
labor" is a cultural theory that has emerged to reconcile the contradiction between social 
production and private appropriation that argues that class society need not be transformed 
because labor already has the power to create reality and the given reality has already superseded 
exploitation.  Such a theory is necessary to explain away the need for revolution at a time of 
growing social inequality on a world scale. 
Negri's understanding of the contemporary is purely cultural despite the language of 
Marxism he uses because he ignores the material measure of value—profit.  Negri has of course 
become a celebrated figure in the culture industry (by the New York Times and the Charlie Rose 
show, for example) for his bestseller Empire, which argues that "imperialism is over" (xiv) and 
has been replaced by "empire," a social formation that lies beyond "the fiction of any measure of 
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the working day" (402).  But, if the work day is a fiction then there would be no more profit.  
Profit is the measure of the working day Negri claims no longer exists. Profit comes from 
surplus-labor, that labor expended in the work day whose value is over and above the value of 
the necessary labor expended in order to maintain the existence of the laborer, as Marx explains 
("The Working Day" Book I, Chap. 10, Capital Vol. I, 340-416).  Profit can only be materially 
explained as coming from the basically unequal relations of production in capitalism.  It is 
capitalism that has monopolized the productive forces of society into a few hands and 
dispossessed the many of everything but their labor power to sell. Without Marx's labor theory of 
value there can be no basic contestation of capitalism, only moral condemnation of its more 
oppressive effects that keeps exploitation intact by immunizing it from materialist critique.  
Thus, in place of an understanding of labor as an historical structure of conflicts that reveals "the 
real movement that abolishes the present state of things" (German Ideology 57) and that thus 
inaugurates the necessity of communism for Marx and Engels, Negri gives a "parable of change" 
("The Specter's Smile" 12) which finds communism ready-made in "the rupture with memory" 
(14) demanded by the "mobile and flexible reality" of (12) spectral production and says good-
bye to the working class as the agent of history.  
In place of a materialist theory of social change Negri tells stories about the potential for 
spontaneous rebellion due to newer technologies.  What defines contemporary exploitation now, 
according to Negri, is not labor in the classical Marxist sense, but the "body" ("The Specter's 
Smile" 13): the "experience" of high-tech work today.  Negri claims that contemporary 
capitalism has brought into being "a common experience of spectrality" (9) in the lives of "a 
laboring subject amassed in intellectuality and cooperative force" (12).  The "new social force of 
mass intellectuality" (15), he claims, produces a subject at home in the body, who therefore 
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"refuses transcendence and chooses to live a worldly, laic [secular] and rational ascesis [self-
discipline] that will lead him towards a constitutive hermeneutics and an ethics of liberation" 
(11-2), or, the "new theory of revolution" (14) that Negri calls "communism" (14).  Negri's 
communism, however, has nothing material to say against exploitation because it is a "rupture 
with memory" (14).  On the one hand, exploitation is real, according to Negri, because 
 
we have communication and the wealth that accumulates therein; 
on the other, we have the solitude, the misery, the sadness, the 
exodus and the new class wars that define this exploitation of labor 
in a world of immateriality and spectral production. (11) 
 
But in these terms, emotions give the truth of the world (not the social relations of 
production) and exploitation is made a matter of moral sentiments (not labor). Morality, 
however, is not autonomous of class but an expression of class. The morality of the ruling class 
is an eclectic blend of "timeless" axioms that provide an imaginary compensation for inequality 
and pragmatic codes that go along to get along in the system while deflecting attention from the 
underlying social relations.  Negri's opposition to inequality is not based on a material foundation 
that will lead to changing it but a sentimental one that distracts attention from what is to be done 
to change it.  His theory of change is basically religious: to "re-value" poverty ("the poor are not 
merely victims but also powerful agents," Multitude 129).  But poverty is not caused by moral 
ostracism.  Its cause is profit.  Actually, it is because Negri's cultural theory is so invested in 
making hi-tech service work in the West the model of all labor because it is "creative" that his 
texts are so caught up in trying to "re-value" the labor of the other. 
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But even in such moral terms exploitation is a thing of the past for Negri because the 
"common experience" of the contemporary that "deem[s] the Marxist ontology out of date" 
("The Specter's Smile" 10) is that "no longer are capitalist relations of production exercised 
solely on a subject characterized through misery" (12).  The "common experience" of the 
contemporary that Negri speaks for is that of a post-exploitative "dual state of mind" (11) which 
"lead[s] the mind to grasp the very nature of Desire, beyond the (past) determinations of 
existence or the (present) external dialectic of sadness and joy" (11).  "Passion" thus figures in 
his imaginary as "destructive of the world of capital and constructive of freedom" (15) more so 
than historical materialist theory that uncovers the unmet needs of the majority and brings it to 
bear upon the ideological.  Through the trope of "immaterial" and "affective" labor as 
constitutive of the contemporary real, Negri first displaces concepts that explain the 
contemporary in terms of conflicts over the ratio of exploitation demanded by the work day with 
sentimental categories, and then, in a second move, injects into this emotional plenitude a 
voluntarist rebelliousness that morally transcends both the affirmation (joy) and negation 
(sadness) of the existing in the "constituent spirit of the ontological violence of transformation" 
(15).  Again, as in idealist theories, it is Spirit (passion) that moves the world, not labor.  
For a more materialist cultural theory of the contemporary one has to turn to the writings 
of Fredric Jameson to understand how the utopian "passion" of a cultural transcendence of labor 
relations is specifically tied to the capitalist mode of production.   This is because central to 
Jameson's writings is Marx's concept of "commodity fetishism," which he understands primarily 
through Lukács' theory of "reification"—the material process of production whereby social 
relations are depersonalized and seen as relations between things and ideas due to the dominance 
of exchange-value (production for profit).  In the Grundrisse Marx theorized that the technical 
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and naturalistic ways of discussing labor in classical political economy was a symptom of the 
real practical indifference toward individual labors in capitalism that reflects the concrete social 
whole in an ideological way (104).  Following Marx, Jameson argues that any conception of the 
autonomous separation of culture from the economic is "a symptom and a reinforcement of the 
reification and privatization of contemporary life" (20) due to the "universal commodification of 
labor power" (Political Unconscious 66): 
 
Such a distinction reconfirms that structural, experiential, and 
conceptual gap between the public and the private, between the 
social and the psychological, or the political and the poetic, 
between history or society and the "individual," which—the 
tendential law of social life under capitalism—maims our existence 
as individual subjects and paralyzes our thinking about time and 
change just as surely as it alienates us from our speech itself... To 
imagine that, sheltered from the omnipresence of history and the 
implacable influence of the social, there already exists a realm of 
freedom... is only to strengthen the grip of Necessity over all such 
blind zones in which the individual seeks refuge, in pursuit of a 
purely individual, a merely psychological, project of salvation. 
(20) 
 
Culture, in short, is ideological, as "the production of aesthetic or narrative form" has "the 
function of inventing imaginary or formal 'solutions' to unresolvable social contradictions" (79) 
thus "strengthening the grip of Necessity" in culture.   It is in "detecting the traces of this 
uninterrupted narrative, in restoring to the surface of the text the repressed and buried reality of 
this fundamental history" (20) that Jameson understands the goal of a materialist cultural theory 
as participating in labor, "the collective struggle to wrest a realm of Freedom from a realm of 
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Necessity" (19), citing Marx.  Thus, Jameson is in a position to implicate Negri's story of 
communism as a new "passion" brought about by technical changes impacting the working body 
as itself a commodification of the senses necessitated by private property, in a manner similar to 
the way he reads Conrad's "impressionistic" style, for example, which attempts "to rewrite in 
terms of the aesthetic, of sense perception... a reality you prefer not to conceptualize" (215).  In 
these terms, Jameson's use of commodity fetishism would seem to show that far from being a site 
of resistance to capital, the "senses" are an extension of exploitative relations: the site of 
ideology.  This is significant because he thus establishes the need to read culture and cultural 
experience (the "senses") not in their own terms, but in relation to their outside, namely the 
commodity relations that both necessitate such experiences and provide "ready-made" 
interpretations that justify existing unequal relations.  He shows, in short, that the senses, 
experience, passion, etc. are not explainable on their own terms (since they are produced under 
certain circumstances) but require explanation (concepts). 
Jameson, however, (both in his early and later work) seems to simultaneously undermine 
this very conclusion in ultimately arguing against the ability to conceptualize economic relations 
and in suggesting that culture (contrary to what he has already critiqued) should be seen as not 
only "semi-autonomous" from class relations but as an (immediate) site of libidinal resistance to 
class inequality.  For instance, he ultimately rejects a materialist theory of ideology which argues 
that "superstructural phenomena, are mere reflexes, epiphenomenal projections of infrastructural 
realities" (Political Unconscious 42), on the grounds that "history... is inaccessible to us except in 
textual form, and that our approach to it and to the Real itself necessarily passes through its prior 
textualization" (35).  There is, in other words, no outside to ideology, according to Jameson.  By 
getting rid of the outside Jameson is here duplicating culturalism.  The effects of this capitulation 
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to culturalism on Jameson's social theory has been devastating.  In his "Third-World Literature in 
the Era of Multinational Capitalism," for instance, he argues for a theory of the "world capitalist 
system" (68) as constituted by "two cultural logics" (85) that "overdetermine each other" (73) 
that displaces a political economic understanding of the global inequality between imperialist 
countries and their colonies with the banality that a "different ratio of the political to the 
personal" (69) is evident and the "controlling forces are... difficult to represent" (81).  On these 
terms "psychology, or more specifically, libidinal investment, is to be read in primarily political 
and social terms" (72) in countries which have suffered the experience of colonialism and 
imperialism whose culture as a result "must be situational and materialist despite itself" (85) such 
that the personal is political.  At the same time, the culture of imperialist nations is considered 
"bereft of any possibility of grasping the social totality" (85) and "sexuality and politics might be 
in homology to each other" (73) such that the personal functions as the political.  Jameson's 
discourse on "national allegory" is itself a class allegory in which class is renarrated as "culture" 
and instead of an economically integrated world internally divided between exploiters and 
exploited the world is composed of "two cultural logics" that program radically different 
subjectivities that remain essentially alien to each other and from which there can only be 
extracted a pious wish that they may be united someday in a "future utopia" of "collective 
cooperation" (81) while in the meantime it serves to remind the Western consumers of the third-
world text of the "optional nature" (79) of culture and identity.  By shifting attention from the 
basic conditions that establish the relation between imperialist and imperialized nations onto 
superstructural features of culture and subjectivity Jameson aestheticizes the political and 
underwrites the commodification of the third-world, which is what actually drives imperialism. 
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For a materialist cultural studies the other of ideology is not some radical identity 
elsewhere, but the positive knowledge (science) of the real motive forces compelling individuals 
as they (re)produce their material life under specific historical circumstances. On Jameson's 
culturalist terms it is impossible to give a critique of ideology as a false-consciousness of the 
economic and produce an awareness of the necessity for social change.  Because Jameson 
abandons the critique of ideology he therefore speculates that beyond the historical specification 
of ideology as global commodification that acts as a "containment" of the awareness of the 
historicity of labor in capitalism, culture also provides the individual with a therapeutic 
"compensation" for a thoroughly commodified social life in the form of the "libidinal 
transformation" (Political Unconscious 237) of the senses:  
 
We stressed the semi-autonomy of the fragmented senses, the new 
autonomy and intrinsic logic of their henceforth abstract objects 
such as color and pure sound; but it is precisely this new semi-
autonomy and the presence of these waste products of capitalist 
rationalization that opens up a life space in which the opposite and 
the negation of such rationalization can be, at least imaginatively, 
experienced. The increasing abstraction of visual art thus proves 
not only to express the abstraction of daily life and to presuppose 
fragmentation and reification; it also constitutes a Utopian 
compensation for everything lost in the process of the development 
of capitalism—the place of quality in an increasingly quantified 
world, the place of the archaic and of feeling amid the 
desacralization of the market system, the place of sheer color and 
intensity within the grayness of measurable extension and 
geometrical abstraction. The perceptual is in this sense a 
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historically new experience, which has no equivalent in older kinds 
of social life. (236-7)       
 
What Jameson is calling a utopian compensation for alienation in the experiential 
immediacy of the senses is really a sign of his own capitulation to the "prior textualization" of 
the economic imposed by the culture industry that makes imperative the folding of culture in on 
itself so as to bolster consumption and marginalize an awareness of culture as an arena of class 
struggle.  In his later writings, such as Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism, Jameson goes further in arguing that "the infrastructural... is necessarily itself 
already cultural" (xv), as postmodern theory claims, by arguing that contemporary "experience" 
itself can be considered a "supreme act of nomination" which "wields a material impact and, like 
lightning striking from the superstructure back to the base, fuses its unlikely materials" (xiii) into 
new hybrid shapes that, therefore, cannot be explained in terms of the laws of motion of the 
capitalist mode of production.  Jameson, to put this differently, substitutes the immediacy of a 
compensatory sensuality (culture) for critique (knowledge of the social totality), which, as Marx 
argues, is necessary to intervene in the workings of ideology from the outside so to end the 
regime of necessity imposed by capital. 
As Jameson himself realizes, the cultural production of the senses has an economic 
function through which men and women "are culturally and psychologically retrained for life in 
the market system" (Political Unconscious 236).  Culture, under capitalism, is, in short, "mere 
training to act as a machine" (Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, 501).  There 
is nothing more impersonal and machine-like than the idea of culture as a privately "sensual" and 
"experiential" matter free of the logic of capital in the world of global production and the 
massive unmet need produced by capital.  Furthermore, the "place" where Jameson locates 
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culture, at the site of consumption and in the immediacy of the senses, actually contradicts his 
own understanding of the prior textualization, or, cultural work, behind the sense-perception of 
the world.   
When one implicates this cultural work in the wider division of labor it becomes possible 
to see that the senses are not the site of an immediacy but the site of class conflict in which 
immediacy serves as an ideological mystification of the historical production of the senses.   
Take the work of Matthew Barney for example, which is read as a new way of seeing art in the 
new millennium; the New York Times has labeled Barney "the most important American artist 
of his generation" and celebrated his work as heralding a "new freedom" for "art in the new 
century" (Kimmelman).  The reason for such praise is that his work is taken to be beyond 
ideology, or, as the Times critic puts it, it is "Free To Play and Be Gooey."  Barney's art is taken 
to be beyond ideology in the mainstream commentary because of its multi-media complexity, 
from Vaseline and self-lubricating plastic to tapioca, precious metals, sculpture, drawing, and 
film, and its cross-cultural references to Masonry, Irish nationalism, pop culture, and high art for 
example, and the way such complexity of means disrupts its narrative coherence which seems to 
eschew any decided content or closure (The Cremaster Cycle is about the failure of gender 
differentiation and identity).  The Cremaster Cycle represents a kind of Gesamtkunstwerk (total 
work of art) that installs a new modality of seeing that exemplifies Jameson's diagnosis of the 
contemporary as a crisis of metanarrative brought about by global commodification and its 
ceaseless production of sensual compensations.   
The main trope of Barney's work is "restraint" and it is graphically represented by the 
barred lozenge figure that recurs again and again in his work and that stands in for the work as a 
whole as a kind of marketing logo.  Barney's understanding of artistic production, and by 
 197 
implication production in general, is that it is always the product of restraint whether of a self-
imposed discipline (such as the early "drawing restraint" harnesses and strategies) or the social 
restraint of conventions and rituals, whose performances form such a major part of the films 
(especially Drawing Restraint 9, 2006).  "Restraint" is what Foucault called "discipline": the 
organization of bodies in practices producing a proliferation of counter-practices and narrative 
inversions.  The "way of seeing" produced by Barney's work, however, is not the product of 
restraint, whether understood as immanent and local as in Foucault or, as in Jameson, the end 
result of the rationalization of the market.  Rather, "restraint" is a mode of sense-making with 
which to contain awareness of the social production of culture and the senses.  In other words, 
the need for a "total work of art" and the multi-plex way of seeing it inaugurates in The 
Cremaster Cycle is not necessitated by the technology of production fetishized in Barney's films, 
nor is it the necessary product of the destruction of metanarratives of the contemporary caused 
by the triumph of the market over social life.  These are superstructural effects that are treated as 
causes on the grounds that material causal knowledge is finally impossible now that 
"knowledge" has displaced labor as the source of value.  In actuality, "restraint" is necessitated 
by the absolute dependence of labor on capital in the contemporary which has normalized the 
self-reproduction of the worker.  It teaches the workers to see the neoliberal privatization of 
social resources as the precondition for "self-fashioning" (acquiring an identity) and thus 
normalizes the flexibility (precariousness) of the current labor market. 
  As Marx predicted (in the "Appendix" to Capital Volume I, "The Results 
of the Immediate Process of Production"), the universalization of the market has lead to the 
normalization of relative surplus value, through such techniques as speed-ups and micro-
taylorization, over absolute surplus value, cutting wages directly or increasing working hours.  
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This state of affairs represents the "real subsumption" of labor under capitalism in which capital 
takes on the costs of its own augmentation through systematic innovations, rather than as in the 
past when labor was only "formally" subsumed under capital through the mechanism of the 
market and the costs of labor were subsidized through extra-economic means (such as the 
welfare state).  In the "global factory" the worker is totally dependent on the market and the 
capitalist has receded from the production process and turned it over, highly rationalized and de-
skilled, to the workers who now organize themselves to be more productive at the risk of losing 
their livelihoods completely.  It is the emergence of the "global worker" who is both de-skilled 
and central to the relative production of surplus-value that necessitates a "global art" which 
places a premium on complexity and multi-linguality and a high tolerance of ambiguity and 
sensual immediacy such as Matthew Barney's.  The modality of seeing culture as a multifarious 
practice of "restraint" (of a primary "gooey-ness") is to deny labor as the subject of history and 
normalize containment of such awareness under the guise of complexity and sheer pleasure. 
Jameson did not have to go far to realize this point as it was the basis for Marx's critique 
of "sensuous certainty" as Feuerbach understood it.  In his critique of Feuerbach's "sensuous 
certainty" Marx was concerned to emphasize how the new ways to perceive that emerge in the 
development of capitalism—"the secrets which are disclosed to the eye of the physicist and 
chemist" (German Ideology 46)—are the product of "industry and commerce" as "[e]ven this 
'pure' natural science is provided with an aim, as with its material, only through trade and 
industry, through the sensuous activity of men" (46). It is in this sense that, as Marx says, "[t]he 
senses have therefore become directly in their practice theoreticians," and, "they relate 
themselves to the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an objective human 
relation to itself and to man, and vice-versa" (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 300).   
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Thus, if the senses are always a relation of men and women to each other and their development 
has reached the point where it becomes productive to experience objects in themselves, 
according to their essential natural properties like color and form as in modern science and art, to 
the point that the totality of human production itself is seen as an object (e.g., what Jameson calls 
a "narrative") free of labor, this is as much as to say that culture has become commodified and 
thus its "enjoyment and labor, production and consumption, devolve on different individuals" 
(Marx and Engels, German Ideology 51) and cannot act as an affective compensation for 
exploitation.  Thus, to hold out a libidinal compensation in consumption in the pleasure of the 
senses is to conveniently forget that access to consumption is a class matter determined by one's 
place in production and to block further access to this consumption on the part of the exploited. 
Jameson's deployment of culture as a libidinal compensation for exploitation 
deconceptualizes the senses and once again turns culture into a self-enclosed locality cut off from 
the world historicity of labor.  A materialist reading of culture, conversely, brings to the fore the 
necessity of praxis in all cultural productions: "praxis" as what Marx theorized as the materiality 
of labor, a "'revolutionary'... practical-critical, activity" that in transforming the objective world 
transforms humanity ("Theses on Feuerbach" 143).  For a materialist reading, culture "reflects" 
objective reality, especially the dialectical interaction between humanity and nature as well as 
between men and women themselves.  The enclosing of culture in on itself that Jameson 
recognizes to be a product of capitalist rationalization and the alienation of the senses it brings 
about, besides being a symptom of the commodification of culture and an index of exploitation is 
also a precondition for the emancipation of culture from capital.  The reification of culture from 
the labor relations of which it is always a part and the phantom objectivity it assumes in ideology 
represents the moment when culture ceases to be grasped in the mode of "tradition" or 
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"convention" and becomes the object of conscious activity.  The commodification of culture 
coincides with the social production of culture.  As the current battles over "intellectual 
copyright" show, the political economy of culture problematizes its privatization on the market 
as an article of personal consumption.  Contemporary culture is the combined activity of workers 
around the world in ways that call into question the private norms of ownership demanded by 
capitalism.  The dominant ideology of culture has fetishized the new forms of culture such as the 
Internet and the global anti-corporatism and contrasts them with what is considered a hierarchal 
"modernist" past ruled by a linear and analogical thinking obsessed with its own identity and 
reproduction.  But there can be no freedom from oppression without awareness of the ongoing 
collectivity of labor at the root of culture and the need of its emancipation from capital.   
The "senses," "emotions," "passions," are not "spontaneous"—they are the product of a 
history of labor in production ("the senses have... become directly in their practice 
theoreticians").  By positing "emotions" (passions, etc.) as independent of the history of labor 
Negri and Jameson block any investigation into the praxical production of the emotions in 
capitalism.  In short, the "passions" etc. (which is a code word for "experience") is an effect 
which needs to be conceptually interrogated by investigating its conditions of production 
(through inquiry into the social relations of production, as I am arguing) not taken as a given (i.e. 
as a self-motivating "cause").  By valorizing the experiential and subjective, Negri and Jameson 
cut off the possibility of such a conceptual reading and reify the effects of capitalism thus 
limiting their theories to the terms set by the dominant culturalist ideology and its class 
politics. Culture as free of the history of production is a reified view of culture that corresponds 
to the needs of those who have had their material needs met from the labor of the other. The 
"place" of culture in the totality does not lie in the experiences of the "heart" (sensuality) but in 
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root knowledge (economics): "the all sided production of the whole earth" (Marx and Engels, 
German Ideology 59).  It is only when the materiality of culture in labor relations is grasped that 
the "liberation of each single individual will be accomplished" (Marx and Engels 59).  Jameson 
and Negri are participating in a more general "ethical turn" to validate the experience of workers 
in their celebrations of the compensatory value of culture in terms of experience.  Against such a 
move it is necessary to return to Lenin's critique of "spontaneity" and "proletarian culture," of the 
"artificially restricted limits of 'literature for workers'" promoted by "(bad) intellectuals [who] 
believe it is enough 'for workers' to be told a few things about factory conditions and to have 
repeated to them over and over what has long been known" (What Is To Be Done?).  Against all 
local delimitations of culture and pleading on the part of "special interests" Lenin put forward the 
universality of culture and the necessity of grasping and completing the thoughts and actions of 
the past through "critique" thus advancing culture to its inevitable conclusion in the construction 
of a truly free society—communism (The Tasks of the Youth Leagues).   
3.2 BARNEYWORLD 
The retrospective exhibition of Matthew Barney's Cremaster Cycle at the Guggenheim museum 
in New York provides an important occasion to inquire into the ongoing debates over the 
contemporary "real".  One reason for this is because of the work's basic commitment to 
reactivate metanarrative as the after-effect of conflicting binary forces and to explore how this 
return to the extra-discursive real challenges some of the basic assumptions of postmodernism, 
which argues that all the big issues that have divided masses, classes and nations in the past, such 
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as social inequality for instance, are essentially over and attention now needs to be shifted to the 
local and micro-political, the space of discursive ethics and care of the self ("little-narratives").   
Formally moving against the postmodern, the Cremaster project as a whole is a meta-
tropic elaboration of the Lacanian Real that gets figured in biological, psychological, 
hermeneutic, mythopoeic and sociological terms.  As Zizek explains, the Lacanian Real is "the 
non-symbolizable traumatic kernel that founds expression… in the very distortions of reality, in 
the fantasized displacement of the 'actual'… in the guise of spectral apparitions" (Mapping 25-6).  
In other words, what is outside culture is "real" at the level of its effects in constituting and 
disrupting discourse, but cannot itself be positively and reliably known.  I will argue that much 
discussion of The Cremaster Cycle has given undue importance to the biological tropes of the 
work by reading it exclusively in terms of cultural wars over sexual identity and misses its 
placement in the politics of the extra-discursive "real" as "non-symbolizable trauma."  What 
focusing on the biological misses is the way in which cultural conventions like gender and 
sexuality are themselves shaped by historical material forces such as class which are also being 
engaged in The Cremaster Cycle and, more importantly, at a time when never before has the 
world been so polarized between excess wealth and unmet need as now.     
 At the same time, however, "class" is being deployed in The Cremaster Cycle in the 
idealist space of the Lacanian Real, which, as Zizek elaborates, insists on the "interpretation of 
social antagonism (class struggle) as Real not as (part of) objective social reality" (Mapping 25).  
This gesture to and displacement of class as Real is an act of bourgeois cynicism that gets 
figured in the academic left imaginary, especially in the writings of Zizek, as the height of the 
political on the assumption that class as inscribed in the social relations of production—the result 
 203 
of the extraction of surplus-labor from propertyless wage-laborers—is no longer a reliable 
analytic in what are assumed to be new times.   
My argument here that "class" is an explanatory concept of the contemporary that reveals 
the workings of bourgeois false consciousness will of course easily be dismissed as naïve on the 
grounds that it relies on an epistemological foundation that is not only subject to textual slippage 
and as such is unreliable as a guide to revolutionary truth, but also, as in post- and neo-marxist 
writings, because it presupposes a social basis whose time is past.  The familiar objections to 
"class" as explanatory of the contemporary social totality because it is epistemologically unsound 
and/or an idea whose time has past are themselves, however, reified understandings of the 
conceptual detached from its material basis in bourgeois property relations; the structure of 
ownership of the means of production that has not basically changed and that yet determines for 
the majority that their needs are incapable of being met so that they labor to provide profit for a 
few.  The important thing that needs to be critiqued in Barney's Cremaster Cycle is its return to 
and evacuation of class as a tropic performance in the time of global social inequality.   
To repeat: The commentary surrounding Barney's work focuses on the politics of sexual 
identity as inscribed in culture. This is in part due to the fact that the word "cremaster" itself, in 
many ways the master trope of the cycle, is a biological term that refers to the muscular organ in 
the male that raises or lowers the testicles, whether because of fear and anxiety, or, for 
procreative purposes, for regulating the temperature of the sperm.  In utero the cremaster muscle 
is also central to determining the sexual destiny of the fetus and therefore represents a primary 
determination of gender difference.  On these terms, Barney is read as primarily engaged in a 
post-feminist queer art practice because of how his work both undermines gender difference 
while at the same time politicizing masculinity by revealing its cultural constructedness thus 
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pointing to the possibility of a "third," "hybrid" or cyber-sexed subject free of the normative 
gender ideologies of the past (Hodge).  While focusing exclusively on the sexual politics of the 
work and how it subverts normative gender hierarchies appears radical in the left imaginary it in 
actuality reflects the interests of the entrepreneurial "middle class" who are deeply invested in 
making class contradictions into conflicts over cultural values to defend their precarious position 
in the global division of labor as skilled workers at a time of rising awareness as to the social 
costs of corporate dominance in the world.   
The exhibition of the The Cremaster Cycle at the Guggenheim itself marks its importance 
beyond the culture wars that assume that people's values are more important than class 
inequality.  Barney was not the first recipient of the Hugo Boss award and given open access to 
the Guggenheim with funding in the millions of dollars by Delta Airlines because these powerful 
institutions believe that people's values are more important than profits, after all.  Rather, 
Barney's celebrity signals the need for institutionalizing and legitimating the end of the post-al 
dogma that maintains the world has entered a new order in which the conflicts and concepts of 
the past have lost their explanatory and transformative power and circulate as merely ghostly 
simulacra and vehicles of consumer desires and cultural values at a time of rising class 
inequality.    
What the dominant cultural commentary of The Cremaster Cycle misses because of its 
exclusive focus on cultural values is what is centralized by the Guggenheim exhibit itself in 
Barney's performance of The Order which was staged in the museum: the return to such concepts 
as "totality", "class" and "class struggle" in Barney's work as well as the historical need to 
contain these concepts to the spectrality of the cultural as a zone free of the centrality of 
exploitation that grounds the ideology critique of capitalism and its knowledge industries.  In 
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short, Barney does the ideological work of the "center" by reconciling in the imaginary the poles 
of class society so as to in effect make side-taking seem "extreme" and therefore discredited 
because it violates the norm of democracy as liberal pluralism which maintains the status quo.  
But, democracy is really the freedom to exploit labor power and it is this basic violence of 
capitalism that needs to be marked as extreme for a new society of equality. 
A sign of the need to move beyond the merely cultural debates of postmodernism is how 
Barney is being framed in millenarian tones in the popular discourses as a "savior" of the 
dominant at a time of crisis: as The Village Voice put it, Barney is "absolutely American" 
because, "[e]ven though his art can be oppressive, fussy, grandiose, melodramatic, supermale, 
hollow, hokey, dogged, and daft, I'm smitten by it" (Saltz).  Being "moved" by art despite 
knowing its ideological function in the context of social injustice is said to have saved the "art 
world… in crisis" (Saltz).  This is of course the formula of cynicism which Zizek has stated as 
"they know very well what they are doing, yet they are doing it" ("Spectre" 8).  What it reveals is 
a structure of assumptions, that Barney is re-activating, central to the dominant consumer 
consciousness that "saves" the people from thinking and having decided political judgments 
about art at a time when it is becoming impossible not to do so. It is this fundamental cynicism 
that makes his work "absolutely American."    
The millenarian reading of Barney as savior of America at a time of ideological crisis is 
not only a journalistic convention as it is featured in the title of Nancy Spector's curatorial 
introduction to The Cremaster Cycle itself, put out by the Guggenheim:  "Only the Perverse 
Fantasy Can Still Save Us."   The "perverse fantasy" is the "hubris" showcased in Barney's work 
because of its commitment to exhibit "pre-symbolic" drives as post-ideological: i.e., because of 
its deep investment in symbolic innovations that disrupt normative conventions in the manner of 
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a merely formal avant-garde tradition, but that do so at a time when such a project cannot be 
taken literally, because of its being obviously marked as masculinist and authoritarian in the 
cultural politics of desire in consumer capitalism, and must therefore be seen as ironic.   
Barney is seen as an ironic savior of the dominant in times of crisis not because, as the 
Voice critic thinks, "Like all great art, Barney's exists beyond language," and, therefore, saves us 
from thinking seriously about art.  Neither is it because of Barney's "hubris" in asserting that his 
use of form "isn't overdetermined" (The Cremaster Cycle 7) by the ideological because it is 
multimedia, multicultural, transdiciplinary and refuses narrative closure.  He is seen as a 
"savior," in short, not because his work maintains a commitment to the freedom of the aesthetic 
above and beyond the analytical and political, but, rather, because he makes it seem so at a time 
when it has become impossible not to see the ideological function of contemporary culture as 
either going along with or resisting the growing social inequality forming in the wake of global 
capitalism—hence the cynical and defensive tone of the critics who laud it "even though it is 
oppressive". 
By containing the political to the cultural the dominant left imagines that parody is 
liberating because it undermines decided position taking and thus opens up a space for 
negotiations and local reforms ("radical democracy").  Far from being an emancipatory politics, 
however, the ludic as radical democracy is a steady ally of the dominant, which needs to contain 
critique to the cultural superstructure so as to normalize the contradictions of the economic base.  
What radical democracy and its reformist codes does is reduce binarity to the epistemological so 
to reveal the differences within every term and thereby occults the actual violence of the 
difference between exploiters and exploited.  The most reliable guide to the ideological function 
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of Barney's work is how it, albeit in an ironic tone, yet legitimates the deeply conservative 
reading of art as "free" of class interest in the world divided between profit and need.    
This contradiction of how pure and disinterested aesthetic form is at the same time the 
most ideologically invested and dogmatically defended gives to the cultural commentary of 
Barney's work a cynical tone ("even though it is oppressive… still…"; "only the perverse can 
save us") that mirrors the parodic quality of his work itself that is activated in the discourses of 
the academic left as the limit of the political now.  What needs to be re-activated as the political, 
however, is what is to be done to end exploitation and build a new society where the needs of all 
can be met because the material preconditions of socialism have already been produced by 
capitalism and further deferrals of what is needed only feeds more the barbarism of its decay.  It 
is in the gap between what needs to be done and what is being done in the left imaginary in the 
name of the radical and emancipatory that The Cremaster Cycle turns class into another ludic 
narrative for the pleasure of the bourgeoisie.  
Thus, even as discussions of The Cremaster Cycle insist on its integrity as what Spector 
calls a "self-enclosed aesthetic system" and the Guggenheim exhibit itself (The Order), is a work 
about a work, a self-referential relay of the entire Cremaster project which consists of five films 
and numerous sculpture, drawings installations and books, this self-referentiality must be 
asserted with what Hegel called an "unhappy consciousness" that is divided in itself because it 
cannot reconcile the conflict between its knowledge of the "unchangeable" (the principled truth 
of class politics) and its practice as situated in the "changeable" ("things of this world," Hegel, 
126), the contingency of everyday life in capitalism.  Specifically, it cannot now reconcile the 
knowledge that any freedom in capitalism is merely formal as it serves to alibi the exploitation of 
labor.  This is especially true now that contemporary art like Barney's is so expensive to produce 
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as to be capable of being funded only by corporations and to bear the marks of this complicity.  It 
is an act of the highest cynicism for instance that the symbol of the Cremaster project itself—the 
barred lozenge figure that represents the cycle as a whole and signifies not only the impossibility 
of gender difference but of all conceptual binaries—functions like a corporate logo for the 
products of what the New York Times calls "Barneyworld," such as the "concert" t-shirts and 
iron on patches sold in the Guggenheim museum store and globally on the internet as souvenirs 
of the exhibition.   
Barneyworld, in short, is absolutely American because it has transformed the museum, 
which is supposed to be an art space for producing oppositional knowledges that protect the 
public good from powerful special interests, into an annex of the market celebrating the power of 
capital. 
Behind the celebration of Barney as what the New York Times critic calls "the most 
important American artist of his generation" and his claim that Barneyworld represents a "new 
freedom" for "art in the new century" (Kimmelman) is the commodification of art by monopoly 
capital.  What is being marked as a savvy self-reflexivity in Barney's work ("hubris" etc.) and a 
new found freedom in contemporary art from the ideological past is in actuality a cynical 
awareness that art is enslaved by class in the contemporary and a thinly veiled attempt to alibi its 
corporate take-over as serving the social good.   
The Order itself not only represents a summary presentation of the entire Cremaster 
Cycle in symbolic form, because in it Barney has turned the ramps of the museum into five 
stages of a mock Masonic ritual that mirror the entire cycle of films that make up the project as a 
whole, but it is also an allegory of the cycle that appears within the film Cremaster 3, which is 
the five part cycle's central work.  This doubling is significant because it symbolically identifies 
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the Guggenheim with the Chrysler building whose construction provides the narrative backdrop 
to the film. This overlapping suggests the loss of the museum's autonomy from capital as well as 
the need for capital to have an ideological cover of its power.   
In the narrative of Cremaster 3, despite its Masonic theology and its Oedipal overtones, 
Barney appears as a worker in struggle against the capitalist played by the artist Richard Serra.  
Although these figures have been to a certain extent "declassed" in the highly allegorical 
presentation staged in the Guggenheim, the fact that crowning the work is the barred lozenge 
figure which functions as the corporate logo of Barneyworld, its draping over the rotunda's glass 
ceiling implying a limit to the upward mobility enacted in the performance of The Order in the 
museum, seems to suggest an awareness that what one sees in the museum now is not a cultural 
enclave that protects the public good from vested interests that have grown too powerful, but 
rather the signaling of the impossibility of such protection because of the final commodification 
of the space of art and the end of social progress.  An end of social progress because The Order 
provides a spectacle presentation of absolute corporate power above and beyond its internal 
contradictions as well as any external limit.  This can be seen not only in the story line of the 
work because of how it resolves the struggle between the "boss-master" (Serra) and "worker-
apprentice" (Barney) in the mutual destruction of both, but also in the mode of the narration itself 
because of how at the end of the work, at the top of the Guggenheim ramp, the viewer is ushered 
into a room of mourning in which the symbols of artistic freedom—the stylized manacles of the 
escape artist Harry Houdini played by Barney in Cremaster 5—lie entombed in a coffin of glass, 
a testimony to the trap that art has become because of its being tied to the failed libertarian 
ideology of individualism, the self-made subject whose loss the narrative of upward mobility The 
Order rehearses and, finally, mourns. 
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The story of failed mastery/progress is ironically mocked by the tone of its presentation 
which the catalogue refers to as "game show meets NFL or, perhaps, Let's Make A Deal meets 
American Gladiator" (The Order 4) because of the use of Barney's signature blue Astroturf and 
athletic padding (from Cremaster 1) as well as the presentation of the spectacle of Barney's climb 
to the top of the hundred foot spiral of the museum on the five massive video screens that hang 
suspended from the ceiling of its Rotunda as in a sports event.  But, in another way, the narrative 
is pervaded by a crude biological literalism that dissimulates its politics in nature and proposes as 
a movement beyond the dismissive politics of ludic parody a counter-narrative of the Real as the 
impossibility of binarity that, by implication, maintains the ideology of the end of the historical 
materiality of power in the contemporary. 
Barney's ascent in the Guggenheim space symbolizes the descent of the testicles that is 
mapped in The Cremaster Cycle and therefore, in the biological tropes of the cycle, narrates the 
story of gender differentiation: in the character of the Entered Apprentice, the Masonic surrogate 
of the worker from Cremaster 3, Barney wears the costume of a Scottish tribesman but colored in 
skin tones crisscrossed with the blue and red of veins and arteries symbolizing the Cremaster 
muscle itself.  He enters the first level where he encounters some Rockettes in the costume of 
The Order of Rainbow Girls, a Masonic organization for women, who echo the Busby Berkeley 
synchronized dancers of Cremaster 1 that represent a state of sexual undifferentiation in the 
mythos of the cycle.  On the next "degree" the Apprentice encounters two New York City 
hardcore bands (Agnostic Front and Murphy's Law) that symbolically represent the Law of the 
Father, which imposes systemic cultural violence on the subject so as to construct sexual 
difference for the purpose of regulating social reproduction.  They thus refer back to Cremaster 2 
which tells the story of Garry Gilmore who was executed by the State of Utah for murder and 
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who was so confused as to his own sexuality that he thought of his execution as a way to resolve 
it and become the "man" he was expected to be by Mormon law.  Next the Apprentice confronts 
the sexual drive itself in the form of Aimee Mullins, the amputee tack star and fashion model 
who in the hybrid form of a cheetah inflicts a wound on the Apprentice and is killed by him so 
that he may become the fully adult male represented by Richard Serra in the character of the 
Master Mason at the next level, which in this way also incorporates the story of Cremaster 4 
where the testicles finally descend by force because they are attached to two racing motorcycles 
symbolizing the biological drive.  The mutual death of the Apprentice and the Master leads to the 
work of mourning in Cremaster 5 and the last exhibit room of The Order that tops the 
Guggenheim ramp, which documents the loss of the self that up to this point had been totally 
identified with a highly naturalized understanding of sexuality as biological destiny.  In the 
mythopoeic imaginary of The Cremaster Cycle, mourning the loss of the male self as adult-father 
represents the ultimate impossibility of fixing sexual identity and thus the possibility of escaping 
its social normativity.   
Such an understanding is of course itself marked by class privilege in so far as it posits 
individual escape from social norms as the limit of human freedom rather than collective 
transformation of the social itself for the good of all.  In other words, within the sexual politics of 
the work is reflected the bourgeois ideology of the contemporary as being shaped by 
knowledge—the knowledge that with the breakup of the modern patriarchal family and its 
related codes gender must be seen as a cultural construct—rather than labor—the actuality that 
capitalism has jettisoned the family and its fixed gender norms because these institutions no 
longer adequately serve to reproduce labor relations and augment profit in the transnational high-
tech economy.     
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The ideological effect of The Cremaster Cycle is more than a matter of identifying its 
position in ongoing debates about gender or agency.  Such a reading fails to engage its basic 
commitment to a logic of "excess" that formally challenges normativity and the way such a 
commitment evacuates the multiple forms the project robs of their historicity and therefore of 
their conceptual value as tied to social relations as a whole—especially the logic of exploitation 
inscribed in the antagonism between capital and wage-labor.  More important than any 
unproblematic statement it seems to make as commentary about contemporary social relations 
and the possibility of change or how it constructs decided knowledge as an arbitrary but 
imperative choice for the subject, The Cremaster Cycle seems to exceed the possibility of 
securing positive and reliable knowledge because of its being multimedia, multicultural, and 
transdiciplinary.  More important because in the contemporary dominant imaginary "knowledge" 
has displaced "labor" as "the principle force of production" (Lyotard 5).  In short, I am arguing 
that it is the conceptual hybridity of the work—its inscription of the social difference between 
the owners and workers as differences within ideas—that provides the necessary ideological 
work of capital in the contemporary because of how it indexes an historically necessary global 
consciousness—what Marx and Engels in The German Ideology theorized as an emergent 
"world historical communist consciousness" produced by capitalism itself.  The ideological 
function of The Cremaster Cycle is to contain this emergent communist consciousness to the 
secondary by locating it in the matrix of culture at a moment in history when classical Marxist 
theory has never been more explanatory and, therefore, more of a global "material force" in 
transforming capitalism into socialism.  
It is more because Barney mixes media by producing video, film, sculpture, drawing, 
performance, etc., places Vaseline next to precious metals, pop culture such as Busby Berkley, 
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hardcore bands, country and western alongside high culture like opera and the discourses of the 
arts and sciences, mixes the metaphors of the arts and sciences themselves by appropriating 
tropes from biology, mythology, theology, ideology, politics, psychoanalysis, philosophy, etc., 
hybridizes gender and sexuality, blurs the line between antagonistic social forces such as capital 
and labor, public and private, Irish republicanism and British imperialism, and deconstructs the 
personal and political as a matter of tropes, that has made him such steady ally of the dominant 
today and such a celebrated figure in the media.  It is in this way that Barney's work provides the 
necessary consciousness skills now needed by big business to reproduce the high-tech labor 
force from which it realizes the most surplus-value.  These workers need to be given complex 
knowledges to work with the globally integrated digitalized production systems of the global 
factory.  At the same time the knowledge must be presented in such a way as to produce what 
Althusser called "good subjects," i.e., subjects who go along with what is good for capital and 
"spontaneously" resist knowledge of their collective exploitation. 
It is not only the underlying tone of cynicism that pervades Barney's work because of its 
deep commitment to epistemic undecidability as resistance to cultural norms that makes it 
ideologically effective in disguising class inequality in the contemporary.  What could be less 
effective than repeating an old avant-garde?  Rather, its main effectivity lies in how Barney 
maintains the old story of culture as free of the economic while providing the viewer with an 
encounter with complexity that demands a global knowledge, even as the work argues against its 
possibility in the story it provides.  In this way, The Cremaster Cycle serves the ruling class by 
jettisoning its outdated ideas.  As Marx says 
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The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing 
the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of 
production, and with them the whole relations of society… 
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance 
of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation 
distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones… And as in 
material, so also in intellectual production… The intellectual 
creations of individual nations become common property. National 
one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more 
impossible, and from numerous national and local literatures, there 
arises a world literature. (The Manifesto of the Communist Party 
476) 
 
Following Marx, I argue that The Cremaster Cycle provides a lesson in "global literacy" 
that has become necessary under transnational capitalism, which needs multicultural and high-
tech workers to consent to their own exploitation as wage-laborers and secures this precondition 
of profit by giving them a false-consciousness of their position.  The Cremaster Cycle produces 
this class effect by evacuating all conceptual binaries of their historical materiality by relaying 
them through a thick network of multiple significations that is framed as exceeding ideological 
closure but that is in actuality a socially necessary ensemble of consciousness skills in the global 
factory.  
In the narrative of The Order staged in the Guggenheim contemporary class conflicts are 
re-narrated as personal obstacles in a complex and dramatic story of self-fashioning that finally 
fails to achieve the autonomy of identity and freedom of agency promised by an older bourgeois 
ideology.  The ideological effect of its mode of presentation, however, is that when one enters 
Barneyworld the conflicts and contradictions of the past are discursively suspended so as to be 
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appreciated as an encyclopedic archive that the aesthetic ideology of the ruling class positions as 
the site of pure immediacy and pleasure above and beyond class exploitation and conflict.  
Barneyworld, in the voice of the New York Times, makes us "Free To Play and Be Gooey" and 
to cynically assert, as the Village Voice says, as proof of one's own absolute Americanism, that 
"Even though his art can be oppressive, fussy, grandiose, melodramatic, supermale, hollow, 
hokey, dogged, and daft" still—"I'm smitten by it."  The point of a radical materialist cultural 
critique, however, is to resist the logic of the "smitten" by re-activating the conceptual, not as 
more ludic mediations and local negotiations, but as root knowledge of the social as 
exploitation—for social change. 
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4.0  CULTURAL THEORY NOW 
4.1 CULTURAL STUDIES IN SEARCH OF A MARKET 
Cultural studies has become exhausted.  A mark of its exhaustion can be seen when Lawrence 
Grossberg asks, "How did cultural studies get so f****** boring?" (8) and takes the boredom as 
a sign that "cultural studies has failed" ("Does Cultural Studies Have a Future?" 8).  It seems for 
a moment that Grossberg will open a productive and enabling inquiry in cultural studies in one of 
its premiere journals of which he is an editor by going beyond the self-evidency of boredom as a 
sign of the ineffectivity of cultural studies because it is not popular and arguing that cultural 
studies is "boring" because of its "culturalism" (24), which has "disembodied and disconnected 
[power] from the material relations of inequality and domination that are its anchor in everyday 
life" (12).  Despite this passing insight, however, his way of engaging the "boring" is not to make 
cultural studies more materialist and read boredom as an ideological symptom rooted in the 
exploitative structure of daily life and to argue for cultural studies to engage with the causes of 
inequality, but in the manner of a crisis manager he reads boredom on its own terms and 
proposes that cultural studies needs to be made more appealing.  On the assumption that cultural 
studies has become boring because of the "limited ambiguity of the concept of culture" (8) that 
gives a reductive view of culture as "ideology" (22) he reads the boredom, in other words, not as 
a political issue but as basically an aesthetic matter to be addressed by what he considers to be a 
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more exciting view of ideology as discourse.  For Grossberg the energies of cultural studies will 
be revived not by recommitting itself to a materialist analytic of culture that brings to bear upon 
the haze of daily life the sobering reality of class inequality but by pluralizing the concept of 
ideology into a merely descriptive term for the "geographical differences amongst specific 
configurations of capitalism" (5).  Leaving aside the fact that cultural studies has largely 
abandoned the concept of ideology as false consciousness of class and turned it into "thick 
description" of the surfaces of everyday life and has abandoned critique as a totalitarian 
imposition upon the pleasures of consumption, Grossberg's more ambiguous, and therefore 
presumably more exciting, concept of culture is itself a culturalist understanding that has been 
dominant since the early 70s.  By pluralizing capitalism into different geographical localities 
Grossberg's "ambiguous" concept of culture does not escape the ideological but simply maintains 
the very culturalism he himself cannot help but acknowledge has led to the failure of cultural 
studies in the first place, because it disconnects power from the material relations of production 
from which inequality comes and renders the social as basically an aesthetic construct.   
Despite his opposition to the reductiveness of the concept of culture as ideology (false 
consciousness) Grossberg has no problem with the reduction of culture to the aesthetic, which is 
to say ideological, terms of culturalist discourse. But, the aesthetic in his text clearly has a class 
function. On his "figural" understanding of the contemporary as different inscriptions of 
capitalism the assumption is that "culture continues to be dominant in the current conjuncture" 
(17) because "financial capital… investment is more important than labor as a source of wealth" 
(15).  It seems that Grossberg's passing observation that cultural studies has failed because of its 
culturalism is simply a way to suggest as he is aware of the problem he would never do it himself 
even as he performs a reification of capital such that its material basis is dematerialized as 
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geographical configurations of (dis)investment and capital itself figures as the source of wealth 
and the motor of change.   It is, finally, for class reasons that culture is depoliticized in 
Grossberg's discourse as "not in the last instance about ideology" (22) and given an aesthetic 
value by being made to seem more ambiguous.  In his cultural theory, wealth is no longer 
produced in the "social metabolism" (Marx) between labor and nature, but is a matter of 
individual choices in the market, which is to say the social is an effect of mind.  By making 
capitalism a superstructural matter of the local patterns of investment which follow what are for 
him the ambiguous movements of knowledge rather than the global ratio of exploitation 
inscribed in wage labor, which demands a critique of the surface appearances of capitalism, 
Grossberg wants to further the ambiguity of culture in the "hope" that this will liberate our minds 
to "imagine new futures and new strategies for realizing them" (5).  For all his opposition to the 
concept of culture as ideology his argument turns out to be precisely one in which it is expected 
that culture must serve market imperatives, which in his text means that culture must be made to 
seem ambiguous in order to further the wealth creating activities of financial speculation.  And 
yet his concept of culture fails to examine the material basis of capital and wage-labor relations 
in its pan-cultural understanding of capitalism as market configurations even as it complains 
about the lack of an adequate theory of materiality in contemporary cultural theory and the 
political crisis this entails for cultural studies.   
Grossberg's understanding of "the material relations of inequality" (12) is itself a 
culturalist understanding of inequality that acts as more of an ethical acknowledgement to 
manage the crisis of cultural studies rather than an actual explanation for why in the midst of the 
global accumulation of wealth evident today do the majority continue to not even be able to meet 
their needs and how these facts impact  upon culture.  According to him, what constitutes 
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inequality are the global patterns of investment through which wealth is generated by market 
choices. Inequality will therefore change, presumably, with a "reconfiguration" of investment 
into new global patterns.  But such a reconfiguration does nothing to change the basic class 
relation inscribed in wage-labor, however, and in fact equates the achievement of equality with 
the equalization of the terms of exploitation as any new geographical configuration of capitalism 
depends upon the continued existence of the private appropriation of surplus-labor.  The global 
normalization of capitalism is thus equated with the realization of equality in Grossberg's cultural 
theory.  It is this apology for rather than opposition to capitalism that has actually placed cultural 
studies in crisis so it has come to be irrelevant for grasping the contemporary and made ideology 
critique come to seem boring to the dominant who want to move on to something new and 
exciting at a time of increasing inequality. What is new and exciting to them it turns out is 
another re-writing of capitalism that "disconnects power from the material relations of inequality 
and domination that are its anchor in everyday life" and maintains the global division of labor. 
Grossberg text is part of a wider turn to deconstruction in the cultural theory of the late 
twentieth and beginning twenty-first century as an "ethical" response to the global inequality of 
transnational capitalism that renders the social a regime of signs and proposes surface 
reconfigurations in the attempt to suppress the need for a materialist cultural theory and root 
change.  Deconstruction has become the primary means today  whereby cultural studies 
spiritualizes materiality as a question of values and secures its place in the state apparatus of the 
academy which safeguards the "truth" that capitalism is here to stay as it co-opts any and all 
opposition.  The deconstruction of the concept of culture as ideology that Grossberg performs 
which turns culture into a self-circling motor of wealth creation on the "hope" that this will 
empower the people and, if not end, then at least lessen inequality, is part of a more general turn 
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to deconstruction in cultural studies that abandons even the pretense of "resistance" — which has 
been the project of cultural theory since the Enlightenment — as any opposition to capitalism is 
now perceived to be aesthetically unappealing in the logic of the marketplace.  Gus Hall, for 
instance, writing in  a special issue of the online journal Culture Machine (No. 6, 2004) devoted 
to bringing cultural studies closer to deconstruction (Deconstruction is/in America: A New Sense 
of the Political), argues that the concept of culture as ideology in cultural studies "reduces 
cultural studies to being merely an expression of its particular social and historical 
circumstances" and dismisses it as an "uninteresting" and "boring" form of cultural studies that 
needs to be opposed by a more "unreadable" understanding of the contemporary in which "it 
cannot be decided in advance that capitalism and globalization are, in every singular instance and 
manifestation, unambiguously bad" (no online pagination).  Hall, without a tinge of irony, shows 
no awareness of the fact that it is precisely the "ambiguous" and "unreadable" concept of culture 
in cultural studies today which separates it from consideration of class relations (exploitation) 
that has placed cultural studies in the service of capital, or, to use his own words, "reduced 
cultural studies to being merely an expression of its particular social and historical 
circumstances," and made it a structure of repetition which always concludes that capitalism is 
"open" to surface re-writings and re-vision.  Rather than understanding cultural studies in 
materialist terms Hall tells a story about cultural studies in which movements within knowledge 
are determinate and capitalism is immunized from a base critique.  In the introduction to the 
issue, for which Hall is an editor, the current state of cultural studies is thus described as "a 
general drift away from 'theory' and 'back to reality' and the political and the economic" that has 
"marginalized" deconstruction and therefore "excluded" what is "difficult," "provocative," and 
"vital" in theory.  As the slash in the title of the issue indicates, the journal will not be committed 
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to examining the causes of what it calls the "'post-theoretical' urgency" that has "taken place 
within cultural studies over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s," in the words of the 
introduction text, but to rendering the relation of cultural studies to deconstruction "undecidable" 
therefore reifying theory from its basis in contemporary class conflicts, as deconstruction has 
always done. What is being called "a new sense of the political" by the journal is thus not a 
situating of theory in the new global struggles — which of course has been the theoretical project 
of cultural studies all along and not just a recent post-theory "sense of urgency" that has 
overtaken it as Hall's revisionist account has it — but a return to a past of theory that was 
dominant when a lower level of social contradictions allowed theory to present itself as 
meditations on the aporias of language as free of the material conditions which shape all 
knowledge. In Hall's view returning to a past less politicized moment of theory will have the 
singular effect of re-vitalizing cultural studies in the current conjuncture, as "the deconstruction 
of identity essentialism" cannot be explained as caused by "global capitalism's production, 
hierarchization and exploitation of difference" and therefore, presumably, provides a basis for 
"agency."  But clearly the deconstruction of identity is a euphemism for the bourgeois take over 
of cultural studies because Hall has no problem with thinking of deconstruction in terms of 
identity as when he claims it represents the "voice" of the dispossessed that has 
"reconceptualized the world from their perspective and asserted the power of the marginalized."  
The deconstruction of identity as grounded in the social relations of production and its 
reinscription as the voice of the marginalized is not only logically contradictory but is itself a 
class strategy to make culture appear unconnected to the economic roots of inequality which 
actually explain power relations and to instead claim that power is a matter of representation, or 
more commonly, the freedom of speech.  The freedom of speech, however, is not a basis of 
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freedom — it simply regulates the terms of the outright theft of labor power.  Freedom is always 
an economic matter that comes with the triumph over necessity.  The equation of freedom with 
speech and representation is simply an ideological maneuver to make the freedom of capital 
appear universally good while deflecting attention from the roots of inequality. 
Deconstruction functions as an "ethical materialism" in cultural studies today; an evasive 
oscillation between idealism and mechanical materialism. While it suggests that the dynamics of 
historical change is objective reality, it uses "ethics" to deal with the objective reality.  The 
objective reality of capitalism for example is formally acknowledged as a "global" logic only to 
promote a cultural opportunism that represents change as a local and contingent outcome, a 
move that displaces the logic of  class (which is a matter of necessity) with the logic of desire 
(the alea of "chance").10 Such an ethical materialism is useful to contemporary cultural studies to 
contest the more obvious contradictions of capitalism only to more effectively mystify its 
underlying basis in exploitation; in doing so it makes its own reformism look like a radical 
alternative to capitalism and its contradictions and gains political credibility. What makes 
deconstruction so "vital" and "exciting" to those such as the editors of Culture Machine and 
Cultural Studies who see it as necessary for rescuing cultural studies from materialist critique, is 
that deconstruction —  despite its deep conservatism and regardless of the fact that what is being 
represented as "new" has been a highly institutionalized discourse since the late seventies —  
provides them with an historical imaginary of a capitalism that has canceled its basic class 
                                                 
10 This cultural opportunism is so popular on the left that some represent materialism itself as an "oscillation".  In 
Peter Hitchcock's Oscillating Wildly for example materialism names "a mode of analysis that isolates the cultural 
from the social, the superstructure from the base, and thus always arrives at 'a problem, whose solution is always a 
unique, ad-hoc intervention'"(quoting Jameson, 9).     
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contradiction and an ethical justification which promises that in the "new" capitalism social 
inequality is a matter of discourse and will change through its rewritings.   
In the discursivist cultural studies deconstruction represents a commitment to a view of 
the social as the space of differences without antagonism that changes with changes in 
representation.11  Such a discursive view of culture relies on two primary assumptions: 
  
• culture is material in itself as it is no longer tied to social relations and 
therefore cannot be conceptually grasped as a totality (logocentrism), 
and 
 
• culture is ruled by the "free play" of the signifier, which is assumed to 
have its own immanent laws (différance) independent of history (as 
class struggle). 
 
On these assumptions the discursivist cultural theory posits a break in history in which 
the present cannot be understood in terms of the ongoingness of exploitation as capitalism is 
                                                 
11 Deconstruction, at least for those who consider it to be a rigorously philosophical engagement with the canonical 
texts of Western culture, has been understood to consist of two closely related conceptual moves: the 
"dehierachization" of all binaries as instances of the "logocentrism" of Western metaphysics and the "reinscription" 
of knowledge as a purely epistemological matter (Gasche).  In these terms, "there is no outside text" (Derrida, Of 
Grammatology) to fix meanings, or, in other words, no extra-discursive real that would serve to anchor the "free 
play" of signification (différance) and secure positive and reliable knowledge.  By making intelligibility a matter of 
the interior of language deconstruction reduces the social relations outside of language to the "extra-discursive" and 
thereby returns to an eighteenth century view of matter as that which is opaque to consciousness, rather than 
understand matter as in terms of its self-movement and development.  In cultural theory more broadly the "extra-
discursive" is made a language effect, as in the writings of Laclau and Mouffe who argue that "'Society' is not a 
valid object of discourse... there is no single principle fixing — and hence constituting — the whole field of 
differences" (Hegemony 111).   
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thought to have canceled its basic contradiction inscribed in wage-labor and become a regime of 
signs.12      
This culturalist story about a "new" capitalism, which unlike the old capitalism based on 
exploitation is no longer exploitative but radically democratic because it is based on knowledge 
rather than labor, is perhaps nowhere more compellingly made, compelling that is if analytical 
subtlety and stylistic facility are any indication, than in the writings of J. Hillis Miller, who could 
be called a reconstructed deconstructionist for the way he updates Paul de Man's literary theory 
of ideology for cybercapitalism.  Miller rescues de Man's theory of ideology —  which because 
of how it turns ideology into a matter of the confusion of linguistics for natural reality that 
separates it from power had come to be seen as too close to fascism by its "aestheticization of the 
political" (Benjamin) — by updating it in the language of cyber-culture.   Thus, according to 
Miller, "it is not so much language as such that generates the delusion of ideologies, but rather 
language as moulded by one or another medium" (Interview 129) that does so.  This shift of 
register in ideology from the medium of language to media in general underwrites an historical 
imaginary in which an "epochal cultural displacement" (127) is said to have occurred from "the 
book age" to "the hypertext age" (127) that militates against "a diagnostic or constantive 
response, that is, a description or critique of the present situation" (135) because the "new 
technologies… confound all… inside/outside divisions" (126) as they "exploit the strange 
propensity to dwell in fictional or phantasmal spaces that each human being has" (129).  The 
deconstruction of the inside/outside is made an incontestable ontological reality in Miller's 
theory rather than being simply a discursive analytic to desediment foundational understandings 
                                                 
12 See Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production, and, for a critique of this position, Zavarzadeh, "Post-ality and the 
Dissimulations of Cyber-Capitalism." 
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of the real as in classical deconstruction and carries profound implications for grasping the 
contemporary. For instance, in these terms Miller argues that whereas "the economies of the self, 
the home, the workplace, the university, and the nation-state's politics… were traditionally 
ordered around the firm boundaries of an inside-outside dichotomy" and relied upon "the regime 
of representation or a certain kind of mimesis" between "extra-linguistic things as they are and 
the representation of those things in language" (132), the "new electronic space, the space of 
television, cinema, telephone, videos, fax, e-mail, hypertext, and the Internet" have insured that 
the "private space has been invaded and permeated by a vast simultaneous crowd of ghostly, 
verbal, aural, and visual images existing in cyberspace's simulacrum of presence" (126) such that 
ideology can no longer be considered a misrecognition of reality but rather must be seen as 
having the "power... to intervene in history and makes things happen" (129). It is the 
performative misappropriation of reality due to ideology on Miller's account of the contemporary 
that constitutes "that seemingly irresistible force for globalization, the World Wide Web" (128) 
that has abolished all "rigid boundaries… between one person and another, one class race, or 
gender and another" (132) and empowers all equally to "create the truths" we take to be "self-
evident" (136).  Therefore it follows, in Miller's historical imaginary, that the inequality we see 
in the world is a language effect that only continues to exist because of a too "rigid" and 
"polarizing" (mimetic) use of ideology that remains blind to its "unforeseeable" and "impossible" 
(performative) uses as "new forms of co-operative human praxis" (136) at a time when "the 
opposition between representation and reality… disappears" (133).  According to Miller, 
technology has empowered the mind to create its own reality (ideology) above and beyond class 
relations and it is precisely the insistence on addressing the extra-linguistic causes of social 
inequality that, ironically, produces it by exempting individuals from participating in the 
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"coming community" (citing Agamben 136) thereby fostering conflicts and delaying the 
realization of "new forms of co-operative human praxis."  Ending class inequality is equated with 
changing our ideas about class from being a material antagonism to being a kind of collective 
ritual.13  Such a shift does nothing to end class inequality of course but simply reinscribes class 
inside culture where it appears all are equal in terms of representation. One would be hard 
pressed to find any fundamental difference between Miller's account of the contemporary and the 
one represented by a Bush aide who sees the world divided between a "reality based community" 
of people who "believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality," 
on the one side, and "history's actors" on the other, who in touch with "the way the world really 
works" maintain that "we're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality" 
(Suskind).  There is a rhetorical difference of course in that Miller seems to take it to heart that 
some will feel alienated and at a loss in the brave new age and so he presents it in a more utopian 
and subtle (less brutal?) language.  
Deconstruction initially appeared at a time when capitalism was dismantling the welfare 
state on a world scale and its knowledge industries were primarily directed against Marxism as 
the materialist theory of history which combines the movement for democracy with the need to 
end the exploitation of wage-labor/capital relations (Duménil and Lévy).  At that time 
deconstruction was primarily concerned to disrupt all binaries as instances of logocentrism, 
which was considered a totalitarian formation of knowledge that depended on a hierarchy of 
value in which reason was made sovereign at the expense of marginalizing the freedom of 
                                                 
13 Saying that ideology has the power to create the real is like when Pierre Bourdieu says that "class as it is observed 
is… the product of the theoretical effect of Marx's work" (Other Words 18) because "the symbolic order. . .  is the 
condition of the functioning of the economic order" (Acts 82).  Because Marxism is assumed to dominate the 
discussion of class on these terms the deconstruction of Marxist theory is made the precondition for ending 
inquality.   
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language and the aesthetic pleasures it offers, such as the joy of poetic discoveries and the 
novelties of rhetorical experimentation.  With the global expropriation of socialist property on a 
world scale following the destruction of the Soviet Union and the consolidation of neoliberal 
global capitalism the intellectual commitments of deconstruction have changed.  Now rather than 
providing a rigorous analytical display of the rhetorical foundations of Truth (with a capital T) 
by revealing them to be grounded on the differential and therefore undecidable slippages of 
signification, deconstruction is more concerned with consolidating its own epistemological 
speculations as an incontestable law immune to critique. Derrida's late texts thus display a less 
experimental play with language and are more concerned to legitimate an idealist tradition in 
philosophy from Kant to Heidegger and are deeply respectful of religious themes and concerns, 
thereby making deconstruction more and more at home in religion departments.  In an interview 
released a few years before his death, for example, Derrida argues that God is the "absolute 
third" (A Taste for the Secret 71) that grounds all binaries, the proper name for that 
"unconditional" limit ("there has to be a limit," 64) that represents "the best shared thing in the 
world" in which "we have nothing in common" (58) now that "language is no longer a region" 
and has "won the totality of space" (80).  God, according to Derrida, is the "common capital" 
(86) that "we draw on all the time… that makes it possible to understand one another" (86) above 
and beyond material differences such as "language, culture, place, home" or "communities, of 
property and ownership" (85). Leaving aside the allusion to Bourdieu's field theory of capital 
which turns capital into a symbolic rather than economic matter,14 such a religious limit to 
knowing must be insisted on, according to Derrida, "for something to happen" (64) in the first 
place, "something non-thematizable, non-objectifiable, non-sharable" (57) that will force a 
                                                 
14 See my, "Pierre Bourdieu as New Global Intellectual for Capital." 
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"dislocation of the present, which renders the present non-contemporary to itself" (7) and insures 
that philosophy will not be limited to a "social welfare service" (7) but "would at best reinforce 
incoherence" (13).  For Derrida deconstruction is just another name for "what happens" (82) in 
"a world in the process of changing, and thus of 'deconstructing'" (81) which rather than provide 
a transformative knowledge of the present in cultural theory puts in its place a story about 
knowledge as a performative game that imagines change comes about primarily through what are 
held to be mysterious symbolic processes that will come to insure individual liberty and, 
therefore, that nothing need ever change in a socially revolutionary way.  
Derrida's A Taste for the Secret provides an occasion to examine the ethics of 
deconstruction and its values for cultural theory.  This text is aligned with a collection of others, 
from those of the leftist sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to those of the conservative pundit David 
Brooks, in addressing class issues while turning class into a cult(ural) category and in place of 
providing a reliable knowledge of inequality grounded in the exploitation of wage-labor makes 
class into a mysterious congeniality of taste existing above "communities, of property and 
ownership" (85).  Perhaps the most explicit deconstruction and reinscription of class as taste 
occurs in Derrida's text when in response to the question, "Why deconstruct?" he answers, 
 
I must confess that I cannot answer the question: Why deconstruct?  
To what end deconstruct? If deconstruction is anything but an 
initiative of my own, or a method, or a technique, but what 
happens, the event one takes note of, then why go in that direction?  
Why make the situation worse? Should it be remedied? Should it 
be reconstructed? … one has to know if one is for or against, if 
one is happy about it or not, and if one wishes to accentuate the 
process or slow it down. It is here that I have no answer. (82). I am 
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not the bearer of a universal reason on the basis of which I justify 
the fact of speaking of one thing rather than another… rather I 
recognize a sort of affinity… There is no justification but there is 
congeniality. (84)   
 
Such statements of mystical belonging depend on a primary disavowal of the 
"interestedness" or "partisanship" of knowledge which is formed by its implication in the 
existing class structure in which the interests of the ruling class have the privilege to appear 
"universal" and "true," and thus a disinterested statement of just the way things are, while any 
opposition to the dominant arrangements must therefore appear as disingenuous and 
disrespectful of the norms of civilized discussion.  When discussing deconstruction Derrida 
deploys such depoliticizing language by referring to deconstruction as an "event" inscribed in the 
real itself, rather than an analytical method or technique for example — deconstruction is just 
"what happens" (82) in "a world in the process of changing, and thus of 'deconstructing'" (81).  
Whereas deconstruction used to provide a rigorous analytics of figuration in a highly abstract 
language whose effect was to render the text opaque to the point of seeming material in itself 
thus disrupting easy access to the real which was seen as a mimetic illusion, more recently 
Derrida had appeared in films and given interviews with friends while assuming a more informal 
style in which the presuppositions of deconstruction are left unexamined and dogmatically 
assumed to be commensurate with the real as such on the claim that "language is no longer a 
region" and has "won the totality of space" (80).  I realize that in the leftist imaginary of the 
dominant cultural studies it will be argued that Derrida is problematizing such depoliticizing 
language in A Taste for the Secret when he asserts that "desire" or "taste" is behind all 
knowledge, in a way similar to Nietzsche who argued that philosophy is a mode of life, or 
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biography, which like all texts establishes its coherence by marginalizing other modes of 
knowing.  However, in actuality such a move gives desire a metaphysical primacy and turns 
existing social antagonisms which are rooted in the structure of property and demand material 
resolutions into cultural differences which can only be endlessly described and metaphorically 
elaborated making them seem effectively eternal and immutable and thus, it is "hoped," 
"resistant" to instrumental co-optation by the ruling order in the historical imaginary of cultural 
studies today.  But if "congeniality" (affinities of taste) is what shapes the social, which is a way 
to say desire rather than need explains the existing, the critique of the existing rooted in the class 
analysis of capitalism is what deconstruction is most firmly set against and for necessary not 
merely cultural reasons: because such an analysis uncovers the basis of taste in the exploitation 
of labor as well and lays bare the cultural masquerade for what it is — a tired justification of 
privilege.  It is in the defense of class privilege that the enemy of deconstruction and freedom 
itself in Derrida's discourse is thus the "totalitarianism of democracy" (59) or, in other words, "a 
public space that makes no room for the secret" which is that "I have a taste for… not-belonging" 
(59).  Derrida's "not belonging" is of course a highly ironic statement given that deconstruction 
has been an institutionalized discourse in the West for the last twenty or so years that like all 
such discourses mystifies its material basis in class society and thereby serves a very decidedly 
conservative function to make the way things are appear as the way they should be. 
Unlike a traditional ethics which bases itself on a normative view of reason that attempts 
to derive the good from the true, the ethics of deconstruction has abandoned the search for truth 
as a reliable foundation and understands reality as primarily an aesthetic matter.  Its mode of 
addressing issues of inequality is basically to turn them into instances of linguistic confusion 
(mimesis) that spontaneously self-deconstruct in the spectral exchanges of cyber-culture ruled by 
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the (a)logic of desire.  A deconstructive ethics grounds itself intellectually in the ambiguous 
status of truth in modern cultural theory which traces itself in the writings of Kant.  In Kant's 
theory, for example, although the ethical is derived from the rational the basis of reason itself in 
empirical reality is held to be essentially unknowable (noumenal) so as to allow for the free play 
of imagination that is taken to be an expression of the essential autonomy of the subject.  Kant 
argued that human dignity was compromised by the utilitarian philosophy of capitalism by 
taking individual self-interest as its basis.  On Kant's view a utilitarian ethics limits the 
understanding of human nature and therefore curtails its freedom.  By contrast, Kant seems to 
argue that as reality is essentially unknowable any ethical theory must therefore take account of 
the incomprehensible motivations of individuals who do not always act in rational ways 
according to their interests because of their basically imaginative relation to reality.  Kant's 
"categorical imperative" which mandates that others be treated as ends in themselves rather than 
as means to an end is, among other things, an aesthetic opposition to utilitarian philosophy 
because it sees the individual as essentially a spiritual entity for whom materiality functions as a 
negative limitation of freedom.  In a deconstructive ethics the supplemental relation between 
imagination and reason put forward in idealist philosophy since Kant, in which objective reality 
appears to depend on imaginative faculties, is thought to undermine the possibility of securing a 
universal good as it bars access to any positive and reliable knowledge of material reality 
(essence).  Rather, following the reversal of causality in Nietzsche's writings (Will to Power 293-
300), the real itself is made a matter of the figurations of truth inscribed in cultural practices thus 
rendering the materialist project of cultural theory an essentially undecidable and contingent 
matter.  The figural is then understood as culturally material rather than strictly imaginative in a 
subjectively interior way as in classical idealist philosophy while at the same time materiality is 
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understood pragmatically as a creative tropological force with the power to reconfigure the real 
rather than simply the negation of human freedom.  However, by delinking agency from the 
subject and making it immanent to the real itself (as textuality) a deconstructive ethics cannot 
advance the knowable good (social equality), which demands the recognition and understanding 
of the workings of material causality, and thereby does what religion has always done which is to 
reconcile the subject to getting along with what is rather than fighting to change it. 
Ethics has always attempted to derive the good from an immanent rather than 
transcendental concept of truth as in religion, but like religion it has always opposed a materialist 
conception of truth (causality) and thus reinscribed the ideological function of religion to mystify 
the social relations.  In materialist cultural theory on the contrary the good is seen as arising from 
the "social metabolism" (Marx) between labor and nature at a certain moment of development, 
which establishes what is true in practice in accordance with human need based on what the 
primary conditions make possible.  Before there can be a culture of consent and resistance over 
the socially consequential meaning(s) that shape people's lives there first needs to be their 
material life itself.  In materialist cultural theory culture is connected to daily life on the 
recognition that it has an economic root in labor: the "process by which man, through his own 
actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature" (Marx 
Capital 283).  Thus in materialist cultural theory "freedom," "equality," "ideology," "ambiguity," 
"unreadability," "oscillation," … all cultural values, are not simply derived from our wants nor 
are they an effect of the (de)limitations of knowledge or the cultural inscriptions of truth, but, 
rather, are terms whose values are always determined in relation to social production.  The 
transcendental ethical, logical and aesthetic values of ancient societies about the good, truth and 
beauty which are held to be divine in origin are actually the effect of a hierarchal social order 
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based on a low level of technological mastery of nature which tended to remain static for long 
periods of time because of the limits of surplus wealth produced in the conditions of slavery, so 
that these values were seen as fixed for all and for all time and what was considered good was 
whatever reproduced the ruling order. With the expansion of the market into agricultural 
products and relations in Europe in the early modern period the social wealth is greatly increased 
and demands the resources of the entire world for its arena of activities as well as a "free worker" 
who is compelled to develop his "individuality" (Marx Capital Vol. 1, 1019-38) and thus truth is 
more and more seen as relative to human practices and the good comes to be seen as that which 
augments human creativity.  As the contradictions of capitalism ripen and the rottenness of the 
system begins to reveal itself it can no longer be legitimated in universal terms of humanity and 
yet legitimated it must be in order to insure the reproduction of the class relations which are its 
basis.  A deconstructive ethics is at home in late, transnational, cyber-capitalism because the 
value it places on contingency and undecidability allows for the displacements and 
contradictions of the system driven by profit motivated technical innovations and violent social 
interventions while reifying materiality as figuration and textuality, thus mystifying the social 
basis of these brutal and irrational social relations and promoting commodity fetishism 
(consumerism). 
The assumption authorized by deconstruction that cyber-capitalism is constituted through 
a ruptual event that liberates cultural singularities from the logic of history such that the present 
can no longer be understood in terms of exploitation is in actuality only possible because of the 
general economy of history.  The notion that culture (ideology) is material in itself, for example, 
is only explained concretely by investigating what Marx calls, in a draft text of a chapter of 
Capital Volume 1 ("The Results of the Immediate Process of Production"), the "formal 
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subsumption of labor under capital" — i.e., the alienation of wage labor in which the "social 
character of his labour confronts the worker as something not merely alien, but hostile and 
antagonistic, when it appears to him objectified and personified in capital" (1024-5).  It is the 
expropriation of labor from the means of production in the form of private property that gives 
culture the appearance of autonomy and self-movement enshrined by deconstruction, rather than 
the singularity of cyber-capitalism as a "post-al" (post-Fordist, post-modern,… ) regime. Prior to 
capitalism culture primarily consisted in a religious worldview that justified inequality in terms 
of a divine order of things so as to normalize the division of labor in society in which the ruling 
class lived by appropriating the surplus product of the toiling class.  By separating the worker 
from the means of production (the communal lands) and rationalizing the work process 
capitalism transformed labor from being bound to craft traditions in which work consisted 
primarily in the production of use-values to a socially abstract form undertaken for wages and 
productive of surplus-value. Separated from the immediate labor of the producers culture is no 
longer tied to the ideological reproduction of the given conditions of production and comes to 
seem autonomous.  The commodification of labor makes culture serve as an economic 
compulsion on the worker to submit to being exploited because labor is no longer for the direct 
satisfaction of needs as in pre-capitalist cultures but rather for their expansion in a commodified 
culture.  The change in labor from being primarily a use-value for meeting the worker's (and 
ruler's) immediate needs to becoming an exchange-value to be bought and sold on the market is 
due to a change in the mode of production that destroys the organic conception of culture of pre-
modern societies.  The cultural politics of the bourgeois revolution thus consisted in liberating 
culture from its ties to Church and State — culture was thus considered "free" when its ideas 
reflected the freedom of the market in Enlightenment theory.  Furthermore, at a certain moment 
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of production when it becomes no longer feasible given the terms of competition to produce 
surplus-value absolutely by, for example, lengthening the working day or cutting wages directly, 
capital "revolutionizes" (Marx 1021) itself by assuming control of its own valorization and at 
that point realizes relative surplus-value by incrementally increasing the ratio of surplus to 
necessary labor through technological innovations.  Marx calls this moment of the self-
valorization of capital on its own terms the moment of the "real subsumption of labor under 
capital" and understands by this that capitalism has reached the point that it can no longer simply 
maintain the worker at a given level of subsistence but requires the worker to become a cultured 
person to engage with the more complex production process thereby diversifying her needs so as 
to increase the rate of profit.  Marx discusses how "increasing diversity in modes of working" 
through technology favors the "development of versatility among the workers" (1026-7) and 
"allows for the worker's individuality" (1032) by providing "an incentive to develop his own 
labour power" (1032) by acquiring new needs, such as "newspapers" (1033).  As a consequence, 
whereas before "men were… forced to labour because they were slaves to others; men are now 
forced to labour because they are slaves of their own wants" (Marx quoting Steurt 1028) as the 
worker's "existence and that of his family depends on his ability continuously to renew the sale 
of his labour power to the capitalist" (1031).  At the moment of the real subsumption of labor by 
capital culture becomes an absolutely economic imperative as Marx explains (1037) — liberated 
from all fixed limitations it becomes an "end-in-itself" to augment the value of labor in the 
context of increased (and "much more violent," 1028) exploitation, more violent because the 
worker is no longer able to increase the value of her labor power through extra-economic means 
and is forced to prove her value solely in terms of the production process itself.  The "constant 
development of new forms of work… corresponds to the diversification of use-values" and 
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through this process the "free worker" (1031) of capitalism "is impelled by his wants" and 
develops a "related feeling (sense) of responsibility" (1031) and "learns to control himself, in 
contrast to the slave, who needs a master" (1033).  Culture, in short, is reified as a realm in itself 
by capitalism which requires it to perform a primarily economic function to commodify the 
worker's subjectivity in accordance with the needs of production rather than being simply a 
political tool to create consensus for the existing order, for example.  The primary value of 
culture today is to foster diversity at the moment in capitalism when the socially necessary labor 
time needed to reproduce the relations of production has greatly decreased due to technical 
rationalization of the production process and the stimulation of needs — which function as the 
markers of cultural identity and the differences around which "culture wars" and "lifestyle" 
politics are formed — becomes an economic necessity because of the falling rate of profit 
produced by the increased economic efficiency in production.  It is in these global conditions of 
labor that culture comes to seem the source of wealth and labor itself is naturalized as a 
transhistorical creative force that all equally possess, rather than what it is: "a system of slavery" 
in which "the wage worker has permission… to live, only in so far as he works for a certain time 
gratis for the capitalist," a system that only "becomes more severe in proportion as the social 
productive forces of labour develop" (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program 535).    
Difference, the (a)logic of desire that drives the slippages of signification and undermines 
all fixed reference, is not the "law" of the singular whose unpredictable vacillations disrupt 
history as culturalist discourses represent it, but itself reflects in an ideologically inverted way 
the logic of the general economy. Deconstruction (which is the logic of culturalism) is in 
actuality a reflection of the "diversification of labor" (1028-34) that, as Marx explains, is brought 
about by the rising organic composition of capital driven by the law of value (profit 
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accumulation).  By making the singular the disruption of the historical and an excess of the 
social logic deconstruction places the singular beyond conceptuality and actually turns the 
singular into a stale generic ideology in support of what exists.  The singular is always tied to the 
transformations of the totality and the space of freedom it promises will only become real on a 
new basis in which labor is not exploited and the social logic is no longer production for profit 
but "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!" (Marx, Critique of the 
Gotha Programme). 
The cultural "resistance" within the circuits of exchange enshrined in cultural studies, 
which celebrates aesthetic values as a sign of spontaneity and the liberation from norms, is in 
actuality an index of the values of an older form of labor which have become unproductive to 
capital coming into conflict with the new terms of the more productive labor.  Take for example 
the way that Melville's Bartleby has become a folk-hero on the Left because the form of his 
refusal ("I would prefer not to") is read as a singular act of rebellion to the ruling order because it 
refuses not only to obey a command but also to provide a reason for refusal, as the lack of 
positive knowledge is considered to be what is singular about cyber-capitalism as a regime of 
writing (knowledge work).15  "Bartleby" has become a sign post in cultural theory for a new 
politics of a new capitalism in which wealth and inequality are made a matter of mind.  Whether 
understood thematically as simply a refusal of work (Negri), or, figuratively as a new form of 
praxis (Zizek, Agamben), Bartleby functions for the transpatriotic Left as a lexography in which 
capitalism has outlived its basic contradiction inscribed in wage-labor and has become the only 
basis of human freedom.  The celebration of cultural resistance in cultural studies is a form of 
romantic utopianism of a locally regulated capitalism, capitalism with a human face, that serves 
                                                 
15  Derrida, Negri, Zizek, Agamben, and Naomi Reed, to name just a few, give versions of this reading. 
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to disguise the needs of global capital in rationalizing labor through its production and 
development of the "free worker" who is economically compelled to cultivate her individuality 
or starve.  Cultural resistance displaces the agency workers only possess collectively in 
production in material antagonism with capital and replaces it with a bourgeois model of agency 
in the superstructure where agency seems a matter of the purely voluntary acts of individuals 
while in actuality the individual is only capable of putting already appropriated surplus-value in 
motion (i.e., exchanging wages for articles of consumption), subsequent to submitting to her own 
exploitation.   
Modern cultural theory since Kant has been concerned to liberate culture in terms of 
individual aesthetic sensibility from the "leveling" imperatives of the State on the one hand 
(hegemony) and the homogenous logic of the market on the other (commodification).  Culture 
was seen as an elusive middle term that because of the ambiguity of reference embodied in 
judgments of taste disrupted totalitarian regimes of signification as such, especially in the 
writings of the Frankfurt School which saw in the defamiliarizing effects of aesthetic discourse a 
form of resistance to the "instrumental reason" of "consumer capitalism" (Judith Grant, "The 
Cultural Turn in Marxism"). In the cultural theory of the generation of '68 that followed from the 
Birmingham school of cultural studies the project of aesthetic resistance was located in more 
popular forms and consumption in general was understood as the locus of resistance that 
promised the space of freedom.  Cultural studies understood "resistance" not only as a form of 
opposition to entrenched power but also as an attack on Marxism for its cultural "elitism," 
because its materialist critique of ideology is based on a positive knowledge of economic 
necessity lying outside the spontaneous experience of everyday life.  At the same time cultural 
studies is indebted to western marxism for its argument that culture has become the arena of 
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struggle in "consumer capitalism" which is seen as depending for its reproduction on inculcating 
certain values, such as productivity, calculability and legibility.  One of my arguments here is to 
distinguish an even earlier still materialist cultural studies in classical Marxism, which sees 
culture as an arena of class struggle and ideology critique as a means to wrest a realm of freedom 
from the grip of necessity, from a later cultural studies that understands capitalism as itself an 
effect of social struggles over values, critique is made the other of pleasure, and agency is 
understood as an individual aesthetic liberation from norms, rather than the economic freedom 
from necessity. My argument entails looking at how changing definitions of capitalism in 
cultural studies have explained the actual changes in capitalism throughout the twentieth century, 
from Marx, Lenin, Gramsci, Adorno, Jameson, Hall and beyond.  Broadly, there are two 
contrasting conceptions of capitalism in cultural studies:  
  
1) The first is Marxist in that it sees capitalism in terms outlined by Marx 
and Engels as based on the extraction of surplus-labor in production and 
culture as subsumed by capital and so functionally related to increasing 
profits, and  
  
2) the second is (small m) marxist and sees capitalism as universal 
alienation brought about by the tendency of capital to rationalize 
production and regulate people's lives, as Lukacs, Gramsci, Adorno, 
Benjamin, Jameson and Foucault argue. 
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The latter argument is culturalist in that in defines the social whole in relation to one of 
its parts (efficiency) and is therefore in its premises actually self-canceling in that it claims to be 
materialist and opposed to reification.  Furthermore, this culturalist position is utopian because it 
defines capitalism in spiritual terms, as the negation of spirit (culture) which it places in the zone 
of the autonomous, excessive, and incalculable.  This idealist utopianism actually unites the 
marxism of the Frankfurt School with the institutionalized discursive cultural studies of today 
despite the populist understanding of culture that has replaced the earlier aesthetic 
understandings of Lukacs, Adorno, and Benjamin, for example, that is usually taken to be the 
most important difference in cultural theory. The focus on culture as a self-acting cause that 
exceeds the (socio)logic of the real is itself a bourgeois ideology of culture meant to promote 
consumerism and counter falling profits.  The defense of such an ideological notion of culture in 
cultural studies in more or less populist language needs to be contrasted with the critique-al 
understanding of culture in classical Marxism which has always argued for a view of culture as a 
weapon in the class struggle and so has demonstrated, for example, what in Hegel, or, Balzac, or, 
Tolstoy, or, Kafka was progressive because it revealed how "consciousness must be explained 
from the contradictions of material life" (Marx Critique of Political Economy 21) and what was 
reactionary apologetics for exploitation because it maintains that it is "the ideological forms in 
which men become conscious… that determines their existence" (21).   
The assumptions of deconstruction have turned cultural studies from being a materialist 
critique that implicates knowledge into the political economy of the real to being an apologetics 
of inequality that makes knowledge the primary matter of society and underwrites the 
volunteerist subject of capital as, for example, in Derrida's insistence in his late texts that 
"language is no longer a region" and has "won the totality of space" (Taste for the Secret 80) that 
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provides the opportunity to force a "dislocation of the present, which renders the present non-
contemporary to itself" (7) by insuring a sense of "not-belonging" that  inaugurates a "democracy 
to come."  Although Derrida can be seen to be appealing to Benjamin's concept of "messianic 
time" which the latter had theorized as a necessary tactical maneuver "to blast open the 
continuum of history" (Benjamin 262) in the manner of "revolutionary classes at the moment of 
their action" ("Theses on the Philosophy of History" 261) at a time when the class struggle was 
more organized around State rivalries, Derrida's religious language is considered too alienating 
to be truly radical now and its premises have been updated in more recent cultural theory which 
has returned to the more revolutionary rhetoric of (small m) marxism as a corrective, as in the 
texts of Badiou, Agamben and Zizek.   
Agamben for example argues that Derrida's theory of language is too idealist as it takes 
language on its own terms and does not confront what is truly unsettling in the human experience 
of it. Agamben seems to understand a purely immanent theory of language to be an expression of 
"the experience of manufacturing work" (Infancy and History 105) and therefore conservative as 
it cannot produce the "authentic concept of historicity" (106) he takes to be "resolutely 
revolutionary" (111).  For Agamben the outside of language is not a "transcendental signified" 
within language that attempts to halt the play of signification and secure meaning, as Derrida 
argues, but "the experience of the difference between language and speech" (60) that "marks out 
the human from other living beings" (59) and "opens the space of history" (60).  By maintaining 
a semiotic concept of language indebted to Sausurre's general theory of it as la langue, a system 
of "differences without positive terms," Derrida, according to Agamben, reinscribes the Western 
metaphysical separation of language (culture) and humanity (nature) even as Derrida must 
assume that language constitutes the human rather than being the instrument of man who is its 
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origin, as in Aristotle for example.  According to Agamben linguistics "never arrives at a 
chronological beginning of language, an 'anterior' of language" (56) not because "there is no 
outside text" (Derrida), but because "it is a speaking man that we find in the world, a man 
speaking to another man, and it is language whereby man is defined as man" (56), and not 
because man is "an animal endowed with speech" (59), but rather because man is a being whose 
"nature means being always-already inside language" (59) experiencing the difference between 
language and speech "painfully" as "the inability… to take possession of his own historical 
nature" (109).  Agamben understands his linguistic theory as an historical materialist (99-115) 
one because it achieves "a more authentic concept of historicity" (106) by confronting "man's 
original historico-transcendental dimension" (60) as a being whose nature is constituted socially 
by being alienated in speech, but on his theory, as in Derrida's immanent theory of language, 
"any such [extra-linguistic] conception of the origin of language" such as labor is "fatuitous" 
(56).  And yet, the origin of speech is not auto-poesis, it does not lie in the use of language for its 
own sake, nor is it primarily for man's spiritual self-definition and realization as religious 
discourses maintain, because as Marx explains: 
 
Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by 
religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to 
distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to 
produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by 
their physical organisation. By producing their means of 
subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life. 
(The German Ideology 37) 
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Although, as Marx theorizes, "language is as old as consciousness" and "only arises from 
the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men" (49) this is the case because it is "practical 
consciousness," because it takes part in what he calls "the first historical act, … the production of 
material life itself " (47) through labor.  Agamben's "more authentic concept of historicity" is 
precisely one which depends on erasing from view the pre-historic and pre-linguistic dependence 
of humanity on nature, or, in other words, the co-existence of humanity and labor which 
necessitates language in the first place. His understanding that the difference between language 
and speech is "man's original historico-transcendental dimension" and a more authentic mode of 
being in the world that can be recaptured by philosophy in order to make history is not actually 
one proven by the "natural sciences themselves" (Infancy and History 56), as he claims, because 
it has nullified causality, the reliance on a notion of "a primary cause which separates in time a 
before and after" (56), and, rather, reaffirms experience (60).  By defining man as an entity who 
must experience his own being as a painful separation from nature due to speech, rather than a 
species-being that must (re)produce itself through the practical interaction with nature, Agamben 
defines humanity in terms of consciousness and makes man a spiritual being, as in religion. 
When Agamben therefore agues, following Benjamin, that a revolutionary theory of history 
consists precisely in the cancellation of time (99) and the recovery of meaning he is making 
praxis into an aesthetic act because the "continuous origin" (60) of man that constitutes the "first 
historical act" that "founds history" is understood as primarily undertaken for reasons of spiritual 
recovery rather than a material act of subsistence grounded in actual soico-historical conditions.  
Agamben's theory of language as the expropriation of experience that founds history as 
an alienated discourse has profound implications for grasping the present and made him a 
popular figure post 9/11.  Using Benjamin's argument that the "state of emergency" invoked by 
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sovereign power as a means to bolster its rule at times of crisis has made the suspension of law 
and rule by violence the norm of modern life, Agamben argues that the metaphysical separation 
of language and the authentic human experience of it extending in philosophy from Aristotle to 
Derrida has become the central political logic of society today that justifies a condition of "bare 
life" in which individuals "can be killed but not sacrificed," i.e., not killed according to legal 
norms which would give their deaths a ritual collective meaning (Homo Sacer).  Agamben is 
seen as a radical figure because of the way his theory, taking the US concentration camp at 
Guantanamo as a universal model, understands democracy as demanding a violent curtailment of 
freedom rather than providing for its realization because of how it normalizes the regulation of 
life and thus leaves it bereft of authentic experience and unique meaning.  But his theory of 
(bio)politics separates power entirely from class interests by considering politics purely from the 
point of view of how it gives us to understand the meaning of our lives (experience).  In 
consequence what is considered material in Agamben's theory is the experience of power rather 
than its objective causes.  Thus according to him, "politics is the sphere neither of an end in itself 
nor of means subordinated to an end; rather, it is the sphere of a pure mediality without end 
intended as the field of human action and of human thought" (Means without End 117).  
Agamben thus succeeds in making power an eternal fact of life, a medium to express human 
nature, rather than an historically developed means to impose class rule and normalize 
exploitation.  The result is that the sphere of human action and human thought is radically 
curtailed in his own theory in a way that accommodates itself to rather than challenges the status 
quo.  If power is the medium of human existence and its present expression is necessarily 
radically nihilistic because it projects its own operation onto nature and mortifies people's 
experience how is Agamben's own prescription that change comes about through a new 
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conception of power as "a sort of dispossession of the self" in which "your life becomes a work 
of art… without the artist" (Interview 21) a challenge to it?  The resignification of power as a 
self-creative act simply makes a virtue out of necessity through a trope, as religion has always 
done. "Bare life" is a condition of absolute dispossession that produces compensatory illusions of 
authentic being while negating a truly authentic life in the same way that for the bourgeois 
morality is always "higher" than mere survival demanding an indifference to it because 
inequality is a fact of life. The unsaid of course is that the moral view of life is a product of class 
relations in which the needs of the dominant class are met from the labor of others. 
Slavoj Zizek too has opposed deconstruction in the name of historical materialism 
while coming to exactly its same conclusions about the contemporary as a post-exploitative 
moment of freedom.  In his latest book (The Parallax View) for example he argues that 
différance now functions as a "neologism whose very notoriety obfuscates its unprecedended 
materialist potential" (11) to reveal the "minimal difference" (11) between the Symbolic edifice 
of cultural meanings and its foundation in the Real, "the hard bone of contention" (26) that 
constitutes a "fundamental social fact… that undermines every narrative solution" (19).  But in 
Zizek's psycho-marxist logic the Real is not a product of "collective praxis" (5), not, in other 
words, a matter of a "social antagonism ('class struggle')" that is "an effect of objective 
socioeconomic forces" (11).  Zizek argues it is necessary to "rehabilitate… dialectical 
materialism" (4) as the "philosophical underpinning of Marxism" (5) by rejecting "the 
philosophically naïve notion of thought as a reflection/mirroring of being (of 'independent 
objectively existing reality')" (6).  Rather he argues that "the gap between the individual and 
the… social is to be inscribed back within the individual himself: this objective arche of the 
social Substance exists only insofar as individuals treat it as such, relate to it as such" (6).  Why 
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Marxism has failed, according to Zizek, is because to "elevate society" into a "general ontology" 
(7) that explains thought as its "reflection" cannot explain the "negativity of thought" which he 
takes to be a "withdrawl into reflexive distance from being" (6).  Zizek's rehabilitated and more 
enlightened view of materialism it turns out basically amounts to the moral platitude that in the 
order of things the belly comes first and before we can address the big issues we must first take 
care of ourselves. He can only conceive of thought as a "withdrawl from being" or a naïve 
cofornisn to the "general ontology" and cannot conceive of an integrated human praxis in which 
thought arises out of objective conditions as their approximation and a guide for transformation.  
The result is catastrophic for Marxist theory because it turns a "radical intervention" (6) from 
being a critique of the "multitude of appearances" (26) that covers over the material roots of 
inequality so as to change it into a kind of moral sermon that provides an "infinite judgment" (5) 
on the present from a position which assumes "the speculative identity between the highest and 
the lowest" (5) and thus "cuts diagonally across all particular groups" (9).  And that sermon 
preaches that "the loss of substantial communal identities" (9) affects us all.  As with Derrida for 
whom theory "would at best reinforce incoherence" (A Taste for the Secret 13), for Zizek too it 
consists of "confronting a universality with its 'unbearable' example" (The Parallax View 13) on 
the assumption that the loss of meaning is more important today than losing one's means of 
subsistence by having one's life depend on working "for a certain time gratis for the capitalist" 
(Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program 535).  In other words, theory must be "ethical" on their 
view or it is nothing at all in a world in which nothing matters anymore anyway because what 
matters is finally what matters to "me."   
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4.2  LEARNING TO LIVE WITH CAPITALISM 
The cultural resistance enshired as agency in cultural studies has been practically co-opted by the 
market and not only functions as its ideological apology but also serves to maintain the level of 
profit by providing the consciousness skills for what have become vital technical innovations for 
capital, and for managing the consequent social displacements. The co-optation of cultural 
studies by the market which has made the project of ideology critique seem boring to its canonic 
defenders who want cultural studies to aestheticize the world for capital is more clearly evident 
still in the publication of such books as Everything Bad is Good For You (Steven Johnson) 
which simply bypass the radical lexicon of cultural theory and embrace the pleasure of 
consumption as a necessary skill for negotiating the cyber-culture of today.  In the popular idiom 
of self-help books, Johnson takes the themes of cultural studies such as how the singularly 
"overdetermined" nature of contemporary society exceeds the possibility of reliable knowledge 
(critique) and how "pleasure" is therefore an enabling cultural practice because it disrupts the 
dominant norms, and presents them as ready made cognitive skills available in popular culture 
(e.g., video games) that are tailor made for getting along in cyber-capitalism.   
Johnson is dismissive of cultural studies because he sees it as caught up with merely 
"symbolic" understandings of culture whereas culture on his understanding is like "man-made 
weather" — a kind of excretion produced by the biological (brain) and technological nexus of 
today's hi-tech capitalism.  Instead of investigating the unity of base and superstructure in which 
culture has a subordinate relation to the class structure he assumes an organic view of culture, 
ultimately indebted to Hegel, and posits their identity — culture thus "expresses" the kinds of 
ideas required by the social environment.  Such a view of course de-politicizes culture as an 
arena of conflicts, hence Johnson's assumption that culture is a matter of "competence" (skill) 
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without "ideology" (class). It should be pointed out that cultural studies itself opened the way to 
the total de-politicization of culture (the Oprahization of culture as therapy for getting along) by 
de-linking the superstructure from the base through "mediations" (the self-circling "complexity" 
of culture that has subsumed the social and canceled the opposition of nature and culture too in 
textuality).  Johnson's book sets up its terms for a therapeutic account of culture by dismissing 
critique as "moralizing" because it is obsessed with "meanings" (the message) and "progress" (or 
improvement) and therefore fails to realize that there are many truths, not just the logical kind, of 
which the most important of all is the "emotional intelligence" that is necessary for living in 
today's highly mediated world where it is not always possible to discern the meaning.  Given this 
thesis it of course should be expected that the book does not give a logically coherent narrative 
about the contemporary cultural moment but takes the form of outlining with bullet point clarity 
what it assumes are self-evident facts, such as:   
 
• Book learning and school are not as important as life experience and in 
some ways actually harmful because they are "outdated" and "moralizing" 
— i.e., they do not offer as many "choices" as popular culture and 
therefore do not offer as many opportunities to make decisions that 
exercise the brain and prepare it for today's complex social environment.   
 
• Knowledge should not have a necessary result that leads to decided 
conclusions about the way things should be because (a) the world is a 
complex place and it is not always possible to know, and, (b) admitting it 
is not always possible to know is a more trustworthy character trait and 
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therefore more persuasive (being persuasive is a necessary leadership skill 
in today's world).   
 
• Knowledge should be "pleasurable" — i.e., offer many opportunities for 
making choices rather than limiting them to the certain and familiar ones 
— because it stimulates the desire to learn (as brain scans have proven 
dopamine is released in the brain as a reward for cognitive effort).  
 
• Consuming popular culture is not mindless and unproductive 
entertainment therefore because it is actually performing a form of 
"intellectual work" in the way it challenges the mind to explore and 
familiarize itself with "complexity" (plurality and ambiguity).  
 
• Consuming popular culture — especially playing video games — will not 
make you a better person (nothing can guarantee that), but it will teach 
you basic things that are useful for managing the kinds of social 
interactions that are more and more required today, such as "problem 
solving" and "emotional intelligence." 
  
That such points are not as clear and coherent as they may appear becomes evident by 
teasing out some of their unspoken assumptions with a few sharp observations.  How is the 
argument that knowledge should be limited to getting along in the world as it is and not for 
"improving" it not itself a moral argument (and therefore outdated)?  If "intellectual work" is just 
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about learning how to "map" and "manage" with the world as it is and possesses the ubiquity of 
"man made weather," why must the knowledge for transforming the world be dismissed and 
excluded through such books as Everything Bad is Good For You?  Is complexity finally 
unknowable because it is not in our power to grasp it, or is this a rather simplistic view of both 
complexity and humanity (that one finds on soap operas)?  What about the ways humans 
ideologically "complexify" the world to subjugate others and the complex ways human labor has 
developed to interact with the natural world that prove scientific knowledge is emancipatory?  
What about the people who do not have access to the electronic culture of the West — is it their 
lot in life to serve the masters who do?  Or, is the focus on popular culture and the commitment 
to justify it as a necessary knowledge of the way the world really is itself a form of mystification, 
a comforting story the West tells about itself at a time when it is no longer economically 
competitive with the technologies of China and India, for example?  
Everything Bad is Good For You shows how culture has been implicated in the political 
economy of the real — not only theoretically but practically.  It has become corporatized as 
"emotional labor" and made necessary for realizing profit by normalizing consumption and has 
lost even the tinge of "resistance."  The incorporation of culture places the practices of cultural 
resistance in question as it reveals such values to be manufactured by the culture industry itself 
and in no way to be considered a threat to capitalism.  Everything Bad is Good For You is a 
cultural marker for the intellectual and political bankrupty of cultural studies which itself has 
abandoned even the pretence of resistance as "boring," and has embraced capitalism. The critique 
of cultural studies in class terms is today considered boring on the same logic as "everything bad 
is good for you" because cyber-capitalism has done away with a universal good (theory for social 
equality) by making ideology the meaning of life in a world that has abolished the line between 
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technology (culture) and biology (nature).  What this means is that ideology critique is more than 
ever necessary now to, among other things, uncover the ways in which the dominant try to 
dissimulate under an aesthetic ruse how the culturalist project to realize a society of equality 
within capitalism has failed and the discursive strategies of cultural studies are now more 
effectively taken up by the commodity. 
The reaction of cultural studies to its crisis of knowledge has been to make culture an 
ethical matter and under the guise of consideration for the practical consequences of cultural 
representations in the context of ongoing inequality to abandon any pretense of resistance as a 
"bad" elitist value because of its residual opposition to pleasure (consumption).  Take for 
example Jonathan Sterne's contribution to a recent anthology (The Aesthetics of Cultural 
Studies) in which he writes in tones of boredom about the sheer repetition of critiques about its 
market populism. Sterne sees cultural studies as caught up in debates over culture as "use" (a 
means to an end) versus culture as "pleasure" (an end in itself) that share a basic presupposition 
which has acquired the force of a dogma — that culture is at root a matter of production. He 
argues that insofar as cultural studies theorizes culture as contestation over the shape of the 
social, when it is not being politically instrumentalist in its readings of pleasure as ideology it is 
equally instrumentalist in its aesthetic use of pleasure as "resistance."  Freedom for Sterne, on the 
contrary, is said to reside in "feelings," which he takes to be the basis of a new aesthetics of 
"meanigless, nondirected activity" (99).  But Sterne shows no awareness of the fact that feelings 
have become incorporated as "emotional labor" and made instrumental for profit.  His own 
"articulation" of the relations between feelings and the social which seeks to defend feeling on its 
own terms is itself evidence of the political economy of feelings — feelings as a space of 
 252 
freedom for recuperation from work.16  Feelings as the zone of the private and the ultra of 
disinterested experience is, in other words, an effect of economics.  For all of Sterne's boredom 
with the materialist critique of cultural studies he fails to advance the issue because he does not 
himself inquire into the contestations over "production" he claims are paramount — his own 
notion of the sheer pleasure of having feelings is as a result equally instrumentalist in its contrast 
to work as the paradigm of "production" he complains about.17 
                                                 
16 Stern argues that cultural studies can no longer expect students or citizens to engage in critique because 
they are too exhausted by work:   
 
"One reason that Americans watch so much TV is that it’s easy to do after a long and draining day or work.  Instead 
of criticizing the paucity of leisure time left over after the ever-extending workday…Budd, Entman, and Stienman 
want to put their subjects right back to work for social change.  Sure, that would be nice, but I suspect that many of 
their subjects are tired and drained, and not particularly in the mood to foment revolution in their sparse evening 
hours.  Though Fiske has given up on significant social changes, he at least builds affect into his theory of culture: 
people watch TV or listen to music because it brings them pleasure.  Given that so many people hate their jobs, we 
ought to take that seriously.  To take it seriously, we need to treat “doing nothing” as a worthwhile practice in itself" 
(97).  
 
17 Janice Peck also concludes that cultural studies suffers from an unquestioned "economism" despite its 
own opposition to the base/superstructure theory of classical Marxism most notably in the writings of Stuart Hall. 
She argues that cultural studies has separated culture from production to such an extent that it is unable to question 
the economic function of culture and so reproduces its logic in a reified form by treating culture as a thing in itself 
that determines society independently of social agency.  It is interesting as well as indicative of the state of cultural 
studies that while Sterne complains of the "instrumentalism" of cultural studies which he seems to see as a form of 
economism, Peck takes issue with its lack of economics and how this carries an economist presupposition about the 
affectivity of culture.  Peck however goes back to Williams' account of mode of production as a corrective to the 
culturalism of cultural studies, which is to say she goes back to the very texts that have discredited base and 
superstructure as "economism" in the Birmingham school of cultural studies.   
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Production is the "paradigm" of culture in materialist cultural theory not because culture 
is the locus of effectivity as in pragmatism, or, the site of work itself as in cyber-labor discourses 
about "emotional labor" being "creative"; the question of whether culture is useful or valuable in 
itself is already a highly reified understanding of culture which takes what is a social matter of 
the level of class antagonism and turns it into a subjective question of whether individuals 
engage in cultural activities because they want to realize an end or not, as in Miller's opposition 
of "mimetic" communities which seek to describe and/or critique and "performative" 
communities.  Such a moral understanding of culture assumes that individuals are something 
independent of culture, something material in themselves, because of the opacity of their desires. 
But the individual only exists in and because of a culture which in turn embodies the values that 
reflect the existing social conditions of production and the conflicts over it. Culture and the 
individual are co-extensive with production and only have their existence in it. The separation of 
the individual as a model of agency from the social as a whole is a purely speculative abstraction, 
undertaken in Sterne's case to "resist" the paradigm of production ("instrumentality"). And yet, 
this abstraction is also a real one necessitated by the social relations — what is outside work is 
structurally determined to be the zone of the private and individual because it is the site for the 
private reproduction and consumption of labor power under capitalism.  Production is the 
"paradigm" of materialist cultural theory because culture has become primarily an economic 
matter and instrumental to profit accumulation.  Without such knowledge of what is it is 
impossible to change it.  
Without an understanding of the labor relations which shape contemporary culture 
student-citizen-workers are inculcated in the regime of immediacy that cyber-culture instantiates 
in which it is assumed that the subject is essentially a consumer who interacts with the real 
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merely through signs and images and that the real itself has become virtual.  An education in 
cyber-culture should rather enable the student to question such immediacy and what is being sold 
as agency and literacy — such an understanding from outside the immediate has always been the 
goal of the humanities and it is fundamentally put in question in contemporary cultural studies 
and cyber-culture discourse. 
Contemporary culture demands to be analyzed, not pragmatically within the terms of 
culture itself — which are actually the terms of empiricism and cognitive psychology more or 
less under the cloak of poststructuralist theory masquerading as cultural theory today — but 
analyzed conceptually so that its own terms are explained by re-situating them from the ground 
up (class).  The problem with existing accounts of culture is that even the criticisms accept the 
fundamental premise of cyber-culture as a "new" phenomenon that causes the changes we 
experience every day and thereby maintains the social alienation of labor which is actually at the 
root of the rapid technological innovations and the reified thinking of them.  Cultural studies 
today ontologizes its own categories and takes what are primarily epistemological ways of 
discussing technology (for its impact on "how" meaning is constructed) as the limit of the real as 
such because of the supposed centrality of information technologies to cyber-capitalism.  There 
is then no "outside" to cyber-capitalism because any outside presupposes "mediation," which is 
seen as central to the reigning cyber-culture.  What this story leaves out of account is the 
question: How did mediation become the universal law of motion of human societies in the first 
place?  There is a difference after all between the local and concrete use of information for some 
particular end and the abstract universal requirement of information for society as such.  How did 
society itself come to depend on information?  Cyber-culture discourse for the most part assumes 
that information and society are synonymous (there is no outside) and thereby conflates social 
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relations with exchanges of "meaning."  This means that it takes information exchange as the 
primary form of activity that constitutes society.  But, how are "meanings" more important than 
material survival?  One answer is that work has become knowledge (Negri), a "creative" force 
that is therefore central to constituting society.  Another is that "knowledge work" is more 
important than "manual" work because it has taken over the whole of society.  But it does 
nothing to further our understanding of contemporary cyber-culture to see "cognitive work" 
as "productive labor" on the argument that technological efficiency makes necessary labor a 
minimal part of the workday (as neo-marxists like Negri, Read, and Witherford argue).  Rather, 
what this does is make it impossible to see culture in terms other than what are necessary for 
capital. The forms of "cognitive work" Johnson takes to be central to society, which are simply 
managerial skills, are actually unproductive forms of labor (circulatory activities) and to consider 
them "creative" of a new sociality, as Hardt and Negri do, is simply to mystify the dominant 
social arrangements which require a "free worker" who feels responsible to his wants and 
experiences his slavery to capital intimately as self-preservation.  The productive intellectual 
labor is actually that which increases surplus-value by reducing the necessary labor time required 
to reproduce the worker (i.e., lowers wage costs).  This labor requires as a consequence of its 
reproduction the "diversification" of needs which workers are forced to acquire to remain 
competitive on the market.  What Johnson claims is an "environmental" incentive whereby 
technological changes trigger chemical reactions in the organism (dopamine) is in actuality "the 
silent compulsion of economic relations" (Marx Capital 1, 899) whereby the law of value (profit 
accumulation) demands that workers increase their consumption while decreasing the cost of 
their labor — "intellectual labor" and "cognitive work" are what this more rationalized form of 
exploitation is called in which the worker is "more violently exploited" (Marx).  Current 
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discussions of cyber-culture all assume that work is the primary activity of society as if 
the purpose of life itself were wage-labor.  Their solution to wage-labor is to re-value work as 
"creative" and aestheticize culture as so "ambiguous" and complex as to defy any "outside" 
understanding.  But how did work (utilitarian practices) become the universal form of all 
practice?  In other words, such accounts of contemporary culture beg the question how are non-
utilitarian (emancipatory) concepts of culture and work materially possible given the universality 
of "knowledge work" as the end of human society?  Marx's answer depends on understanding the 
transformation of nature by labor: an "outside" to labor that changes it.  What is missing in 
cyber-culture discourse is an account of the self-negation of the new cyber work-culture — of 
how cyber work-culture produces its own negation in the form of the revolutionary proletariat 
whose work does not meet its needs and indeed serves to brutally curtail them thus necessitating 
an ideology critique of culture that furthers the collective project of overthrowing capitalism 
(socialism).  
4.3 CULTURE AS ALIENATED LABOR 
A real positive account of cyber-culture would re-understand contemporary culture as 
itself a "social project" alienated from itself — cyber-culture as alienated and exploited labor.  
Cyber-culture has produced new ways of interacting with nature that allows greater control over 
it and that changes how we think about our own humanity — just look at the bio-tech industry.  
But these new powers and needs have been formed under the economic coercion of capitalism in 
which everything is made to serve profit rather than human emancipation.  It is the enslavement 
of culture to capital that produces the cyber-culture discourse in which technology is given a 
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spiritual value as "creative labor" to compensate for social alienation.  A materialist account of 
cyber-culture on the contrary is not dismissive of it in the way that "positivist" accounts of it are 
— which assume cyber-culture represents the "new" which cancels history — because it 
understands culture as the subjective side of the labor process that perfoms certain ideological 
work (to "invert" the material conditions and make them appear to be mental).  Cyber-culture 
does the ideological work of capital but not by simply asserting "what is" as what "ought to be".  
Rather it sutures "what is" to "what ought to be" through the mediation of a discourse about 
technology having the utopic power to realize our hopes and dreams on the assumption that the 
socially democratic project of Marxism has failed.   
Thinking of cyber-culture as alienated and estranged labor raises some difficulties of 
course.  The first may be described as a thematic one in that cyber-culture itself includes the 
discourse of alienation but reunderstands it as basically a cognitive matter — the subject as 
alienated from herself, the loss of personality (Momento, The Matrix, etc.), or, in more popular 
discourses, alienation from the "love," "security," etc. offered by "community" (which new 
technologies of the self will suture — The Notebook, Erin Brockovich, e.g.). In this way cyber-
culture naturalizes alienation as a fact of life and proposes itself as a spiritual or therepuetic 
solution.  The "new" cyber-culture in fact re-installs some very "old" ideas in this way of 
addressing the cultural effects of capitalist exploitation rather than its causes in the division of 
labor.   
Take the crisis of the humanities as an example.  In cyber-culture discourses (Bill 
Readings, J. Hillis Miller, Negri, et. al.) the crisis of the humanities is considered a result of 
purely demographic and spatial changes brought about by a new technological proximity to the 
other that calls patriotic intelligibilities into question.  On this account, the existing hegemon is 
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thought to depend on a certain regime of discourse which installs an imaginary distance from the 
real (mimesis) that allows him to manipulate it and so dominate those who do not 
posses the privilege of distance.  Cyber-culture, it is argued, calls this subject in question by 
collapsing the illusion of distance and levelling all discourses so that none are seen to offer a 
privileged relation to the real but rather the real is seen to be a performative construct open to 
multiple configurations.  It is by embracing rather than oppossing the cyber-culture that the 
humanities will prove its value in the "new" world here.  This discourse assumes that the role of 
the humanities is basically conservative rather than critique-al — to construct a new hegemonic 
subject that assents to the dominant regime as his own creation rather than experiencing it as a 
foreign imposition.  But the shift from considering the real as objective reality to performative 
effect abolishes the outside (revolution) and thus manufactures consent for what exists.  By 
abolishing a critique-al outside  the liberal pluralist humanities (which supports the status quo) is 
rescued from the critique-al humanities.  My point here is to emphasize how the "positivist" 
account of cyber-culture which is given the power of determination spontaneously through its 
sheer hegemony must "naturalize" in its conclusions that which it "negates" in its technological 
premises in the manner of deconstruction and so reproduces a very old story about "what is" as 
impossible to change (for what are assumed to be ethical, spiritual, etc. reasons) – that capitalist 
hegemony is essential to humanity.   
More important than the thematic problem of seeing culture as alienated and estranged 
labor at a time of global commodification is the conceptual problem in that it seems to assume 
labor as a transhistorical ontological reality that resists change when in actuality labor itself is 
alienated social praxis.   
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In a world where humanity has mastered the productive forces of nature so as to meet its 
needs the concept of labor as essential to humanity loses its meaning because human need will 
no longer be limited by its given natural requirements but will itself become a productive force. 
In other words, freed from the conditions of necessity that compel humanity to expend its 
energies in laboring activities these energies will be primarily expended in the transformation 
and expansion of needs through new social combinations.  
The cyber-culture of today produced by the highly globalized production system is 
transforming the senses and necessitating a global awareness that is highly distorted by 
bourgeois ideology and private property.  In cyber-culture capital is seen as the sole productive 
force and given highly symbolic meanings and quasi mystical status as "creative labor" and so on 
while the impoverishment of the working class is disappeared. 
It is not new technolgies that are producing a "ghostly proximity" that has changed the 
traditional senses (from mimesis to spectrality) but the new transnational relations of labor that 
are doing so and necessitationg what Marx and Engels in The German Ideology call "communist 
consciousness," which is an awareness of the need to abolish labor in a world in which it has 
become the only mode of life.   
 Cultural theory today is in awe of the creative power of labor but it has nothing to say 
about the brutal reality of the workers whose mode of life it is.  The "end of work" is the "ideal" 
of cyber-culture in which cultural theory has turned into an "idea" about how work has become 
creative because of newer technology and that therefore capitalism does not need to be 
overthrown.    
 260 
What is needed now is the communist consciousness that the global power of capital is 
producing an international revolutionary class unified by their conditions of life and the ideal that 
it is necessary to change it.     
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